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The rise of the Neo-Schumpeterian economic thought in the economic 
development theories in the last two decades put the National Innovation 
Systems (NIS) approach to the agenda of developing countries.  However, a 
proper consideration should be placed on the external and internal factors that 
affect the any given country’s capacity in adapting the proposed innovation 
policies.  Thus, the formal innovation systems approach should be incorporated 
more directly with the studies on the social dimensions of the transition to new 
knowledge society without being trapped into technological determinism of the 
neo-Schumpeterian approach. 
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CHAPTER 1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Research  Background 
This thesis examines the global processes that generate national 
systems of innovation and more particularly the effects of privatization on 
technological development in the Turkish telecommunications industry 
considered as an integral part of Turkey’s national system of innovation. It will 
use a systematic and in-depth research approach to investigate whether 
technological capabilities have been positively affected by the buy-off of public 
shares by multinational telecommunications equipment companies in the mid-
1990s. The discussion focus then shifts to consider the manner and extent to 
which the national system of innovation approach properly applies to developing 
countries like Turkey by analyzing changes in characteristics of production as 
well as in research and development activities (R&D) in selected Turkish 
telecommunications equipment companies. 
Since the late 1980s, learning and innovation have caught the attention 
of an increasing number of researchers and policymakers; this interest is fueled 
in part by the advent of what has been termed the “knowledge-based” (OECD, 
1997a) or “learning-based” economy (Lundvall and Borras, 1997; Lundvall and 
Johnson, 1994), Theories of economic development have accordingly changed 
their focus from capital accumulation to knowledge accumulation. If we frame 
world history as a transition from agrarian to industrial societies, what we now 
call developing countries have found it difficult to move along the road to 
industrialization; consequently, the expansion of the industrial West has been for 
them a source of subordination, and so they have become in fact not developing 
but underdeveloped countries. Today, as we are becoming a knowledge-based 
society, the economies of developed countries are solidly based on science, 
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technology, innovation, and advanced education. Developing countries comprise 
the rest of the world, and they have been unable to use knowledge—its 
generation, transmission and application—as a fundamental tool for economic 
growth and social improvement. 
In the so-called golden age of development, the decades following 
World War II, great hopes arose from a succession of strategies that were 
proposed to accomplish the industrialization of underdeveloped countries. The 
various proposals offered differing accounts of the prime motor of development, 
but the existence of a single such factor was a simplifying common assumption; 
thus, all such proposed approaches are properly seen as “monist” approaches, or 
models, in a strict sense of the term. Disappointment with the slow pace of 
development, which covered almost all the developing world during the 1980s, 
has been accompanied by a sterile debate between proponents of state-centered 
and market-centered models. The failure of state-centered models was followed 
(perhaps predictably) by the failure of market-centered models. To be sure, some 
successful growth-generating processes have occurred, but apparently without 
following either of the aforementioned models. 
 
1.2 Main Objectives 
This research aims to explore the organization of innovation-related 
activities in the process through which countries like Turkey undergo economic 
and social development. Particular attention is given to conditions in the local 
telecommunications industry and to the state of existing national 
telecommunications services in creating a technological foundation conducive to 
the flourishing of the national system of innovation in Turkey. Following the 
innovation systems literature in general, the research analyzes structural changes 
in the technological capabilities of the Turkish telecommunications industry by 
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assuming that general conditions in the sectoral innovation system of the 
telecommunications industry are closely related to conditions in the Turkish 
national system of innovation. The research therefore addresses changes at both 
the sectoral and national levels. 
The thesis also considers the effects of globalization on the 
development of innovative capacity in Turkey and in other countries with 
similar development backgrounds. By revealing differences between those 
countries that have succeeded in climbing the development ladder in recent 
years, this thesis will illustrate the main arguments behind the national 
innovation systems approach and defend its applicability to Turkey in light of 
recent economic and technological developments. 
The telecommunications sector, through major contributions to R&D, 
has become an important source of technological advancements. In recent 
globalization debates, the telecommunications sector as a whole has played one 
of the most important roles in intensifying the transmission of data at 
unprecedented rates. However, such rapid developments in the 
telecommunications sector, and similar developments that have occurred in 
other high-tech sectors, have not brought about the expected technological 
advantages in countries that have been unable to accumulate basic innovation 
capacities. 
The central argument seems to be that what works in the developed 
countries should also work in developing countries. The national innovation 
systems approach has been greatly emphasized in explaining recent economic 
development in post-industrialized countries. These success stories and 
institutional recipes have therefore been made into blueprints for development 
through technological advancement for countries that are at relatively lower 
levels of economic development. The rise of a national innovation system and 
  3 
the development of innovative capacity more generally are not, however, 
processes that play out independently of the structure of a country’s political 
economy, which is shaped by domestic and international forces. It is obvious 
that, for the last two decades, global flows of capital, labor, and technology have 
not followed a pattern of equal distribution in terms of choosing countries in 
which to settle or ways of conducting business. It is necessary, therefore, before 
generalizing to a universal recipe for development, to explore the unique factual 
conditions pertaining to each individual country. Thus the main objective of this 
research is supported by the next question: How does the national systems of 
innovation approach apply to conditions that characterize innovative capacity in 
the telecommunications sector in Turkey? In addition, if there is a link between 
the Turkish national system of innovation and the telecommunications sector, 
what has the Turkish telecommunications sector contributed to the Turkish 
system of innovation to date? 
One question that arises immediately when studying national systems 
of innovation and the applicability of the national systems of innovation 
approach to the telecommunications sector in Turkey is whether there are 
efficient public and private agents to support the system in terms of transferring 
new capabilities in process and product innovations. In addressing both sides, 
the present research gives more emphasis to private sector agents who, similarly 
to their counterparts in other developing countries, are responsible for the 
majority of the innovation activities. Several questions arise in considering 
whether private agents in the sector (henceforth called ‘companies’) have been 
the source of Turkey’s innovation capacity: 
•  What are the main contributions of the sample companies to the 
telecommunications industry in Turkey? 
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•  How does globalization affect the performance of these companies in 
terms of R&D in process and product development? 
After answering these questions, a detailed examination of the Turkish 
national innovation system is initiated by describing the development of the 
industrial structure in general. A more detailed investigation of the electronics 
and telecommunications sectors follows this section. Here the following 
questions are addressed: 
•  What are the main characteristics of the industrial structure in Turkey? 
•  What are the historical roots of present conditions characterizing 
industrial capabilities in general? 
•  What are the main characteristics of the telecommunications sector in 
Turkey? 
•  Is there a relationship between company ownership status and their R&D 
and innovative capabilities? 
Answering these questions will lead us to examine features of the 
national innovation system in Turkey and its relationship with the 
telecommunications sector in the special case of interaction for the purpose of 
innovation between firms and institutions. These additional questions arise: 
•  Is there a national innovation systems approach in Turkey? 
•  What are the policy implications for better interactions between the 
innovation structure and the telecommunications sector? 
To answer these questions, two international telecommunications 
equipment companies located in Istanbul have been chosen on the basis of their 
relatively longer presence in the Turkish market and their strong ties to 
homeland companies in North America and Europe. Additionally, these two 
companies share Turkish-majority ownership in their background. Another 
similarity between the companies is their attitude toward advancements in 
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telecommunications technology. In the recent past, at least until the mid-1990s, 
these companies had relatively intensive R&D organizations as in-company 
establishments. 
 
1.3 Understanding the Limitations of the NIS approach in Developing 
Countries 
The research found, in brief, that the innovative capacity of the 
telecommunications industry in Turkey has been negatively affected by the 
recent privatization and liberalization processes. With the gradual changes in 
ownership status following privatization, the case study firms have been 
integrated into the global R&D network that includes their respective parent 
companies and, excepting some defense-related projects, they have ceased 
conducting independent research for new product and process innovations. 
Major changes have also occurred in the employment structures and 
main activities of the R&D departments. Even though both companies 
underwent major restructuring in their company organizations following 
privatization, the total number of employees in both R&D departments remained 
at almost the same levels; in one cases it amounted to one-third of total 
employment. This favorable climate for R&D employment was not, however, 
directly related to the intensity of innovative activities. Instead, it was the result 
of increasing software development activity and the application of consumer-
oriented problem-solving tasks that contained no formal R&D activities but 
rather application-specific developments and solutions. Thus, in addition to 
engineers, many business graduates have been employed in the R&D 
departments since the re-organization of the firms. 
The changing trajectory of telecommunications technology has also 
contributed to the reorganization of innovative activities in the sector. Through 
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the convergence of telecommunications and computer technologies the info-
communications market came to dominate the equipment sector, while software 
development subsequently occupied R&D departments as a core activity. Then, 
as the combined costs of corporate R&D expenditures on equipment 
technologies began to threaten profit structures after the telecom burst of the late 
1990s, many global telecommunications companies relocated their product 
R&D departments to low-wage countries in order to stay competitive. 
The most important consequence of the above-mentioned 
developments in the sector was the break-up of the innovation system in which 
the Turkish PTT (the postal system), universities, the Turkish Army, and the 
case study companies once interacted as major players. Between the early 1960s 
and the late 1990s, the monopoly service provider PTT, employing 
differentiated procurement policies, stimulated domestic firms into developing 
technologies needed for the expansion of telecommunication networks and 
services. The R&D departments in this period acted as direct contributors to the 
creation of value for the public by conducting research on both new technologies 
and the adaptation of existing technologies to country-specific conditions. This 
generated substantial accumulation of capability in telecommunications-related 
technology fields and enabled the case study firms to develop important 
defense-related projects independently. Yet even though one of the case study 
companies kept its defense-related R&D unit alive, no further projects were 
considered for implementation. 
The research also found that no effective national science and 
technology policy that would increase the level of innovative activities has 
occurred in Turkey, largely due to inadequate commitment on the part of 
successive political regimes. None of the various science and technology 
policies that have been implemented over the past five decades has met its 
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target. Irregularities in the allocation of financial resources and unwillingness on 
the part of established authorities to accept new institutional arrangements have 
been the major causes. 
The evaluation of the case study companies shows that applying the 
national innovation systems approach to developing countries produces mixed 
results. On the bright side, a developing country may excel in a specific 
technological field by narrowing its focus and ignoring others where it lacks the 
resources to succeed. For this purpose a closed innovation system with all its 
components might be protected from global rules governing certain specific 
fields like nuclear energy and its variations. On the darker side, however, several 
limitations challenge the application of the national innovation systems 
approach to developing countries. First, the innovation systems concept still 
relies primarily on the history of development in Western capitalist countries to 
inform its ideal institutional model. Yet even among the most industrially 
advanced countries there are important differences in the organizational 
structures that are set up for innovation. For example, while Germany has, since 
World War II, excelled in making incremental innovations in durable materials, 
the United States have been successful in producing breakthrough innovations in 
industries with products having very short lives and very complex technologies 
(Hollingsworth, 2000: 627). Thus the organization of the social system of 
production is important in determining the desired outcome with regards to 
innovation as well. 
Second, the expansion of neo-liberal policies on a global scale can 
actually hinder a developing country when it is implementing a national 
innovation system across important sectors. In order to increase the efficiency of 
public assets or to ease the chronic balance of payments problem, strategic 
resources may fall prey to market-friendly policies. 
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Third, the innovation systems approach requires a well shaped 
policymaking organization with expertise in basic social and economic fields 
such as education, finance, and political participation. Developing countries 
perform substantially worse in this respect than developed countries; they must 
therefore design innovation systems policy in accordance with local resources 
and social endowments. 
 
1.4 Research Design and Method of Analysis 
1.4.1 Theoretical Framework 
In analyzing the evolution and present condition of the Turkish 
telecommunications equipment industry as one of many sources of national 
innovation capacity, I draw primarily from two bodies of literature in 
development studies: evolutionary economics and the national innovation 
systems approach. In response to the shortcomings of the orthodox neo-classical 
approach, evolutionary economics accounts for divergent economic trajectories. 
In contrast to neo-classical assumptions, in evolutionary economics not all 
actors in the field are perfectly informed about economic opportunities and risks, 
nor are all goods and services optimally allocated. Thus, actors’ choices are 
conditioned by the broader socio-economic institutional settings within which 
they operate. In addition to considering the tendency of evolutionary economics 
to regard social and economic institutions as determinist sources in driving the 
economic trajectory, I approach the emergence of institutions in a critical sense 
by accepting the historical conditions affecting the broader environment in 
which those institutions operate. Consequently, by analyzing the institutional 
structure in this way I find that, rather than leading to optimal allocation of 
goods and economic convergence, the choices may result in sub-optimal 
allocations while creating divergent outcomes. 
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The principles of evolutionary economics can be applied to firm-level 
analysis by adapting the innovation systems literature. The literature is 
concerned with identifying factors on the national or sub-national scale that 
influence a firm’s capacity to innovate. Those factors can include the presence 
of key organizations (such as educational and research centers, financial/lending 
services, competing and complementary firms), the nature of relations between 
and among those organizations, as well as the institutions that shape those 
relations (Rantisi, 2002: 7). 
Since the telecommunications sector has undergone extraordinarily 
rapid change over the past two decades, it has become an essential sector in 
information exchanges at the global level. Following a severe crisis in the late 
1990s, telecommunications equipment has emerged as a strategic sector, with 
telephony, Internet, mobile application, and media services depending 
increasingly on national and global telecommunication infrastructures. 
Therefore, an objective of this dissertation is to assess the extent to which the 
Turkish telecommunications equipment sector serves as a source for the national 
innovation system in Turkey. 
 
1.4.2 Methodological Approach 
In this thesis I use the case study method to analyze historical change, 
key actors, and their inter-relationships in the telecommunications equipment 
sector. The case study method is the preferred research strategy when “how” and 
“why” questions are being posed and the focus is on a contemporary 
phenomenon (Yin, 1994). This method relies on “multiple sources of evidence, 
with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion . . . [and on] the prior 
development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis” 
(Yin, 1994: 13). 
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In order to ensure the reliability of data, a diversity of information 
sources is employed. I use both primary and secondary information as data 
sources. Primary sources include: 
•  Government publications: State Statistics Institute of the Republic of 
Turkey, foreign trade statistics, research and development statistics, 
industrial production statistics, telecommunication statistics 
•  International sources: OECD Communication Reports and OECD 
Science and Technology Outlook 
•  Biographies of key industry actors 
Secondary sources include: 
•  Annual Almanacs of the Turkish Electronic Industrialists Association 
•  Academic journals, books, and unpublished theses 
•  Union and trade association reports 
To ensure the reliability of the information reported by any one of 
these sources, the data were compared for consistency with other available 
published sources, and with other complementary sources of primary 
information generated through semi-structured interviews during my fieldwork 
research. The interview method is a valuable technique for analyzing economic 
activity because it provides the testimony of key participants who are involved 
in complex processes and whose motivations cannot be revealed through 
quantitative techniques (Schoenberger, 1991). For example, in comparing the 
technological capabilities and level of innovative research of two companies, a 
comparatively greater number of engineers employed in one of the companies 
might indicate a competitive advantage. 
For this thesis, I conducted several semi-structured interviews with 
persons from selected telecommunications companies who were able to provide 
information about both the technological and managerial policies of their 
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respective companies. In addition to members of telecommunications 
companies, I interviewed representatives from government departments, trade 
unions, and related associations.   
The interviews were conducted in the periods of June - September, 
2000 and January - March 2005. They were conducted face-to-face and the 
interviewees were encouraged to speak freely for an hour on average. The 
purpose of the interviews was explained to respondents as being twofold: First, 
to reveal the technological capability of the firm and the economic returns of 
these capabilities; second, to determine the effects of recent globalization and 
privatization on those capabilities. For these purposes, questions were asked 
about five topics, as follows: 
•  General characteristics of the firm. General information about the firm’s 
economic activity such as annual production, R&D expenses, total 
number of employees, investments, and net profit. Some information in 
this section was also obtained from annual reports of the firms. 
•  The source of the technological capabilities obtained during the firm’s 
start-up phase. Start-up technology sources include technology transfer, 
turn-key projects, and joint venture agreements. It is important to reveal 
the mode of the technology entry to assess the firm’s historical capacity 
to assimilate and diffuse this technology. 
•  The level of the technological capacity of the firm. Delineation of the 
current state of the firm’s efforts in new technology development and its 
capacity to innovate in terms of new products and processes on the basis 
of acquired technology over time are the main objectives of the questions 
pertaining to this topic. 
•  The consequences of privatization on the local research and 
development activities of the firms. The firm-specific consequences of 
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privatization and organization of research and development in the new 
international division of labor within the multinational company are 
deliberated under this subject. 
•  The economic and social returns of the technological capabilities at both 
the sectoral and national levels. What are the firm-level contributions in 
terms of technological innovation efforts to the Turkish 
telecommunications sector? What is the nature and level of collaboration 
with other institutions (e.g. research groups, universities, trade unions, 
and other companies)? 
A sample of the interview guide used for Turkish telecommunications 
equipment sector professionals is included as Appendix. 
 
1.4.3 Selection of Case Studies 
Two companies were selected for the case study portion of this thesis. 
In the selection of these firms, criteria designed to enhance the credibility of the 
research were utilized. I considered relative market share, number of employees, 
and relative R&D intensity when evaluating company activities in the 
telecommunications equipment sector. As of 2000, the two selected companies 
represented 60% of total sales in the sector and about 30% of total employees. 
Another important criterion was having a foreign partnership in 
technology development at start-up or during the immediately following years. 
One of the selected companies had foreign capital shares during their start-up 
phase, while the second one was initially started as a wholly-owned Turkish 
company. Both companies became foreign-owned firms, however, after their 
partial privatization in the early 1990s. 
The intensity of research and development activity is the last criterion 
that was considered as characteristic of a technology-driven firm. All the 
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companies studied were set up with extensive R&D departments in their initial 
establishment period. In addition to the existence of separate departments 
devoted to corporate R&D, substantial quantities of both capital and labor 
resources have been devoted to technology development in the two selected 
companies, comprising on average around 7 to 10% of total sales and around 
10% of total employees. 
 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 2 includes background 
and a theoretical frame of reference. It stresses the presentation of different 
definitions and concepts regarding innovation, knowledge creation, and 
innovation networks. It also includes a discussion of the conceptual and 
theoretical foundations of the national innovation systems approach. In 
particular, an attempt is made to explain the nature and functioning of an 
innovation system. This part of the thesis is intended to serve as a foundation for 
the remainder of the work, leading to further discussion of the link between 
innovation and the political economy of developing countries. 
Chapter 3 paints the background against which the development of the 
global as well as Turkish telecommunications sectors is laid out. The first part of 
the chapter offers a summary of recent developments in the global 
telecommunications sector to help assess current conditions in Turkey. The 
second part of the chapter emphasizes the industrial development model and 
major developments in the telecommunications sector in different phases of the 
modern Turkish state following the First World War. This section argues that, in 
the Turkish case, contemporary conditions in the sector are closely related to the 
dependent nature of industrial and technological structures. 
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Chapter 4 provides the detailed documentation of the case studies that I 
have chosen for the thesis. As case studies, two multinational 
telecommunications equipment companies have been selected for their 
performances and related technology policies. 
Chapter 5 addresses national innovation system efforts in Turkey and 
their connections with the telecommunications sector. This chapter aims to 
investigate the present conditions in the telecommunications sector and 
limitations in developing a national innovation structure and indigenous 
technology. 
Chapter 6 reviews and discusses the findings of the thesis and suggests 
future directions for related research. Among the more interesting findings is 
that globalization has created a disadvantage for developing countries seeking to 
establish national systems of innovation, and that R&D work in the 
telecommunications equipment sector focuses primarily now on software 
development because most of the equipment depends on software support to 
function. Finally, Turkey faces a number of obstacles to the development of a 
robust national system of innovation, including political events and balance-of-
payment shortfalls that typify the experience of developing countries. 
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CHAPTER 2.0 INNOVATION AND DEVELOPMENTAL DYNAMICS: 
SYSTEMS OF INNOVATION 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter features a review of the innovation systems literature in 
order to conceptualize recent debates on the effects of innovation theories on 
development economics. Particular attention is devoted to explicating the 
national innovation systems approach and the role of government policies in 
supporting systems of innovation in developing countries. Even though 
innovation theory in developmental economics does not differentiate developed 
from developing countries in its proposed recipes, some recent studies have 
addressed difficulties in applying the innovations systems approach to 
developing countries (Mani and Romijn, 2004; Dantas, 2005; Ahrens, 2005). 
The main argument in these studies focuses on the capacity of subject countries 
to apply predetermined rules designed to increase the absorptive capacity needed 
to foster technological capabilities in various sectors. Even though the ability of 
a state apparatus to execute autonomous policies in a developing country is 
subject to limitations posed by the market-friendly approaches of neo-liberal 
politics, the state apparatus in these studies was seen as the key actor in a 
process through which relevant policies are formulated and implemented to 
cultivate technological capacity. However, particularly in high-technology 
sectors in which transnational companies (TNCs) control the market, a 
government’s intention to build national innovation capacity may be frustrated 
by the requirements of the TNCs’ global reach. We see in the final section of the 
present chapter that, in many developing countries, the recent involvement of 
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TNCs in high-technology sectors has diminished the capacity at the country 
level to develop new technologies in particular sectors. As the present thesis 
focuses on the changing trajectory of the national innovation capacity in the 
telecommunications industry in Turkey, the chapter ends with some country-
specific studies of telecommunications-related industries. 
By the late 1970s, some insights into the emergence of a learning 
economy had been constructed with respect to regions such as Silicon Valley 
and the so-called Technopolis projects in France and Japan (Castells and Hall, 
1994). The evolution of these issues is creating a rapidly growing interest in a 
broad and diverse collection of theories concerning knowledge, learning, and 
innovation as keys to competitiveness. Lundwall (1992a:1) states that 
knowledge is seen as the most fundamental resource in the modern economy, 
and learning as the most important process in what he described as the learning 
economy. In these debates, attention has also been devoted to representing the 
interactive and systematic nature of innovation, and to stressing the roles of 
different actors in the innovation process. 
New ideas about the dynamics of innovation have led to various 
models in economics, such as the Triple Helix (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 
2000), “the Mode 2” of the production of knowledge (Gibbons et al., 1994), and 
the systems of innovation approach (Edquist, 1997; Nelson 1993; Lundwall, 
1992b). Although the exact link between economic development and innovation 
is unclear, most of these theories emphasize innovation as an evolutionary and 
interactive process involving different types of learning (Dosi et al., 1988), 
interdependencies, and feedback (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986). Most also 
emphasize the role of social interaction between different individuals and 
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organizations that boost innovation-based sectors in the national economic arena 
(Asheim and Isaksen, 1997). 
 
2.2. Theoretical Perspectives on Innovation 
As the objective of this chapter is to elaborate on the development of 
the systems of innovation concept, it is important to review the historical basis 
of theories of innovation. Of course the various collections of theories on 
innovation make the task of revealing all of them nearly impossible, so we focus 
instead on a few of the most seminal contributions to the field. Within a range of 
related theories on innovation, two approaches will be explained in detail: (1) 
the Schumpeterian, and (2) the Neo-Schumpeterian. 
  
2.2.1 Innovation: the Schumpeterian Revival 
Joseph Schumpeter, an Austrian economics scholar, has inspired 
serious consideration of the main ideas that have found their way into innovation 
theories. Although Schumpeter’s ideas are not considered to constitute a formal 
innovation theory (Freeman, 1988), they provide the starting point for 
innovation analyses. On this point, Simmie and Kirby write: 
[Innovation theory] stresses the argument that capitalism is a fluctuating 
evolutionary process driven by technical and organizational innovation . 
. . it emphasizes the uncertainty and instability confronting firms in 
contrast with the perfect knowledge assumed in neo-classical theory . . . 
it recognizes that social institutions play a role in innovation and came to 
stress the particularly important role of large, oligopolistic firms (Simmie 
and Kirby, 1998: 163). 
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According to Schumpeter, innovation was based on discontinuities in 
the entrepreneurial process of technological innovation (Marshall, 1987). New 
ideas in Schumpeter’s works that have inspired proponents of innovation theory 
(Simmie and Kirby, 1998: 160) include the following: 
1.  Innovation is the main source of dynamism in capitalist economic 
development. 
2.  Historical perspective plays an important role in understanding long-term 
economic change. 
3.  It is essential to distinguish conceptually between invention, innovation, 
and diffusion of innovation to analyze the long term effects of 
technological progress. 
4.  Links between organizational, managerial, social, and technical 
innovations are all important to understanding the system as a whole. 
Schumpeter proposed two models. In the first model, called Mark 1, he 
examines how micro-economic factors influence the wave-like development of 
the economy. The main elements of this model revolve around inventions 
exogenous to firms and the innovative entrepreneur who assumes the risk of 
turning inventions into innovation (Freeman, 1982). The key agent of innovation 
is the small innovative entrepreneur who is motivated to innovate in order to 
gain substantial market share, maintain it over time, and edge out less successful 
firms (Breschi and Malerba, 1997). This leads to competition between such 
entrepreneurs to create new innovations. From this competition, a bandwagon 
effect results, leading to clustering on the footing of new upswings at the 
beginning of recovery periods in long economic cycles. A growth period begins, 
which favors the diffusion of new products and processes. As innovation 
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products mature, profits are driven down by competition, so that the ascending 
cycle is renewed and investment decreases while profit seems to diminish. 
In the second model, labeled Mark 2, Schumpeter recognizes the role 
played by technological capabilities that have accumulated in the past (Breschi 
and Malerba, 1997), i.e. endogenous R&D in large firms. This model is 
characterized by high levels of patenting and hence creates monopoly rents in 
the intermediate goods sector. In this model, Schumpeter weakens the 
exogenous invention and entrepreneurial role, emphasizing the role of the large 
monopolistic firm, increasing investment in industrial research, and the 
bureaucratized process of technological change. The pattern of successful 
innovation activities is therefore restricted to a small population of innovators, 
namely those who are able to increase R&D intensity, setting up a virtual self-
reinforcing circle leading to renewed impulses to increase market concentration 
(Simmie and Kirby, 1998: 162). 
The concept of innovation as conceived by Schumpeter involves 
technology and uncertainty. One of the major contributions common to both 
models is the recognition of the revolutionary potential of innovation and the 
combined productive functions in the innovation process. These include new 
commodities, new technology, new sources of supply, and new types of 
organizations. 
 
2.2.2 The Resurgence of Evolutionary Economics 
The evolutionary economics approach provides an alternative 
perspective on innovation and technological change. In their pioneering work, 
Nelson and Winter (1984) asserted that this approach has gained popularity 
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largely because of dissatisfaction with neoclassical theories,
1 but also because of 
the difficulty involved in modeling Schumpeterian ideas (Malecki, 1997). The 
main features of this approach are summarized by Dosi et al. (1988:2): 
(1) Technical change is a fundamental force in shaping the patterns of 
transformation of the economy. (2) There are some mechanisms of 
dynamic adjustments, which are radically different in nature from those 
allocation mechanisms postulated by traditional economy (neo-classical) 
theories. (3) These mechanisms have to do both with technical change 
and institutional change or the act of it. As regards the former, we 
suggest it is both disequilibrating and a source of order for the directions 
of change and the dynamic adjustment processes as new technologies 
diffuse through the national and international economies. Paradoxically, 
despite its fluctuation and crises the world is more stable and better 
ordered than could be deduced from prevailing economic theory. (4) The 
socio-institutional framework always influences and may sometimes 
facilitate and retard processes of technical and structural change, 
coordination and dynamic adjustment. Such acceleration and retardation 
                                                 
1 The basic approach of Neo-Classical theory can be characterized by two attributes: (1) It 
assumes rational, maximizing behavior on the part of agents with given and stable preferences; 
(2) it focuses on attained equilibrium states. A number of other assumptions are then made, e.g. 
that resources utilized are homogenous, that optimal inputs are non-costly, that information is 
freely available on the market, that technology is exogenous, that economic agents behave 
rationally, and that agents will not display opportunistic behaviors (Belussi, 1996). In most of 
the exposition, the theory and its attributes put an analytical focus on three major factors, 
namely, the ways in which an economy allocates resources, the distribution of income, and the 
processes of economic growth (Smith, 1994). In this context, innovation and technological 
change seem to affect the equilibrium properties of the economic system and income 
distribution. The firm is viewed as the place where economic agents transform inputs into 
outputs (Braczyk et al., 1997). They are assumed to follow the same basic rules when making 
decisions (Lundwall and Borras, 1997). The firm is operating in a world of perfect competition, 
where all agents possess the same resources and the same technological capabilities. 
Technological superiority is a signal of market imperfection, which affects the equilibrium states 
of the system. 
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effects relate not simply to market imperfections, but to the nature of the 
markets themselves, and to the behavior of agents. 
The main features that differentiate evolutionary theories from 
neoclassical approaches are discussed by Saviotti (1997:185-186): 
(1) Qualitative change, or change in the composition of the system, 
resulting from the balance of variation, the creation of new “species,” 
and selection, which is based on differential adaptation. Inheritance too 
affects the rate and type of qualitative change. (2) Uncertainty, path 
dependency and multistability, all features arising from the out-of-
equilibrium nature of systems and processes. (3) Heterogeneity of 
agents, requiring a population approach, emphasizing not only 
representative agents and mean values of properties, but also their 
distribution within a population. 
In general, attention in evolutionary theories is given to history, 
routines, influences of environments, and institutions (Andersen, 1997). The 
firm is portrayed as a collective agent characterized by a certain degree of 
resource-development capacity, with an extended life. As Belussi (1996:8) puts 
it, “. . . firms are created, they grow and discover new routines, or slowly tend to 
towards atrophy, and as a consequence they exit from the market.” With respect 
to innovation and technological change, evolutionary theories recognize that 
new technologies are superior only in particular ways, so that they are not 
optimal in an absolute sense because the system never reaches equilibrium. 
Technological change is set up as an evolutionary process of qualitative change, 
emerging from an open-ended and path-dependent process arising from the non-
equilibrium state of systems and processes. 
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Thus, evolutionary theories provide a new understanding of innovation 
and patterns of technological change. Even though these evolutionary theories 
remain at an early developmental stage, they clearly present important steps 
towards reconsidering technological change by encompassing the 
institutional/organizational as well as the cognitive aspects of economic 
evolution within a single conceptual framework. 
 
2.3 Innovation and Technological Change  
An examination of the manner in which technology is generated, 
acquired, and utilized is necessary to explain recent conceptual advances 
towards understanding the innovation process. In this section, characteristics of 
the preeminent driving forces behind modern economic development will be 
discussed, with a focus on the shift observed in the innovation and technological 
process since the 1950s. 
 
2.3.1 Innovation as an Interactive Process 
Innovation is defined as a process by which “firms master and get into 
practice product designs and manufacturing processes that are new to them” 
(Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993:4). To state it another way, innovation 
corresponds to “the search for, and discovery, experimentation, development, 
imitation and adoption of new products, new production processes and new 
organizational set-ups” (Dosi, 1988:222). This view about the character of 
innovation has changed considerably in past years. Increasingly, innovation is 
no longer viewed as a linear process, but rather as an interactive learning process 
(Lundvall and Borras, 1997; Smith, 1994; Kline and Rosenberg, 1986). 
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There have been two major sets of approaches to the innovation 
process. The first set, prevalent from the 1950s to the mid-1970s, proposed 
linear models of innovation, commonly referred to as the ‘science-push’ and 
‘demand-pull’ models. The science-push model assumes that innovation is a 
linear process, beginning with scientific discovery, passing through invention, 
engineering, and manufacturing activities, and ending with the marketing of a 
new product or process (Malecki, 1997). The demand-pull model sees 
innovation as derived from a perceived market demand that then influences the 
direction and rate of technology development. Kamien and Schwartz (1982) 
argue that, in this model, innovation is primarily induced by the department in a 
firm that deals with customers who indicate problems with a design or suggest 
possible new areas for investigation. Both of these linear models posit a simple, 
sequential linear process, on the one hand emphasizing R&D—the market being 
a receptacle for the fruits of R&D—and on the other hand emphasizing 
marketing—the market being the source of ideas for directing it (Figure 2.1). 
The second, non-linear, model is centered on interaction processes, that 
is, on feedback effects of the downstream and upstream phases of the earlier 
models. According to Smith, the problem of the so-called linear model is two-
dimensional. The first problem was “. . . an overemphasis on research 
(especially basic scientific research) as the source of new technologies” (Smith, 
1994:2). This means that a low level of R&D activity could simplistically 
explain a low innovative capacity, or if the level of R&D increases, a 
corresponding increase in innovation should follow. The second problem was a 
“technocratic view of innovation as a purely technical act: the production of a 
new technical device” (Smith, 1994:2). 
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Building on modern innovation theory, evolutionary theories of 
economic and technological change have now replaced the determinism of the 
linear model by recognizing that “technological innovation and its contribution 
to economic growth is punctuated by discontinuities, non-appropriabilities and 
processes of learning by doing, using, and failing” (Felsenstein, 1994). Thus, the 
emphasis now is that innovation is an interactive process that involves the 
synthesis of different types of knowledge rather than imposing the formal 
scientific knowledge inherent in R&D on other forms of knowledge. 
The alternative model has been referred to as a “bottom-up interactive 
innovative model” (Asheim and Isaksen, 1997) or as the “learning economy” 
(Lundvall & Johnson, 1994), where “knowledge is the most fundamental 
resource and learning the most important process” (Lundvall, 1992a). 
The interactive model of innovation has challenged the linear model by 
emphasizing the social nature of the interactive learning process (Edquist, 2000; 
Asheim and Isaksen, 1997). A sociological and systemic view is implied in 
which “learning is predominantly an interactive, and therefore, a socially 
embedded process which cannot be understood without taking into consideration 
its institutional and cultural context” (Lundvall, 1992:1). This perspective 
emphasizes the fact that innovation cannot be produced in isolation, relying 
exclusively on internal resources within an organization. The institutional setting 
and cultural aspects of a region or country interact as components in the whole 
process (Figure 2.2). 
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Figure 2.1. The Interactive Model of Industrial Innovation. 
Source: Adapted from Kline and Rosenberg (1986), Malecki (1997), Fischer 
(2001). 
 
2.3.2 Knowledge Creation 
Under the innovation systems concept, knowledge creation drives 
economic development. According to Dosi, knowledge creation is “an activity 
with a basic element of uncertainty and with an absence of the necessary 
relevant information to facilitate rational decision-making” (1988). Knowledge 
plays a fundamental role by distinguishing itself as an input in the production 
process. As Archibugi and Michie (1995: 1) stated it, “the production and use of 
knowledge are at the core of value-added activities” that increasingly determine 
the performance of individuals, firms, regions, and countries. Knowledge takes 
two different forms: tacit and codified. According to the OECD: 
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•  Codified knowledge is information that is recorded and distributed 
throughout an organization and transformed through R&D processes; it 
regulates an organization’s routines and procedures (OECD, 1997). 
•  Tacit knowledge is organizational know-how, the skills developed to 
apply codified knowledge. Since it is more embodied and context-
dependent than codified knowledge, it is transmitted through interaction 
and example. It is difficult to transmit tacit knowledge without mutual 
trust within and between organizations (Malmberg and Maskell, 1997). 
 
2.4 Innovation Systems Theory: From the National to the Sectoral Scale 
This section describes the innovation systems concept in detail. Since 
this study applies the National Innovation Systems (NIS) approach to Turkey by 
emphasizing the telecommunications sector, the major components of and 
mechanisms posited by the NIS approach must be delineated. 
 
2.4.1 The Literature on Innovation Systems 
An innovation is simply a new creation with economic significance. 
Whether it is a brand-new idea or a combination of existing elements or 
processes, an innovation can contribute to existing knowledge or change the way 
things are made. We have seen in this chapter that innovation does not simply 
follow a linear path from basic research through R&D to a new process or 
product. Instead, innovation happens through an interactive process in which 
science, technology, learning, production, policy, and demand interplay through 
“complicated feedback mechanisms” (Edquist, 1997). 
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The National Innovation Systems approach takes into account all 
factors that influence the innovation structure. In a complex and unpredictable 
environment, firms choose to interact with other organizations to add, develop, 
and exchange knowledge and information. Universities, research institutes, 
investment banks, other firms, schools, government ministries, and so forth 
comprise the entities related to the innovative firm. 
In addition to these factors, legal structures, social rules, cultural 
norms, and technical standards also influence a firm’s behavior. In Edquist’s 
words, “Interaction between various organizations operating in different 
institutional contexts is important for the process of innovation. The actors as 
well as these contextual factors are all elements of systems for the creation and 
use of knowledge for economic purposes. Innovations emerge in such systems” 
(Edquist, 1997: 2). 
The term National Innovation System was used first by Chris Freeman 
in his book about the Japanese industrial system (Freeman, 1987). In their initial 
attempt to conceptualize the subject, Bengt-Åke Lundvall (Lundvall, 1992) and 
Richard Nelson (Nelson, 1993) contributed diverse disciplinary perspectives to 
the literature. In separately edited books. In Lundvall’s book, the main concern 
was to develop a theoretical foundation for the concepts of innovation and 
interactive learning to generate an alternative to neoclassical economics. 
Although this book refers to only one country (Denmark) in its empirical 
approaches, Lundvall clearly demonstrates the essential elements in policy shift 
that are needed to transform an economy into an interactive system. 
Within the context of the sectoral level and at the level of particular 
technologies, Bo Carlsson has developed what has become termed the 
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technological systems  approach, indicating that innovation systems can be 
specific to particular technology fields or sectors (Carlsson and Stankiewick, 
1995). Elaborating on this issue, Malerba defined a sectoral innovation system 
as “. . . the set of heterogeneous agents carrying out market and non-market 
interactions for the generation, adoption and use of new and established 
technologies and for the creation, production and use of new and established 
products that pertain to a sector” (Malerba, 2002). Thus, three groups of 
variables are important for a sectoral system: 
•  Knowledge and technological domain: Sectoral boundaries might be 
drawn on the basis of a specific knowledge base, technologies, and 
inputs. As the technology evolves over time, the boundaries also change. 
•  Actors and networks: In a given sector, there might be individuals and 
organizations (e.g. consumers, entrepreneurs, scientists) who interact 
with each other through processes of communication, exchange, 
cooperation, competition, and command for innovation and its 
commercialization. Organizations may be firms (e.g. users, producers, 
and input suppliers) or non-firms (e.g. universities, financial institutions, 
government agencies, trade unions, or technical associations) and include 
subunits of any of the above entities such as R&D or production 
departments (Malerba, 2005: 385). 
•  Institutions: Relationships between agents in a specific sector may be 
shaped by norms, routines, common habits, established practices, rules, 
laws, and standards that incorporate the institutional framework. An 
institutional framework may include formal and informal routines (e.g. 
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patent laws vs. traditions) and binding norms applying to relationships 
between agents (e.g. contracts). 
As Nelson has indicated, however, sectoral and technological systems 
are strongly influenced by a nation’s overall innovation structure (Nelson, 
1993:518). Thus, according to Howells and Neary, the prior institutional 
endowments of a national system may help or hinder innovative activity and 
performance within particular sectors of a national economy (Archibugi et al., 
1999:2). 
 
2.4.2 On Definitions and Concepts 
To understand the concept of an innovation system, and distinctions 
between levels of analysis (sectoral, regional, or national), we must define key 
terms of the theory. The systems of innovation concept refers primarily to the 
network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and 
interactions initiate, import, modify, and diffuse new technologies. Further 
widening the scope of the conceptualization, Lundvall proposed two different 
definitions: In offering a narrow definition, he included organizations and 
institutions involved in knowledge creation—such as R&D departments, 
technological institutes, and universities. He then broadened the definition by 
including all actors affecting learning as a whole, which include “all parts and 
aspects of the economic structure and the institutional set-up affecting learning 
as well as searching and exploring—the production system, the marketing 
system and the system of finance present themselves as sub-systems in which 
learning takes place” (Archibugi et. al., 1999:3). 
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Geographically, a system of innovation can be regional, national, or 
supranational. At the regional level, Silicon Valley in California and Route 128 
in Massachusetts are the two best-known examples. At the supranational level, 
some parts of Europe (Germany, France, the UK) display connections that from 
different perspectives can be seen as both regional and supranational. 
Thus, to construct a formal theory of systems of innovation according 
to the conditions depicted above, at least a geographical boundary needs to be 
drawn. In line with this study’s main objective, taking the national level as the 
level of analysis in the systems of innovation approach is the most appropriate 
way to examine innovation in Turkey. 
 
2.4.3 National Innovation Systems  
In attempting to identify the institutions through which an innovation 
system is established, we naturally focus on national institutions, which are both 
well defined and common to most countries. Innovation scholars have therefore 
framed the innovation systems approach most frequently at the national level. 
Various factors affect an innovation system at different points of intersection, 
but all seem to converge on institutions at the national level: At the social level, 
we find established rules and conventions that regulate work, education, and 
law; at the macroeconomic level, we see the influence of such factors as shares 
of high value-added industries in total domestic production, financial and 
banking structures, general rates of domestic savings, and the corporate 
decision-making process. In addition to all the above factors, national cultures, 
of course, make huge differences in the organization and process of transactions 
between institutions. Although the effects of globalization make it practically 
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impossible for independent policymaking and unique cultural conventions—at 
least in daily life—to predominate in a given country, the advantages of 
communicating in a common culture remain intact. 
National ideologies also matter in a national framework of analysis. 
Ideological differences between countries, such as distinguish the Japanese 
ideology of communitarianism, the US individualistic ideology, and the German 
model of corporatism produce different outcomes in societal and economic 
spheres. Thus, in the age of so-called global economic convergence, ways of 
doing business still differ at the level of the industrially advanced countries. 
That is why many scholars still claim that, despite the increasing effects of 
globalization on national economies, the sovereignty of individual countries 
over national policymaking processes persists (Berger, 1996: 6). 
 
2.4.4 Elements of National Innovation Systems 
In delineating a national innovation system, it is important to analyze it 
into its basic elements. It is part of the innovation systems concept that diverse 
elements operate in an interconnected environment without external 
intervention. 
 
2.4.4.1 Labor Market Conditions   
It has been long argued that technological advancements and 
employment represent conflicting imperatives, due to the negative effects of 
technology on the level of employment at any given time. As general acceptance 
and capital intensity in production rises, the labor share of total output declines. 
From the perspective of the economics of equilibrium, this is an effect of 
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changing demand on the skill levels of workers, with rising unemployment a 
likely consequence. In Karl Marx’s terms, unemployment is the difference 
between the worker displacement that results from changing technological 
factors and the new labor demand that is generated by the accumulation of 
capital (Pianta, 2005: 572). As the constant drive for capital accumulation leads 
to searches for new products and production process, high unemployment rates 
assure lower wages, but this causes an inevitable problem of lower demand 
depressing profits. 
To Neo-Schumpeterians, information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) have been responsible for an emerging techno-economic paradigm in 
advanced economies. This systemic change creates new types of jobs while 
destroying large numbers of traditional job categories. According to this 
approach, the unemployment problem is mainly frictional, caused by a mismatch 
between new job opportunities and existing workforce skills. Speed of 
adjustment is therefore crucial in providing a well-functioning labor market with 
the capacity to absorb frictional unemployment and minimize the effects of 
technological unemployment. And, in addition to having to adjust to new work 
conditions, innovation must adapt to social needs and economic demands. As 
Pianta has suggested, “New technologies need to be matched by organizational 
changes, new institutions and rules, learning processes, the emergence of new 
industries and markets, and the expansion of new demand” (Pianta, 2005: 571). 
It is generally expected that, at the firm, industry, and macro-economic 
levels, product innovation will have positive effects on employment while 
process innovation will have negative effects. The differentiated impacts of 
innovation depend, however, on national-level macroeconomic conditions and 
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institutional factors. As Pianta put it, “The employment impacts of innovation 
generally are more positive in economies in which new-product generation and 
investment in new economic activities are higher, and in which the demand-
increasing effects of price reductions are greater” (Pianta, 2005:582). 
Innovation creates both increasing demand for skilled workers and 
wage polarization in the labor market. In the EU, technological innovations have 
caused declining demand in absolute terms for low-skilled workers. The US, 
however, has seen growth, albeit slow, in demand for low-skilled workers. This 
decline in the EU was related to institutional set-ups governing the labor market 
as well as labor union constraints on the EU. While these general constraints on 
the labor market have had negative effects on the level of employment in the 
EU, overall such constraints have had positive effects on wage polarization, 
while minimum wage and social compensation have been more favorable to 
labor in the EU than in the US. This was reflected in the US in slow growth in 
low-skilled workers with increasing polarization between wage structures. 
Thus, a national innovation system is critical in mediating the influence 
of technological innovation and diffusion on employment. The ability to develop 
long-term learning, innovative capacity, and technological opportunities are the 
main characteristics of a national innovation system where its strengths, 
orientation, and priorities are likely to be reflected in employment figures. 
 
2.4.4.2 Finance 
The allocation of financial resources was crucial to Schumpeter in his 
study of the economics of innovation. He focused on two different but related 
units of analysis in conceptualizing links between innovation and resource 
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allocation. On the one hand, he was concerned with the microeconomic 
characteristics of innovation, those that primarily affect the entrepreneurial 
behavior of individuals. On the other hand, he studied interaction between 
structural economic change and resource allocation at the macro-economic level. 
According to Schumpeter, an innovation accomplishes a commercial or 
industrial breakthrough in a new way, through a new product or process, a new 
type of organization, a new source of supply, or a new product market. He 
emphasized three characteristics of the innovation process that had crucial 
implications for resource allocation: “First, innovation depended on the 
investment of resources: Major innovations and also many minor ones entail 
construction of new plants (and equipment)—or the rebuilding of old plants—
requiring non-negligible time and outlay” (Schumpeter 1939:68). Second, 
innovation, as a general rule, was embodied in new firms that were founded to 
undertake the new combination. Finally, innovation was usually driven by 
entrepreneurs who were “new” men, that is, who were not already prominent in 
business circle (O’Sullivan, 2005:256). 
In his later studies, Schumpeter emphasized firms over individuals in 
his analysis of innovation. As he described it, the “perfectly bureaucratized giant 
industrial unit” had the capacity to rationalize and routinize the process of 
innovation to such an extent that the large-scale enterprise had become “the 
most powerful engine” of economic progress (Schumpeter 1942:106). As a 
result, technological progress had increasingly become the business not of 
individual entrepreneurs but of “teams of trained specialists who turn out what is 
required and make it work in predictable ways.” In his view, innovation had to 
be financed by external resources. Therefore, the waves of innovation that were 
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responsible for a country’s economic development had to be backed with a well 
developed financial system. 
In a recent study, Perez follows Schumpeter in placing technological 
revolutions at the heart of her theory. She also emphasizes that the effects of 
technological revolutions go far beyond their economic impact to include “a 
transformation of the institutions of governance, of society and even of 
ideologies and culture” (Perez, 2002:24-25). While Schumpeter focused more 
on the role of finance in the initial stage of innovation, Perez emphasizes the 
characteristics of a financial system that involve the productive system 
throughout the life cycle of technological revolutions. 
Even though the vitality of a financial system is conclusive in the 
development of innovativeness at the aggregate level of an economy, it is 
important to distinguish the characteristics of financing and investment behavior 
in different sectors of production. According to Rajan and Zingales, the financial 
requirements of industries are technologically determined by industry. The 
extent of an initial project scale, its gestation period, the cash harvest period, and 
the requirements for continuing investment differ substantially among industries 
(O’Sullivan, 2005:256). 
At the aggregate level, the source of financing, for example whether 
market-based or bank-based, matters to the development of different industries. 
It has however been observed in multi-country research that describing the legal 
system that governs transactions between parties is more important to 
understanding an innovation system than identifying financial sources 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002). 
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2.4.4.3 Public Innovation Policy 
A functioning innovation system requires properly designed policy 
clusters that interact to ensure that the efforts and financial resources used 
publicly create additional social wealth. In neo-classical economics, public 
intervention is acceptable only during a market failure. From an innovation 
policy point of view, market failure amounts to lack of incentives for knowledge 
production (Lundvall and Borras, 2005:613). In practice, neo-classical 
economics considers the provision of basic research and general education to be 
the only legitimate public activity. 
In the innovation systems approach, however, intervention becomes 
the most essential policymaking tool on a public scale. This implies that major 
policy fields need to be considered in the light of how they contribute to 
innovation. The most important issue in innovation policy becomes the 
reviewing and redesigning of linkages connecting parts of the system. Thus, 
contrary to the neo-classical assumption of market failure, in an innovation 
systems model the most important failures that alter the whole system negatively 
are failures of institutions to coordinate, link, or address various systemic needs. 
The innovation systems approach also recognizes that no one recipe for 
an institutional set-up is valid for all countries. Institutional set-ups differ across 
national economies, and this has implications for the types of technologies and 
sectors that thrive in the national context. For example, in addition to economic 
growth and international competitiveness, the European Union policies that are 
combined with social cohesion and equality may require particular technology 
policy regulations. However, there are some major objectives of innovation 
policy that are valid for almost all countries that deploy them. 
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As can be seen from Figure 2.2 below, we can differentiate innovation 
policy from science and technology policies as follows: First, innovation policy 
aims to increase the innovative capacity of the whole economy by improving 
individual skills and learning abilities, improving access to information, 
imposing environmental regulation, and so on. Whereas science policy aims to 
boost production of scientific knowledge through such wide-ranging 
mechanisms as increasing tertiary enrollment in education, funding competitive 
research initiatives, and deploying tax incentives for firms, technology policy 
aims to advance and commercialize sectoral knowledge by supporting public 
procurement policies, labor force training and improvement of technical skills, 
and standardization (see Figure 2.2 below). 
In terms of country-specific cases, innovation policy shows different 
characteristics in different national economic and social settings. Primary 
examples can be illustrated in the US, Japan, and the European Union. The 
biggest advantage of the US innovation system, of course, is the availability of 
massive amounts of funding for competing research projects, which in turn 
creates a great diversity of technological outcomes. Although there is no specific 
coordination of innovation efforts in the US, the powerful military-industrial 
complex and a solid domestic market for new products act as market-signaling 
mechanisms for research institutions at different levels. Because of the market 
mechanism governing the diffusion of technological advancements, however, 
the less-competitive industries are neglected because of their incompatible 
solutions for consumers and the market in general. 
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Science Policy
Focus: Production of Scientific Knowledge  
 
Instruments: 
- Public Research funds granted in competition 
- (Semi-) Public research institutions (i.e.: 
laboratories, universities, research centers…) 
- Tax incentives to firms 
- High education 
- Intellectual property rights 
 
Technology Policy
Focus: Advancement and commercialization of sectoral technical 
knowledge 
 
Instruments: 
- Public procurement  
- Public aid to strategic sectors 
- Bridging institutions (between research world and industry) 
- Labor force training and improvement of technical skills 
- Standardization 
- Technology forecasting 
- Benchmarking industrial sectors 
Innovation Policy
Focus: Overall innovative performance of the economy 
 
Instruments: 
- Improving individual skills and learning abilities (through general education 
system and labor training)  
- Improving organizational performance and learning (i.e. ISO 9000 standards, 
quality control, etc.) 
- Improving access to information: information society 
- Environmental regulation 
- Corporate law 
- Competition regulations 
- Consumer protection 
- Improving social capital for regional development: Clusters and industrial districts 
- Intelligent benchmarking  
- Intelligent, reflexive and democratic forecasting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 The relationship between science, technology, and innovation policy 
Source: Lundvall and Borras, 2005. 
Among the governments presiding over major national innovation 
systems, Japan’s has been the most explicitly involved in technology policy, 
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with a direct national policy promoting specific sectors and industries aimed at 
increasing Japanese industry’s international competitiveness. The Ministry of 
Technology (MITI) has designed and applied a wide-ranging technology policy, 
in which some of the core sectors such as automobiles, electronics, and 
telecommunications have been awarded substantial subsidies for research and 
development under the infant-industry  schema. In telecommunications, for 
instance, the NTT, a public telecommunications company with monopolistic 
control in the market, has played an important role in coordinating technology 
development efforts in major electronic firms such as Hitachi and NEC 
(Lundvall and Borras, 2005: 621). 
With its diverse economic and social structures at the national level, 
the European Union has implemented numerous programs in science and 
technology to realize the economic convergence objective that lies at the center 
of the Union’s foundations. The main effort to establish a competitive European 
technology base began in the 1970s. COST (Cooperation in Science and 
Technology) and Airbus were the most important two initiatives in those years. 
In the early 1980s, the ESPRIT program was launched to increase joint efforts in 
ICT between the Union’s three most developed countries, Germany, Britain and 
France. Currently the most important initiative in the joint technology effort is 
the EU Framework program, in which every project has to include at least three 
European countries. The program aims to lower national barriers in creating a 
European theater for research that can compete with the world’s other leading 
regions without undermining the general goal of social cohesion (Lundvall and 
Borras, 2005:623). 
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2.5 The National Innovation Systems Approach and Developing Countries 
Applying the NIS approach to the economies of some developing 
countries is a matter of controversy because of differences between developed 
and developing countries in terms of technological attainment and institutional 
structure. In developed countries, innovation systems maintain or improve an 
already established level of competitiveness and growth, while developing 
countries are naturally preoccupied with “catching-up” (Feinson, 2003: 4). 
Catching-up policies in developing countries have historically stressed 
importing existing technologies from developed countries and creating the 
internal capabilities needed to utilize and improve them in order to close the 
technological gap. According to Edquist, developing internal capacity to absorb 
imported technologies is more important than developing innovations that are 
new to the world (Dahlman and Nelson, 1995). 
This focus on absorptive capacity makes the learning process more 
important in developing countries. Learning can be passive or active. In passive 
learning, absorption of technological capacity for production takes the form of a 
“black-box” approach. In active learning, however, a deliberative effort is 
exerted to improve and spread technology on a national scale (Feinson, 2003: 9). 
 
2.5.1 Acquiring Foreign Technology 
Developing countries can acquire technology in three ways: imitation 
of foreign capital goods, foreign direct investment (FDI), and foreign licensing. 
The government can influence these avenues of acquisition in a variety of ways, 
including FDI policies, foreign licensing regulations, intellectual property rights 
regimes, and public procurement policies. 
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One way of acquiring technology from imported capital goods is to 
imitate these goods domestically so as to keep pace with international market 
trends. Even though this method was used extensively by developing countries 
into the late 1990s, increasing restrictions in trade and tariff as well as 
intellectual property laws have made this kind of technology acquisition 
unsustainable for the long term. Furthermore, in some cases imitation costs can 
approach innovation costs (Mansfield et. al., 1981: cited in Feinson, 2003). 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) refers to the establishment of singly or 
jointly owned subsidiaries in a foreign country, and it includes “hiring foreign 
labor, setting up a new plant, meeting foreign regulations, [and] developing new 
marketing plans” (Saggi, 2000). Foreign licensing, on the other hand, involves 
leasing rights and sometimes equipment to previously established firms to 
produce a particular capital good. In the case of FDI and sometimes licensing, 
the foreign firm provides assistance in implementing the new technology, and 
this provides an important source of theoretical and practical knowledge. Host 
countries can limit the bargaining power and options available to multinational 
firms by creating policies that either hamper or facilitate licensing (Pack and 
Saggi, 1997). 
An important issue that arises in this connection concerning technology 
diffusion in FDI is that of domestic ownership in multinational firms. In order to 
tap the positive effects of imported technology, developing countries might 
regulate the amount of domestic ownership in multinational firms, which would 
be consistent with protectionist economic policies, and increased local 
ownership might also increase the networks available for spillovers to other 
domestic firms. However, as protection of domestic markets has become 
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difficult to sustain through waves of global liberalization, many multinational 
companies have increased their shares in the ownership of foreign country 
subsidiaries in order to remain competitive in global markets. 
 
2.5.2 Foreign Direct Investment, Multinationals and their Effects on Host 
Country Technology 
The literature on local, regional, and national innovation systems puts 
the private firm at the center of the argument. As was mentioned earlier in the 
chapter, evolutionary economic theory regards the private firm to be the most 
efficient organization for new technological innovations. Due to its incentive 
structure, however, the intended results may not be recognized in most parts of 
the world. In his exhaustive research on concepts like “learning region” and 
“regional innovation systems,” Sokol concluded that, in contemporary capitalist 
development, multinational companies are more concerned with profit levels 
under “heightened competition” than with the economic welfare of the regions 
within which they operate (Sokol, 2003). Contrary to expectations of rising 
employment, improving skills, and increased value-added activities in a host 
country that would result from foreign investment, FDI from a foreign country 
may cause decline in those areas if a given firm is not located in a value-chain 
network (Morgan, 1997; quoted in Sokol, 2003). 
As FDI is considered the most appropriate way to adopt advanced 
technologies in less developed countries, in the last two decades a growing body 
of literature has emerged to assess the process of technology diffusion in host 
countries. In his study about the effects of FDI on a host country’s technological 
level, Narula claimed that even though FDI is not the only option available for 
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developing countries to promote economic catching-up, it is the most efficient 
one (Narula, 2005). However, as he states, the extent of spillovers generated by 
FDI, the readiness of the domestic sector to absorb these spillovers, and the role 
of FDI in substituting for or complementing domestic industry are important 
issues to be considered. 
Some of the most important cases of technology spillovers through 
FDI were experienced in the former socialist countries, which were once 
considered to have weak innovative structures straining under heavy 
bureaucratic regulations. In the case of FDI through privatization in Hungary, 
King found evidence that FDI could bring about opposing outcomes. This 
strategy could strengthen the extent of the advanced business techniques and 
capital for modernization. Thus, state-owned enterprises that are privatized by 
multinational firms take on the structure and functions of the most advanced 
business form in the world. If however the purchasing company is reluctant to 
move production to the host country rather than reconfiguring it, FDI merely 
destroys domestic industry (King, 2000). Thus, if a foreign investment enters a 
national market by way of privatization, depending on the local conditions that 
regulate the business, the new firm might lose its technological capabilities as a 
result of FDI, which in turn brings about a decline in the national capabilities in 
a given technological field. 
In other research on the results of privatization of public companies in 
former socialist countries, Bonin and Abel concluded that, with majority 
ownership in a new company, multinational companies tended to be more 
engaged in creating new production processes (Bonin and Abel, 1998). 
According to the authors, the existing literature on enterprise restructuring in 
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transition economies showed that financial restructuring (changes in the capital 
structure of a company and inherited debt overhang, in particular) is easier to 
achieve than operational restructuring (labor shedding, focus on core activities, 
modernizing technology and developing new products, etc.). In many transition 
economies, governments have chosen the former strategy in order to create 
companies suitable for the market economy. This was related to the economic, 
social, and institutional burden involved in the latter option. However, as the 
authors concluded, financial restructuring took place mostly in the form of 
privatization and, depending on its ownership structure, a given foreign 
company implemented various policies in making technology use and diffusion 
available in the host country. 
In their exploratory research on the effects of privatization and market 
liberalization on Brazil’s national innovation system, Sato and Dergint studied 
five different sectors to assess the changing trajectory of “active” and “passive” 
learning systems. Borrowing from Viotti, they identified active learning systems 
as “absorption of production capability” and passive learning systems as 
“mastery of production capability together with the improvement capability” 
(Sato and Dergint, 2005: 5). Their study showed that, after privatization and 
liberalization, the case companies, electrical machinery, and telecommunications 
equipment sectors in Brazil felt fierce competition and had to move towards 
more innovation-oriented business models. However, the emphasis on 
innovation was not in creating or developing new technologies, but rather in 
improving and adapting existing technologies to local conditions. Particularly in 
the telecommunications case, shortly after privatization the new company had to 
retreat from innovative operations after a brief increase in product and process 
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development efforts. This was due mainly to changes in firm focus from in-
house technology development to direct transfer of related technology from the 
parent company (Sato and Dergint, 2005: 20). 
Another case that indicates the importance of ownership in developing 
local capacities for technology development in the telecommunications sector 
took place in Brazil in the early 1980s, when the government pressured the 
multinational subsidiaries to transform themselves into joint ventures to increase 
interaction among local and foreign companies (Szapiro, 2000). According to 
the author, these subsidiaries would have to sell the majority of their shares to 
Brazilian capital and become national firms and, from that moment on, develop 
technology locally. For a brief period of time, with the inclusion of joint-
ventured telecommunications companies, a local innovation system was 
established which included other small and medium-size companies in the sector 
for outsourcing and networking. The Brazilian government changed the related 
regulation in the following years, however, and eased limitations on foreign 
ownership in the sector. With the increasing dominance of foreign shares in the 
telecommunications sector, multinational companies isolated themselves from 
local collaboration and focused on the direct application of imported technology 
from their respective parent companies (Szapiro, 2000:3). 
 
2.5.3 Foreign Direct Investment and Technological Capabilities in the 
Telecommunications Sector 
The effects of FDI and privatization on the technological capabilities 
of developing countries have been vigorously debated, with no definitive 
conclusions having been reached yet. However, in their study on the effects of 
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privatization and market liberalization on different sectors in Brazil, Sato and 
Dergint found that, after privatization, one of the telecommunications equipment 
companies with foreign ownership reduced its new product development 
facilities and established a process of acquisition of equipment and technology 
transfer from headquarters. Even though this strong focus on the acquisition of 
foreign technology has not changed after privatization, for a brief period of time 
foreign firms in Brazil took advantage of the Informatics Law. The law gave 
financial incentives and support for new research and development to new firms 
that aimed to develop their own technology in the sector. However, changes in 
macroeconomic conditions in Brazil required significant reductions in public 
resources, and the program lasted only four years, with support ending in 2001 
(Sato and Dergint, 2005). 
It has been widely observed in developing countries that strong local 
technology accumulation in the telecommunications sector has been related 
directly to state-owned monopolies as national carriers. In his study of the 
effects of privatization on changes in technological capacity in the 
telecommunications sector in Brazil, Schima analyzed structural changes in 
sectoral and national innovation systems. According to him, the incumbent 
national carrier, Telebras, and its R&D unit, CPqD, made significant 
contributions to the local capacity in telecommunications technology following 
the establishment of the latter in 1976. However, as the Brazilian state suffered a 
severe macroeconomic crisis during the mid-1980s, like many other state 
enterprises Telebras and CPqD were also considered for privatization. After the 
privatization of Telebras in 1998, CPqD became a private foundation (FCqPD) 
and even though it was entrusted with the R&D responsibilities for 
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technological development of the telecommunications sector, it did not show the 
same commitment to fostering a systematic program of R&D as CPqD did 
(Schima, 2004). Instead of focusing on innovative new products and processes, 
the new company mostly provided project-based solutions for the global 
operations of the new owners of Telebras, namely the consortium of Telefonica, 
Telecom Italia, and WorldCom. 
In assessing the effects of privatization and liberalization on the 
telecommunications sector of India, Brazil, and South Korea, Mani (2004) 
concluded that, in developing countries, the central elements of a dynamic and 
self-sustaining system of innovation in the telecommunication sector are the 
firms that manufacture and sell the equipment, employing technologies 
developed locally. By employing a thorough analysis of the strengths of the 
telecommunications sectors in these three countries, he concluded that only 
Korea has gained a cutting-edge technological advantage by providing proper 
strategic direction to its public laboratories. This strategy consisted of 
identifying future growth potential in mobile communications and then 
systematically building up its innovation capability by directing financial 
incentives to R&D and designing public procurement policies that would assure 
secure market conditions for locally developed products, while limiting access 
of foreign companies through strict industrial regulations (Mani, 2004). 
However, macroeconomic instability and lack of state commitment to designing 
new sectoral policies dictated by the changing global telecommunications 
business caused Brazil to lag behind in achieving self-sufficiency in local 
innovative capacity. 
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In the next chapter of the thesis, a detailed background analysis of the 
major milestones of industrial developments in Turkey is provided to help in 
assessing current technological capabilities in the telecommunications sector. As 
shown in the current chapter, in many developing countries Foreign Direct 
Investment has become the only way to acquire the latest technological 
advancements. As the studies of the telecommunication industry show, however, 
recent neo-liberal variations of macro-economic policies in developing countries 
have brought adverse effects on the development of local technological 
capabilities. Turkey, like Brazil, has also privatized a number of state enterprises 
in such critical sectors as the telecommunications, petroleum, and steel 
industries and, in most cases, foreign companies became the new owners in 
these industries. 
In the Turkish case, local technology development policies for 
telecommunications were advanced as early as the 1960s. The state monopoly 
carrier PTT and its R&D unit ARLA joined efforts in the late 1960s to develop a 
national technology base for the telecommunications industry. With the 
introduction of two joint-ventured companies shortly after that, controlled 
competition and an increase in technology resources were targeted. In 
accordance with import-substitution industrial models and infant-industry 
support mechanisms, over the following three decades basic infrastructure and 
related equipment were developed and installed into the early 1990s. The 
technological trajectory in the sector shows similarities with the Brazilian case, 
in which PTT and ARLA functioned in Turkey in a way that has been similar to 
that of Telebras and CPqD in Brazil. Like Turkey, Brazil also privatized both 
companies in the late 1990s and foreign companies in the sector became major 
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players as technology resources. As the case studies presented in Chapter 4 will 
show, however, this was also valid for the Turkish case and a national 
innovation system with the accumulated technological capacities of the previous 
period has resulted in the changing macroeconomic policies characteristic of the 
neo-liberal approach. 
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CHAPTER 3.0 BACKGROUND TO THE CASE STUDY: DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY IN TURKEY 
 
3.1. Introduction  
The current chapter aims to present a historical basis of the present 
conditions in the telecommunications industries on the global and local scales.  In 
the first part of Chapter 3, changes in the global telecommunications industry will 
be delineated in light of the key historical periods which relate the mode of 
industrial production and the respective innovation system in the sector.  This 
periodization is important in understanding the changing nature of 
telecommunications technology and related responses of the private and public 
actors to the ongoing changes. These responses ranged from providing necessary 
infrastructure to restructuring the way the new products and processes are 
innovated.  Borrowing from Fransman’s latest contributions on the literature, three 
different periods of the organization of telecommunications services and equipment 
sectors are outlined.  In the old telecommunications period, there was one 
monopoly service provider and its central research laboratory acted as the sole 
provider of new products and processes.  The second period started with the 
liberalization of the national monopolies and the major service providers focused 
only on network extension with the break-up of R&D facilities that left the 
innovation activities to major private companies.  In the last period, computer-
based technologies became the core of the sector and while the major private 
carriers continued to dominate the service part, numerous companies of all sizes, 
entered the product and process development market.  
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As this thesis deals with the effects of privatization and changes in 
ownership structure of telecommunications companies in creating local innovation 
systems in Turkey and in some other developing countries, it is important to 
analyze the global conditions for the sector on a historical basis.  It is revealed that, 
for countries that are dependent on foreign countries for telecommunications 
technology, macro conditions on both the global and local scales play important 
roles in creating a local capacity for new technology development.  In each period, 
the existing macro-economic conditions dictate a framework of valid industrial 
development policies, such as support to heavy industries in the 1950s and 1960s, 
promotion of IT industries in the 1980s and the introduction of innovation-based 
industrial development policies in the late 1990s.  Additionally, related to the 
research question of this thesis, firms had different policy reactions towards 
technology creation and diffusion in the host countries.  Thus, in the second part of 
this chapter, a detailed examination of overall macro-economic conditions for the 
last five decades in Turkey is employed in connection with the industrial 
development policies that complemented these conditions.   This chapter is 
important in understanding the factors that adversely affected the ability of Turkey 
in becoming a net technology exporter country in high value-added industries.  In 
order to examine the current conditions in the telecommunications sector, it is 
necessary to disclose the development and change of the telecommunications sector 
with related references to changing political-economic circumstances on the global 
and local scales.   
From the first phase of its industrialization process, Turkey remained a net 
importer of high technology from developed countries.  During the protected 
domestic market conditions and with limited foreign trade relations between the 
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1950s and 1960s, a state-guided industrialization model was in effect and without 
the heavy involvement of private firms in the key sectors, public companies, 
universities, and research organizations assumed the formation of a basic 
innovation system in key sectors such as telecommunications, petroleum and 
chemicals in order to provide the necessary infrastructure for economic expansion.  
However, with the rapid liberalization and increasingly open market conditions 
after the 1980s, the participation of local and foreign private companies in the 
industrial sectors changed the mode of technology assimilation that was mostly 
formulated upon the transfer of foreign know-how under import-substitution 
industrial development policies.  In the post-1980 period, privatization of public 
companies, involvement of private firm take-overs and an increase in non-public 
research and development institutions created a different mode of technology 
acquirement.  Thus, the second part of Chapter 3 involves the assessment of 
development and change in the telecommunications industry in Turkey in a 
historical perspective to reveal major causes of the failure of the initiation of a 
necessary national innovation system and the disintegration of the existing system 
in the sector.   
 
3.2 Development of the Telecommunications Sector in the World  
The roots of the telecommunications network used globally today are the 
basic telephone lines that connect two sides via copper wires.  As the formation and 
transfer of information become the major part of the production factors today, the 
quantitative and qualitative conditions of the present telecommunications 
infrastructure have become important, while the ever-increasing demand from a 
variety of users has guided the direction of the recent developments in the 
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telecommunications sector.  These include developments such as video-on-demand, 
broadband internet services, and wireless communications, which require some 
technical adjustments to the conventional telecommunications infrastructure in 
addition to the technology needed for the telecommunications infrastructure’s role 
in the creation, storage and transfer of information.   
The technological changes in the telecommunications sector have also 
brought significant structural changes in the world telecommunications equipment 
industry in the last two decades.  Transition from analog to digital technology 
through the mid-1980s and the convergence with information technologies in the 
past decade have forced  global telecommunications companies to reorganize 
themselves to compete.  In explaining this transition, Fransman identifies three 
periods in which the telecommunications industry evolved: the old telecom industry 
that survived until the 1980s, the new telecom industry of the 1990s and, the 
Infocommunications industry that emerged after the global telecom burst after 2000 
(Fransman, 2003).   
 
3.2.1 The Old Telecommunications Industry  
In many countries, due to the natural monopolistic character of the sector, 
the monopolies of public telecommunications services were the sole providers 
during this period.  Except for in some developed countries, in which the 
telecommunications equipment sector was represented by at least two or more 
global companies that provided the necessary equipment through local production 
facilities and imports, the natural monopoly hypothesis did hold for many 
countries.  The monopoly service provider and its chosen circle of specialist 
equipment suppliers were given access to the telecoms network and were able to 
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make innovations for it.  Thus innovation system for this period was prohibitive 
and had high barriers to entry.  For many industrialized countries, the monopoly 
network operator was both user and innovator of telecoms technologies and 
equipment.  However, there was a division of work in which the incumbent 
operator was responsible for the basic and long-term research and some equipment 
producers were responsible for the production of high-end equipment
2.   
The old telecoms industry is presented in three layers (Figure 3.1): 
•  Layer 1 is characterized by equipment and network elements (switches 
and transmission systems).  This layer is essentially focused on equipment 
development. 
•  Layer 2 is about network development.  Until the 1970s, circuit switches 
were used to send and receive information.  First applications of the packet 
switched data network were developed on the basis of these networks.  As diffusion 
of the Internet became widespread through the 1990s, data communications and 
services acquired greater volume and economic relevance.   
•  Layer 3 relates to the service aspect of the industry.  It is made up of the main 
and enhanced services in the old telecoms industry, such as voice, fax and toll-free 
0800 services. 
In its typical innovation system in this era, the central research laboratory of 
monopoly operator did the initial research and developed the initial prototypes.  
                                                 
2 “In France and Germany the monopoly network operator--to become France Telecom and Deutche 
Telecom respectively--also co-operated closely with national equipment suppliers.  In France a 
complex process of government-inspired re-organizations and mergers, largely between subsidiaries 
of American company ITT and French electronics companies, resulted in the birth of the major 
French specialist telecoms equipment company, Alcatel.  In Germany it was the electrical and 
electronics company, Siemens, that immediately became the major national equipment supplier 
although the Deutche Bundespost (which would become Deutche Telecom) also procured 
equipment from non-German suppliers like SEL, a subsidiary of ITT” (Fransman, 2002: 9). 
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The task of further development and mass manufacture was handed on to the 
specialist equipment suppliers.  Eventually, however, those equipment suppliers 
took over the task of innovation and R&D facilities from monopoly operators by 
increasing their own R&D capabilities and that accelerated the transitions of the 
industry into the new era.  Moreover, as the public procurement system of 
monopoly network operators provided a safe shelter for these equipment suppliers 
in their domestic markets, in order to grow they were forced to enter and compete 
in foreign markets, particularly in developing country markets where there were not 
similarly sheltered equipment suppliers producing for the domestic monopoly 
network operators  (Fransman, 2002: 12). 
 
LAYER 3: SERVICES LAYER 
(Voice, fax, 0800 services) 
LAYER 2: NETWORK LAYER 
(Circuit-switched network) 
LAYER 1: EQUIPMENT LAYER 
(Switches, Transmission Systems, Customer Premises 
Equipment) 
 
Figure 3.1 The layers of the old telecoms industry 
Source: Fransman, 2002. 
 
3.2.2 Transition to New Telecommunications Industry  
The necessary stimulus for the new era came with the partial liberalization 
of telecommunications services markets in major developed countries in the 1980s.  
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In Japan, DDI, Japan Telecom, and Teleway were given permission to compete 
with NTT, of which company the Japanese government continued to own two-
thirds.  In the UK, however, the government sold off majority shares of BT and 
permitted the new entrant, Mercury, to compete in the domestic market (Fransman, 
2002).   
The entrance of new operators in the services segment created potential new 
markets for equipment suppliers who were in search for opportunities to grow.  For 
example, as a new competitor to AT&T in long distance services in the US, MCI 
allied with Nortel for equipment supplies and wanted to take advantage of Nortel’s 
accumulating knowledge and competencies
3.  With the further stages of 
liberalization around the world telecommunications services, Nortel become the 
main technology supplier to the new entrants.   
The new equipment suppliers under these competitive global market 
conditions became more R&D-intensive companies and eventually this model 
reflected the characteristic innovation system in this transition period.  As Table 3.1 
reveals, incumbent operators of the previous period had significantly low R&D 
spending, while equipment supplier companies spent 10 to 20 percent of their sales 
on R&D.   
 
 
                                                 
3 “…Nortel was originally established in 1895 as the subsidiary of Bell Canada.  From 1906 to 1962 
AT&T’s equipment subsidiary, Western Electric, held a minority stake in Nortel, a stake that was 
gradually sold to Bell Canada.  In 1971 Bell Canada, which bought most of its equipment from 
Nortel, established a joint R&D subsidiary with Nortel called BNR.  However, in order to grow, 
Nortel from the late 1970s made strenuous efforts to enter export markets.  In these attempts the 
company was considerably aided by its pioneering success in developing one of the first small 
central digital office switches, the DMS 10.  Beating AT&T into this segment of the switching 
market, Nortel was able to gain a foothold in the US, its first major breakthrough outside Canada” 
(Fransman, 2002: 14).   
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Table 3.1 The Location of R&D in the new Telecommunications Industry. 
Source: Fransman, 2002. 
FIRMS  R&D % SALES 
NTT 3.7 
BT 1.9 
AT&T 1.6 
CISCO 18.7 
ERICSSON 14.5 
NORTEL 13.9 
LUCENT 11.5 
NOKIA 10.4 
WORLDCOM ~0 
QWEST ~0 
LEVEL 3  ~0 
GLOBAL CROSSING  ~0 
 
Through the late 1990s, however, another wave of entries to the industry 
came from new generation network operators, which with the leverage of the 
financial markets, aggressively took over the latest entrants, especially in the US.  
For example, WorldCom acquired MCI and Sprint, Qwest acquired US West, and 
Global Crossing acquired Frontier to construct their own global networks.  Unlike 
the companies they acquired, however, the latest wave of companies almost 
completely dissolved in-house R&D facilities and outsourced all equipment from 
global suppliers strategically focused on utilizing the technology.  However, some 
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of these aggressive new entrants, such as Global Crossing and WorldCom, had to 
file bankruptcy in 2002, due to over-estimated expectations about future demand 
and falling prices in telecom services (Fransman, 2003).    
 
3.2.3 The Infocommunications Industry 
After the entrance of the highly innovative equipment suppliers into the 
industry in the early 1990s, and aggressive new entrants in the late 1990s, a 
transition towards more information-oriented communication modes was made 
possible with the introduction of the Internet protocol worldwide.  As the Internet’s 
capability in handling different modes of data was realized through the late 1990s, a 
convergence for voice, data, and video on the same network was made possible 
with the utilization of TCP (Transmission Control Protocol)/IP (Internet Protocol) 
applications.  Thus, the telecommunications industry entered its new era, which 
Fransman called the “Infocommunications Industry” (Fransman, 2002:37).   
The main characteristics of this era are almost no barriers to the entry of 
innovative activities, widespread common knowledge of operating systems which 
enabled easily development of new applications for global use, and increasing 
importance of software in all kinds of applications at the different layers.  In 
addition to the above, the Internet has become a ubiquitous platform for innovation.   
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Table 3.2 The Infocommunications Industry: A Layer Model 
Source: Fransman, 2002.  
LAYER ACTIVITY EXAMPLE  COMPANIES 
VI  Customers - 
V 
Applications layer, including 
contents packaging (e.g. Web 
design, on-line information 
services, broadcasting services) 
Bloombergs, Reuters, AOL-
Time Warner, MSN, 
Newscorp, etc. 
IV 
Navigation and Middleware Layer 
(e.g. browsers, portals, search 
engines, directory assistance, 
security, electronic payment, etc.) 
Yahoo, Netscape 
III 
Connectivity Layer 
(e.g.Internet access, Web hosting ) 
IAPs and ISPs 
IP INTERFACE 
II 
Network Layer 
(e.g. optical fiber network, DSL, 
local network, radio access 
network, Ethernet, frame relay, 
ISDN, ATM, etc.) 
AT&T, BT, NTT, Vodafone 
I 
Equipment and Software Layer 
(e.g. switches, transmission 
equipment, routers, servers, CPE, 
billing software, etc.) 
Nortel, Lucent, Cisco, Nokia, 
Alcatel, etc. 
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The latest introduction to the Infocommunications industry was mobile 
telecommunications services, which for the last decade have been threatening the 
existence of fixed communication lines.  Even though the cellular mobile system 
was invented in the US in the late 1970s, it was first made commercially available 
by Scandinavian countries in the early 1980s.  Notably, Ericsson and Nokia 
evolved as highly competitive companies against rival companies such as Motorola 
and NEC.  These two companies had played important roles in shaping the Third 
Generation Mobile standard, which was capable of providing Internet access at 
speeds of 2 megabits per second compared to the 9.6 kilobits offered by Second 
Generation mobile systems.   
 
3.3 Industrial Development and Changes in the Telecommunications Sector in 
Turkey 
3.3.1 Pre-WWII Development (1923-1940) 
The  foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 took place in very 
unfavorable economic conditions.  The new state had to rise in a war-torn country 
with no industrial base even for the production of the most basic consumer needs.  
In addition to these difficult conditions, the Lausanne peace agreement between 
Turkey and the allied states put a hold on Turkey’s sovereignty to determine its 
foreign trade regime for another five years.  Under these conditions, some trade 
concessions that were given to foreign businessmen during the last period of the 
Ottoman Empire lasted for some time and the new state was responsible for the 
former Empire’s foreign debts.  In accordance with the valid division of labor, 
similarly to the other undeveloped countries in the early 1920s, Turkey was also 
considered to be the main exporter of raw materials and a good market for imported 
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consumer products of industrialized countries.  These conditions made the “unfair” 
foreign trade business the most profitable economic action and almost all local 
bank credits poured towards it.  With no sufficient funds for development and 
adverse effects of liberal trade conditions, industrial production showed no 
significant change and remained only 10% of the gross domestic product on   
average until the early 1930s (Boratav, 2004:51).     
As Table 3.3 shows,  the composition of the industrial sectors in 1927 
reflects a raw-material based industrial structure with low-technology level 
characteristics of the industrial base at the time. 
 
Table 3.3 Sectoral Composition of Industry in Turkey (1927) 
Source: Keyder, 1999: 47. 
Sector  Total Value Added (%)  Total Employment (%) 
Food, Tobacco, Leather  64.4  43 
Textile 18.3  18.7 
Metal 4  13.2 
Chemicals 3.6  1.2 
Wood 3  9.5 
Mining 3.5  7.4 
Paper 1.3  1.1 
Construction Materials  1  4.8 
Other 0.9  1 
Total 100  100 
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On the other hand, according to another condition of the Lausanne 
agreement, only some critical items could be exempted from the lowered custom 
tariffs.  The new Turkish state could specify the items to be protected from foreign 
trade and which could be produced locally, provided that the investments were 
realized by a state enterprise.  This is the basic reason for the indispensable role of 
the state in the early industrialization stages of the new republic.   
With the 1929 economic crisis, as happened in most of the countries, liberal 
approaches in foreign trade were replaced with the protection of national markets 
by limiting foreign trade.  In order to exploit these conditions and use the window 
of opportunity to create a national industrial base, the Turkish state prepared the 
First Five-Year Industrialization Plan in 1933.  According to the plan, priority was 
given to the industries for which the supply of raw materials could be obtained 
within the national borders (Sonmez, 1999:4).  Within the plan period, more than 
three-quarters of the realizations were in consumer goods like textile and sugar.  
This first import substitution experience accomplished rapid industrialization and 
the share of industry in the total GDP increased from 9.9% in 1929 to 18.8% in 
1939 (Boratav, 2004:76).  However, with the beginning of the Second World War, 
this trend ceased. 
Like the other large-scale infrastructures such as railways, harbors and 
electricity networks, the telecommunications sector in the mid-1920s was also 
operated by foreign companies who obtained various trade concessions from the 
government of the Ottoman Empire.  During the first years of the Republic, only 
Istanbul had a phone network operated by a foreign company and the total length of 
telegraph line was 40,188 km (25,117 miles) (Basaran, 2000:71).  In 1924, with 
Law No. 406, the sole right to establish and operate the telecommunications 
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infrastructure was given to PTT (the Directorate of Post, Telephone and Telegraph).  
As a result of the first national tender, Ericsson was chosen for the establishment of 
the city telecommunications networks in Ankara and Izmir, in 1926 and 1928 
respectively.  
The direct involvement of the state in the economy had two targets:  First, 
by supplying the necessary infrastructure and investment goods, the development 
of a national entrepreneur class was encouraged.  Second, it was assumed that 
negative effects of rapid industrialization on the social cohesion of the new nation 
would be lessened by direct ownership of the state.  In addition to railways, coal 
mines, harbors, electricity and gas companies, private telecommunications 
networks were also nationalized under these circumstances.  In accordance with the 
“Statist” development policies, the Istanbul Telephone Company in 1936 and the 
Izmir Telephone Company in 1938 were nationalized (Basaran, 2000: 73).    
 
3.3.2 Post-WWII Development (1940-1960) 
Even though Turkey did not enter the Second World War, its economy 
suffered deeply from the global war conditions.  The Second Five-Year Industrial 
Development Plan (1937-1942), which put more emphasis on investments in 
capital goods industries, was not realized due to increasing expenses for national 
defense, and the share of industrial production in the total GDP remained nearly the 
same.  However, increasing agricultural prices in export markets created a positive 
balance of payments during the war.  
One important consequence of the war was the change of Turkey’s political 
stance from the direction of the Soviet Union towards that of the US and other 
Western countries.  With the acceptance of the Bretton Woods agreement in 1946, 
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Turkey declared its commitment to capitalist development conditions and joined 
the global finance and military establishments such as the IMF, the World Bank 
and NATO, to integrate into the post-war world system.   
In this new period, the new government, which was formed by the first 
political party selected after a 22-year rule by a mono-party regime, assumed the 
role of the main provider of the general infrastructure and capital goods that the 
private sector needed to flourish.  For the finance of those large scale investments, 
the above global institutions were ready to supply loans and credits and in turn 
demanded more relaxed terms for foreign trade and internal investments.   
Beginning from 1946, foreign trade rules were eased to lower protective walls and 
an export-market oriented, agriculture, and mining-based economic development 
model was initiated.  Consequently, between 1946 and 1953, growth in agriculture 
and industry were 13.2% and 9%, respectively.  Similarly, the share of agriculture 
in the GDP rose from 42% in 1946-47 to 45.2% in 1953-53, whereas, the same 
values for industry fell from 15.2% to 13.5% (Boratav, 2004:101).   
However, rapid growth of the unprotected internal market for imported 
goods caused a large balance of payments deficit in the early 1950s and beginning 
in 1953, a new import restriction scheme was introduced.  In accordance with this 
new protectionist regime, a new law was passed to encourage foreign companies to 
set up plants in Turkey to produce intermediate and consumer goods that were 
previously imported.  Under the restrictive regime, the share of imports in the GDP 
declined from 9.5 in 1952 to 2.5 % in 1958 (Nedimoglu, 1993:88).  With the 
expanding import substitution model, new investments in areas such as the 
assembly of motor vehicles, electric home appliances and pharmaceuticals took 
place internally.   
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The import substitution program realized large industrial and infrastructure 
investments with the support of foreign credits and loans.  However, internal 
market-oriented manufacturing with imported technology and capital caused 
another balance of payments problem that hindered the import substitution 
industrial growth in intermediate and capital goods industries (Celasun and Rodrik, 
1988). 
Consequently, an IMF-designed stabilization and devaluation program, 
supported by substantial financial assistance and debt consolidation was proposed 
in 1958.  The program proposed a large reduction in agricultural price subsidization 
and more resource deployment towards industrial investments.  However, as the 
first democratically selected government of Turkey since the foundation of the 
Republic, it had a majority of agrarian electorate in general and thus, a greater part 
of development loans were again channeled towards agricultural investments 
(Nedimoglu, 1993:90).  The further deepening economic severity and rising 
political opposition from the urban elite resulted in the coup of May 27, 1960.  
The Second World War years showed the importance of a national 
telecommunications network for defense purposes.  However, with the limited 
capacity, the existing network was mostly assigned to military uses and no 
significant investments were realized for civil use.  Similarly to 
telecommunications services and most other industrial sectors, very little 
development was realized in the telecommunications equipment sector.  The 
existing telegraph equipment factory in Istanbul continued to supply some 
insignificant items to the national market; however, no additional investment took 
place to catch up with the technologic advancements in the sector. 
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Similarly to the European countries in which economic restoration started 
just after the war, the state in Turkey as well became a major player in the 
economic field through direct involvement in the productive sectors.  This 
Keynesian approach required the state to provide necessary infrastructure, social 
services and direct involvement in critical industries such as petroleum, mining, 
transportation and electricity to enable a sustainable and cohesive economic 
development.  Thus, telecommunications in Turkey was accepted as one of the 
most important variables to foster the national unity by means of a national market, 
a tool for national security and a national sovereignty (Basaran, 2000:168).   
The changing political stance of Turkey from that of the Soviet Union 
towards that of the Western world and consequent involvement in global 
organizations like the IMF and NATO provided financial resources and technical 
expertise for large-scale projects in the telecommunications sector.  In addition to 
network expansion, this period marked the beginning of dependency on developed 
countries for technology and financial resources in telecommunications, and until 
the mid-1960s, Turkey remained totally dependent on imported equipment.  
 
3.3.3 Import Substitution Era (1960-1980) 
The 1960 army intervention was another important milestone in the 
economic history of Turkey.  After returning to multiparty democracy in 1961, the 
new economic model was determined to be import-substitution-based 
industrialization (ISI) in a planned economy.  Industrial development, structural 
improvements in agriculture, the establishment of public economic enterprises in 
industry, the restriction of foreign competition, and the protection of private 
enterprises were basic features of this model (Kazgan, 1999).  According to 
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Kepenek (1999), the ISI model relied on the three following factors, which were 
established and facilitated by the state: 
1.  The protection of national markets against foreign competition with 
high import tariffs, 
2.  Encouragement of domestic industrial investment through 
government subsidies and cheap intermediate goods supplied by the 
public manufacturing enterprises, 
3.   High wage policies in modern industrial sectors and in agriculture, 
strengthening the domestic demand and enlarging the domestic 
market.   
Turkey had already completed the establishment of the basic consumer 
goods industries such as textiles and food, to a great extent by the 1960s.  Thus, the 
ISI policy aimed to complete the industrialization process first by creating the 
durable consumer goods industries and then setting up the intermediate and 
investment industries.  
State planning in the ISI model played a major role during this era.   
Following the 1960 army intervention, the most progressive constitution of Turkey 
was approved.  The new constitution attempted to develop a “social democratic” 
balance within society, while at the same time it tried to guide an orderly 
development of the capitalist economy (Keyder, 1979).  The State Planning 
Organization (DPT) was established to prepare the plans, which were designed to 
ensure balanced economic macro-economic development.  The economic role of 
the state was to supervise the implementation of development plans, direct the 
public investments and assist the private sector’s growth.   
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The financing of the ISI policies relied on foreign aid and loans, remittances 
of Turkish workers in Europe, and agricultural export earnings.  Industrial exports 
remained insignificant and did not play a role in financing the policy implemented, 
especially during the 1960s.  Even though the early plans, covering 1963-1972, 
were successful in achieving a growth rate of 7%, the manufacturing industry 
showed a tendency towards an unbalanced growth by the end of the 1960s.  The 
share of the consumption goods sector was larger than the intermediate and capital 
goods sector, which created an increasing dependency on expensive imported 
capital goods.  Consequently, foreign trade deficits increased significantly and the 
IMF started to demand a change in Turkish economic policy, including the 
devaluation of the Turkish currency, the liberalization of foreign trade and the 
suppression of the labor movement.  
The increasing foreign trade deficits, the pressure of the international 
financial institutions along with conflicts within the local capital brought the 
second military intervention in 1971.  The army established a bureaucratic 
government, which stayed in power until 1973.  Despite pressures from different 
resources, the Military Memorandum did not change the economic policy but 
restored it. 
The oil crisis in 1973 and 1974 had a negative impact on the Turkish 
economy, similarly to many other countries’ economies, although the Turkish 
economy managed to sustain high growth rates until the mid-1970s.  The sharp 
increase in internal demand with high industrial growth was the characteristic of the 
economy during the first half of the 1970s.  The value of exports increased by 137.9 
%, from 589.0 million in 1970 to 1.401.0 million US $ in 1975 (TOBB, 1990).  
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However, the 21.4% average annual rate of economic growth over the same period 
could not be maintained after the mid-1970s (TOBB, 1990).  Consequently, Turkey 
faced the most severe debt crisis in 1977, which was also accompanied by a social 
and political crisis.  The third five-year development plan period (1973-1977) 
witnessed a high import bill, price increases in the local market, an energy 
bottleneck and a decrease in production.  Following an interim plan for 1978, the 
fourth plan, covering 1979-1983, was introduced, but it failed to prevent economic 
problems such as a severe foreign exchange bottleneck, great deficits in external 
payments, a high inflation rate, public financing deficits, and growing 
unemployment. 
The Import Substitution-based Industrialization (ISI) policy of Turkey was 
put into action without attention being paid to the quality of production, capacity of 
production, scale of production and technology of production (Kepenek, 1999; 
Soyak, 1999).  Due to the excessive numbers of firms operating in the durable 
consumer industries, the scale of production was far from being efficient by the 
standards of technology they used (Kepenek, 1990).  Toksöz (1988) considers that 
the inefficient size of production units in Turkey is a direct result of the import 
substitution strategy which enabled the establishment and survival of numerous 
small firms behind protective trade barriers.  All these factors increased the cost of 
production and prevented the creation of economic conditions in which firms could 
invest in creating their own technologies and quality improvements (Kepenek, 
1990).   
During this period, Turkey faced a serious balance of payments problem 
and a foreign debt crisis (Tokatli and Erkip, 1998).  The economic problems, 
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increasing external debt, stoppage of foreign credits, political instability, street 
violence between left and right-wing youths, and a petrol crisis created enormous 
tension in the society as a whole.  On the other hand, the international finance and 
capital groups like the IMF and the WB and some local capital groups of Turkey 
started to put pressure on the government to change the policies to free market 
policies.  However, a transition to a free market economy was not realized through 
democratic ways, but by the third military intervention in September, 1980.   
The only telecommunications equipment facility that Turkey had until the 
1960s was a telegraph factory that produced some mechanical line equipment and 
batteries for telegraph lines.  With the second import substitution era in the 1960s 
and 1970s, local industrial companies were encouraged to obtain technology 
through partnership agreements with foreign companies and technology transfers.  
However, in the telecommunications sector, due to its state monopoly 
characteristic, no significant efforts towards domestic technology creation were 
observed until 1965.  Similarly to the general industrial development scheme, the 
necessity to gain technological capability in the development and production of 
telecommunications equipment in local conditions was finalized through the 
establishment of PTT-ARLA (PTT-Research and Development Laboratory) in 
1965 (Basaran, 175: 2000).  The main purpose of PTT-ARLA was the design and 
production of related equipment prototypes and provide them to private companies 
for mass production.   
The most important drawbacks in this period were a lack of a skilled 
workforce and an insufficient technological level of existing backward linkages in 
the telecommunications sector.  To overcome these problems, PTT-ARLA 
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employed some of the PTT’s existing technical staff in turn and conducted basic 
R&D, mostly in terms of “reverse engineering” methods to provide the increasing 
demand for telecommunications equipment.  However, due to weakness of the 
private industrial establishments in the sector, shortly after its establishment, PTT-
ARLA also assumed production of equipment.   
In those years, the national innovation system in telecommunications was 
closely related to the telecommunications regime.  As a monopoly in equipment 
procurement, PTT demanded various minimum local content requirements in 
telecommunications equipment.  This ranged from setting up production facilities 
locally to making the related product and process technologies available (know-
how) for local producers.  In this way, in line with the import substitution 
industrialization regime, accumulation of technology capacity in 
telecommunications was mainly channeled through PTT investment policies. 
In line with this policy, as a condition in the procurement of cross-bar exchanges 
from Northern Telecom, NETAS was founded under PTT’s majority ownership.  In 
the beginning, the firm mainly focused on the production of exchanges and phone 
machines.  A relatively independent R&D department was established in 1973 for 
the product localization and adaptation.  However, as the firm gained the capability 
to produce digital exchanges through the 1980s, some policy conflicts took place 
due to the parent company’s willingness to hamper the local technological 
advancements to keep the market for its old-fashioned cross-bar technology 
(Basaran, 2000:178).      
During the preparation process of the first Five-Year Development Plan 
(1963-1967), a report to assess the level of national telecommunications services 
was prepared.  According to this report, the main problems in the sector were stated 
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as being the existence of old technologies, the lack of a skilled and experienced 
workforce both in industry and services, a long waiting list for the subscription of 
basic telephone lines in the urban areas, and a low level of quality in voice 
transmissions.   
In the mid-1960s, development of national telecommunications became an 
important state policy and the National Security Council (MGK) recommended 
building a national electronic industrial complex that would decrease dependency 
on foreign technology, strengthen the national defense systems, and provide rural 
areas with access to the national telecommunications network.  Even though these 
policy recommendations found a separate section in the Second Five-Year 
Development Plan (1968-1972) for the first time, no significant achievements were 
realized.  In this plan period the total number of PTT employees increased from 
35.862 to 38.594 (DPT, 1972: 79).   
The Third-Five Year Development Plan (1973-1977) had more detailed 
targets and investment programs for the sector.  The plan targeted the creation of a 
secure, flexible, and advanced national telecommunications network that would 
support economic and social development goals without undermining the national 
security (DPT, 1972:103).  As can be seen in the last two plan periods, the 
telecommunications infrastructure was regarded mostly as a national security 
matter by the policy makers during the 1960s and 1970s.  This was mainly related 
to the Cold War era politics that considered Turkey to be the eastern-most 
stronghold of NATO against a possible Soviet threat.  In particular, 
telecommunications investments between 1950 and 1960 mostly aimed to create a 
network of reliable data and voice traffic in the country which could not be carried 
over telegraph lines.                    
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The late 1970s were characterized as experiencing the most severe macro-
economic crises in the developing countries.  This was mainly due to a balance of 
payment crisis, in which import-substitution industrialization policies under the 
closed economy restricted exports and focused on the internal market.  In the 
telecommunications sector, even though rapid local technological developments 
under PTT’s monopoly investment and development regimes encouraged the 
establishment of local production companies in the sector, cutbacks in financial 
resources for investments created bottlenecks for the access of individual users and 
deterioration in the quality of services.  For example, between 1964 and 1973, 
within the 19 OECD countries, the proportion of telecommunications investments 
in the total GDP of Turkey was the lowest, with 0.17%, where the same rates 
reached 0.30% in Mexico, and 0.98% in Greece (DPT, 1977: 23). 
 
3.3.4 Post-1980: Export Oriented Development 
At the beginning of the 1980s, Turkey faced further strain from a severe 
debt crisis, political violence and increasing economic problems that initiated the 
installment of another IMF-led stabilization program in January, 1980 (Aricanli and 
Rodrik, 1990).  This program was based on neo-liberal policies and aimed to 
articulate the Turkish economy to the world economy.  These policies were 
embraced by the military government, which came to power eight months later in 
September, 1980, and by subsequent governments. 
The major economic policies adapted in this era were briefly flexible 
exchange rates, austerity and export drives, public enterprise reform and 
privatization, financial liberalization, import liberalization and promotion of foreign 
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direct investments.  This program aimed on the one hand to reduce government 
intervention by placing increased reliance on market forces, and on the other hand 
to replace inward oriented industrialization with an export strategy.  
The industrialization policies of Turkey after 1980 have five interrelated 
dimensions (Kepenek, 1999).  The devaluation of the Turkish currency became an 
important policy to increase the demands for Turkish goods in foreign markets.  
The second policy is the reduction of wages and the shrinking of the internal 
market.  The third policy is the removal of state control over interest rates, foreign 
currency values and the foreign trade regime.  The fourth one is the government’s 
financial support for imports.  The last policy is the elimination of state intervention 
in the manufacturing sector through the privatization of the State Economic 
Enterprises.  
During the establishment years of liberal economic policies, successive 
governments’ priorities increased industrial exports in order to provide the 
necessary foreign currency earnings for debt servicing; to reduce inflation through 
tight monetary policies; and to suppress the labor movement during the 1980s.  In 
other words, the main purpose of the government was to orient existing and new 
manufacturing industries towards exports by restricting the expansion of the 
internal market.  The elimination of state intervention in the economy through the 
privatization of State Economic Enterprises was considered to increase the 
efficiency of the private sector in the economy.  Economic growth was expected to 
be realized through the encouragement of exports by the existing industries and 
through the removal of foreign investment restrictions to attract new export 
oriented foreign investment (Kazgan, 1988; Senses, 1989).  
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According to Aricanli and Rodrik (1990), external developments in 
Turkey’s hinterland and the internal political structure of the era prepared a suitable 
environment for the implementation of these policies.  These developments were 
military rule between 1980 and 1983, Turkey’s enhanced strategic importance for 
the US and Europe after the Iranian revolution and during the Iran-Iraq war, and the 
ability of the incoming government party (the Motherland Party) to apply the neo-
liberal economic policies after resuming democracy in1983.  
The post-1980 neo-liberal economic policies have changed the economic 
structure of the country dramatically.  The country’s exports increased during the 
1980s, particularly to Middle Eastern countries.  With respect to the economic 
performance of the model, the rate of growth in the GNP, which had declined 
towards the end of the 1970s, was restored to an average of 4.3 per cent in the 
1980s and the annual rate of industrial growth averaged 6.2 per cent in the 1980-
1989 period.  Exports recorded a significant increase in value with an annual 
average growth rate of 30 % over the same period.  Moreover, the share of 
manufactured goods in total exports increased from 36.0 % in 1980 to 78.2 % in 
1989, when export incomes compensated for 73.8% of the cost of imports. 
However, contrary to the objectives of the export-oriented growth model, 
the rapid growth in the share of manufactured goods in exports during the 1980s 
was largely generated from the fuller utilization of existing manufacturing 
capacities rather than new foreign or domestic private fixed capital formation.  It 
was achieved as a consequence of a change in exchange rate policy, the 
introduction of export incentives and subsidies rather than from new investments in 
manufacturing.  The overall public and private gross fixed capital formation 
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reached the 1976 level only in 1986 (Boratav et al., 1996).  For the public sector, 
the 1992 figures were around the 1977 levels, while private gross fixed capital 
formation reached the 1977 level in 1986.  The share of manufacturing in total 
private sector fixed capital investments declined from 36.3 per cent in 1980 to 21.8 
per cent in 1989.  The private sector’s investments shifted from manufacturing to 
housing, tourism, finance, export and trade (Sonmez, 1996).  The share of the 
public sector’s industrial investment in total public investment fell from 20.7% in 
1978 to 18.7% in 1984, 4.5% in 1990 and 2.9% in 1994 (Sonmez, 1999). 
Although the new model aimed to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
manufacturing, it is clear that there have not been significant developments since 
the beginning of the 1980s, thus new legislative arrangements were put in place to 
attract FDI.  Consequently, the number of foreign companies active in the economy 
increased from 78 in 1980 to 1856 in 1990 and 3161 in 1995 (Tokatli and Erkip, 
1998).  While foreign companies had mostly invested in manufacturing before 
1980, this shifted away from manufacturing into the service sector through the 
1990s.  Thus, investment in manufacturing as a proportion of all investment 
dropped from 91.5% in 1980 to 65.2% in 1990 and 68% in 1995, whereas in the 
service sector it rose from 8.5% in 1980 to 28.5% in 1990 and 28.9% in 1995 
(Tokatli and Erkip, 1998).  However, Turkey’s share in the world stock of FDI 
remained disappointingly low (Balasubramanyam, 2001; Sonmez, 1996).  
The improvement in industrial competitiveness during 1980-1988 was 
achieved due to real devaluation and wage repression (Boratav et al., 1996).  The 
relative price adjustments in wages, tradable prices and agriculture had vast 
redistribution consequences (Aricanli and Rodrik, 1990).  Real wages fell sharply 
after 1980, in spite of the 35 per cent increase in the absolute size of the industrial 
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labor force (TOBB, 1990).  Although the unemployment rate fell from 11.6 per 
cent in 1980 to 9.8 per cent in 1988, the absolute numbers of the unemployed had 
increased (OECD, 1990).  The model was unable to generate enough new export-
oriented investments and, therefore, was unable to create sufficient new jobs.  
The post-1980 era can be characterized as the period of revolutionary 
developments in the telecommunications sector in Turkey.  With the fundamental 
changes in macroeconomic policies, an outward-looking industrialization policy 
was employed with a strong emphasis on the upgrading of technology of existing 
industrial complexes and privatization of major state estates and companies.  In 
opening the domestic market to international investments and trade, the 
government aimed to increase the competitiveness of local companies in 
international markets.  In the Fifth Five-Year Development Plan (1985-1989), in 
line with the export-oriented industrialization policies, the government gave 
priority to financial support to export companies that planned an improvement in 
their telecommunications facilities.  The plan also anticipated channeling public 
investments in energy, mining, transportation and telecommunications sectors, in 
which the private sector would not be interested due to their economics of scale 
(DPT, 1984:35). 
In the telecommunications sector, several new applications changed the 
technological stand of Turkey in those years.  For example, the first digital 
exchanges were put in service in Ankara in 1984.  To handle the growing demand 
from the users, an underground fiber optic line between Ankara and the Golbasi 
satellite ground station was connected with 1310 nm wavelength at 140Mb/s speed 
in 1985.  Through the early years of the 1990s, the first mobile phone services, the 
first inter-city fiber optic line and the first digital radio-link line between Ankara 
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and Istanbul were opened to service.  For international connections, the EMOS-1 
project, which connects Italy, Greece, Turkey and Middle Eastern countries through 
fiber optic line, was put in service in 1990. 
As a result of the investments in telecommunications technology in the 
previous decade, the rate of digital phone lines in total lines in Turkey exceeded 
that of the OECD average between 1990 and 1995 (see Table 3.8).  In addition to 
changes in fixed line technologies, the first GSM operators, Turkcell and Telsim, 
were licensed in 1994. 
 
3.3.5 Mid-1990s and Early 2000s:  
The applications of the neo-liberal economy policies have been 
strengthened during this era.  The Turkish economy, according to some academics, 
entered a new era in 1989 with the de-regulation of the capital account and full 
liberalization of the financial markets and Turkey opened its domestic markets to 
the speculation of international finance capital (Boratav, 2004).  Thus the growth 
performance of the economy depended directly on inflows of international finance 
capital (Yeldan, 2004).  Yeldan (2004: 7) argues that “Turkey is able to attract such 
capital inflows with the aid of very high rates of financial arbitrage that it offers in 
the international capital markets.” 
Systemic crises, chronic economic instability in terms of high and 
fluctuating inflation rates, and erratic changes in the balance of payments have 
become the characteristics of the economy.  The Turkish economy experienced two 
major financial crises in 1994 and 2001 and a smaller one in 1998-1999 due to the 
strong fluctuations in capital transactions and has become one of the heavily 
indebted countries by increasing her debt from 41.7 billion dollars in 1989 to 133.2 
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billion dollars in 2003.  The average annual growth rate of the country was realized 
as 3.2%, which was the lowest growth rate the Turkish economy experienced 
during her modern history, apart from the war times.  
The degree of openness of the economy has increased to a great extent and 
its trade capacity has made significant progress, but Turkey has not showed 
progress in its industrial development.  Although the share of manufactured goods 
continued to increase in exports, the problems of the industrialization persisted in 
the 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s.  These problems are the difficulties in 
realizing fixed capital in manufacturing in a high-interest dominated economy, the 
competitiveness capacity of the manufacturing in the international market area and 
the lack of high technology (Kepenek, 1999). 
The Turkish economy has suffered in the last two decades from high 
interest rates due to the liberalization of financial transactions, and this brings about 
results such as increasing debt and difficulties in the balance of payments.  This 
economic environment has made it difficult for the private sector to invest in 
manufacturing.  One of the results of these developments has been the increasing 
investment of large industrial capital in financial assets until recently.  A 
breakdown of the aggregated balance sheet of the 500 largest industrial firms shows 
that the share of non-industrial revenues in total revenues averaged 45% in 1991-
1992, in contrast to 17.5% in 1982-1983, and reached to more than 50% in 1999-
2002 (Boratav, 2004).  Most of the former consisted of short-term returns on risk-
free financial instruments, and represent the unnatural situation of firms 
increasingly acting as rentiers (Boratav et al., 1996).  On the other hand, large-scale 
enterprises producing for both the internal and export markets benefited 
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disproportionately from the new rent-creating activities that emerged with the 
application of neo-liberal policies along with many rent-creating activities of the 
protectionist economic policies.  Some of these activities were the illicit 
appropriation of export subsidies through fictitious exports, speculative urban and 
tourist rents, privatization and stock exchange operations, government tenders, 
fiscal incentives and the bailing out of firms and banks in distress (Boratav et al., 
1996).   
The public sector’s investment in manufacturing also continued to decline 
disproportionately during this era.  The government’s policy,  influenced by the 
pressures to counter the worsening income distribution, was the deferment of the 
privatization of State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) at the beginning of the 1990s.  
However, the withdrawal of the government’s support, the improvement in wages 
at the beginning of the 1990s, and the direction of the resources to pay the domestic 
and foreign debts instead of spending them for modernization and further 
investment in SEEs created many problems for them.  Privatization, which has 
become the main policy for the SEEs since the beginning of the 1980s, came to the 
government’s agenda with different discourses.  The government argued the 
necessity of privatization of SEEs to increase their efficiency at the beginning of 
this era.  Then this discourse was replaced with the necessity of privatization to pay 
the public deficits.  Privatization accelerated in the 1990s and has been in process in 
the 2000s.  What remain today is only a few big SEEs, many of which are in the 
process of privatization, too.  
The openness of the Turkish economy increased to a great extent with a 
9.4% growth rate in imports and a 9% growth rate in exports between 1988 and 
2002.  The country’s exports increased from 2.9 billion US$ in 1980 to 10.2 billion 
  81 
US$ in 1987 and 26 billion US$ in 1998 while the share of manufactured goods in 
exports realized from 36% in 1980 to 85% in 1998 (Sonmez, 1999).  However, 
Turkey managed to improve its competitiveness in industrialization by suppressing 
labor cost, rather than with the usage of advanced technology.  Boratav (1992) 
argues that changing and redefining the policy parameters regulating and shaping 
income distribution against labor in general was a major goal of the structural 
adjustment programs.   
After a brief surge over 1990-1993, real wages have been showing decline 
for a long time.  The shrinking of the domestic market, bankruptcy of the small and 
medium-sized industries and pressure to solve increasing income inequality forced 
the government to soften the implementation of neo-liberal policies by improving 
the wages and by introducing Extra-Budgetary Funds, which increased government 
discretion in raising the public revenues from imports and directing expenditures 
toward social spending at the end of the 1980s.  There was a good improvement in 
public sector wages, with a 42% increase in 1989.  The private sector followed the 
government and increased the wages parallel to the wages in the public sector.  
Although the private sector did not bring the wages to the wage level of the public 
sector, the improvement in the wages was satisfactory.   
However this improvement in wages did not last for a long time.  Some 
mechanisms, such as the new types of employment, particularly informal jobs, de-
unionization and the lay-offs in the private sector were implemented by both 
government and private sectors (Kepenek, 1999).  According to Yeldan (2004), 
“the transfer and creation of the financial surplus through the speculative 
transactions of the financial system would directly necessitate a squeeze of the 
wage fund and a transfer of the surplus away from wage-labor towards capital 
  82 
incomes, in general.”  The result was a worsening of the increasing inequality 
among the social classes in the 1990s onwards.  
The main characteristics of the telecommunications sector in the 1990s in 
Turkey were the fast adaptation of international communications standards and the 
entry of GSM and Internet technologies.  It can be assessed that, during the 1980s, 
main efforts in the sector were to upgrade conditions at the national scale.  With the 
increasing pressure for globalization in the 1990s, however, the international 
dimension in telecommunications became more important.  For example, in those 
years Turkey’s first communication satellites, Turksat and Turksat-1C, were 
launched in 1994 and 1996, respectively.  As Table 3.4 reveals, in the 1990s, there 
were important developments in the fiber-optic transmission lines, for international 
telecommunications, as well.  
 
Table 3.4 Undersea Fiber-Optic Lines in Turkey (1999)  
Source: DPT, 2001. 
System  Capacity  Termination Countries  In Service 
EMOS-1  2*140 Mbit/s  Turkey, Italy, Greece, Israel  1991 
TURMEOS-1  16*140 Mbit/s  Turkey (Interregional)   1994 
TURCYOS-1  4*140 Mbit/s  Turkey-T.R.of North Cyprus  1994 
SEA-ME-WE-2  4*140 Mbit/s  Turkey+12 Countries  1994 
ITUR 16*140  Mbit/s  Turkey-Italy-Ukraine-Russia  1996 
KAFOS 8*140/155  Mbit/s  Turkey-Romania-Bulgaria 1997 
SEA-ME-WE-3 64*140/155  Mbit/s Turkey+33  Countries  1999 
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In this period the most important institutional change was the break up of 
the PTT, and the formation of Turk Telekom exclusively for telecommunications 
services in 1995.  With this operation it was expected that telecommunications 
services would be more effective and user-oriented.  Additionally, in order to be 
ready for privatization in the near future, which took place in many OECD 
countries mostly through 2000, Turk Telekom aimed to increase value-added 
services such as broadband internet and GSM services.  For example, the No. 7 
signaling system, which enables the use of voice, data and video streams in the 
same exchange system, was put in service in 1996.  This was one of the major 
infrastructure investments to enable the spread of the Internet over the existing 
phone lines.  In addition to other private ISPs, Turk Telekom started to provide 
internet access for existing phone subscribers with a flat annual price that was less 
than its market level to spread the use of the Internet for all.  
 
3.4 Development of the Telecommunications Services and Equipment Sectors 
in Turkey 
As has been the case in many countries, PTT was a monopoly institution 
over telecommunications services in Turkey until the early 1990s.  Thus, the 
current structure of the sector in Turkey has been very affected by the early 
developments and efforts of PTT.   
In the early 1980s, with the advent of rapid liberalization of the domestic 
market and export-based industrialization, necessity for a sophisticated 
telecommunications infrastructure came to the surface.  As a monopoly in 
providing related services and infrastructure investments, PTT heavily relied on the 
supply of telecommunications equipment from domestic and foreign companies.  In 
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accordance with the growing demand for telecommunications services, PTT 
utilized a strategy to increase the rate of digital technology in the total 
infrastructure.  In addition to the rapid shift into digital technology in the total 
infrastructure, the annual increase in the penetration rate of fixed lines mounted to 
the highest in its history.  As can be seen in Table 3.5, between 1978 and 1982 
there were roughly 500 thousand new fixed lines, namely PSTN (Public Switched 
Telephony Network), added.  Between 1982 and 1988, however, the increase in 
new PSTN lines reached 3.4 million.  The annual growth rate of the total PSTN 
lines showed a steady increase until 1998.  The most likely reason for the decrease 
after that year can be explained with the introduction of mobile phone services in 
1996.   
The total investment in the telecommunications infrastructure and 
equipment is also another indication of the growing importance of the 
telecommunications infrastructure in Turkey.  Until the mid-1990s, 
telecommunications investment per capita fluctuated between one-tenth and one-
eighth of that which OECD averages.  After the late 1990s, however, 
telecommunications investment per capita jumped to one-fourth of the OECD 
average and remained roughly the same through today (Table 3.6). 
Another indication of the growing importance of the telecommunications 
sector in Turkey is the percentage rate of public telecommunications investments in 
gross fixed capital formation.   As can be seen from Table 3.7, after the late 1990s, 
the related average recorded was more than twice as much as that of other OECD 
countries.   
 
 
  85 
 
Table 3.5 Developments in Public Switched  Telephony  Network  (PSTN)     
Capacity in Turkey 
Source: Soyak, 1994 and Telecommunications Authority, 2004. 
YEAR PSTN  LINES 
INCREASE RATE 
(%) 
PENETRATION  
(Lines Per 100 Capita) 
1978  986.000 na  Na 
1982  1.501.000 52  3 
1988  4.920.000 228  9 
1995  13.227.000 168  21,2 
1996  14.286.000 8  22,4 
1997  15.579.000 9  24,8 
1998  16.806.000 7,88  26,3 
1999  17.911.000 6,57  27,6 
2000  18.395.000 2,70  28,0 
2001  18.904.000 2,77  28,5 
2002  18.890.000 -0,08  27,1 
2003  18.916.000 0,14  26,7 
2004  19.125.000 1,10  27,0 
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Table: 3.6 Public Telecommunications Investment per capita in Turkey and OECD 
Average (USD). 
Source: OECD Telecommunications Outlook, 2005. 
 
Average 
1988-90 
Average 
1991-93 
Average 
1994-96 
Average 
1997-99 
2001 2002  2003 
Avg. 
2001-
03 
TURKEY  9,97 13,48 8,12  43,98  43,14  31,04  31,11  35,10 
OECD  86,76 102,21  119,21  149,33  174,38  125,11  111,85  137,11
 
 
Table: 3.7 Public telecommunications investments in Turkey and OECD, as a 
percentage of gross fixed capital formation (GFCF). 
Source: OECD Telecommunications Outlook, 2005. 
 
Average 
1988-90 
Average 
1991-93 
Average 
1994-96 
Average 
1997-99 
2001 2002 2003 
Avg. 
2001-
03 
TURKEY  1,99 1,94 1,27 6,11  11,19  7,08  5,94  8,07 
OECD  2,51 2,54 2,61 3,20  3,76  2,73  2,21  2,90 
 
The quality of telecommunications investment can be measured with the 
rate of digital lines in total lines in service.  As Table 3.8 suggests, until the late 
1990s, Turkey averaged better than the OECD average in total digital lines in use.  
This is one of the results of the relatively late development of the 
telecommunications sector in Turkey.  However, as a latecomer in industrialization, 
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Turkey took the advantage of adopting the latest technological developments in the 
sector more rapidly than the industrial countries. 
 
Table: 3.8 Digitalization in the OECD area; fixed network (% of digital access 
lines) 
Source: OECD Telecommunications Outlook, 2005. 
  1990  1993  1995 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
TURKEY  41  74  77 82 84 87 89 90 90 
OECD  39.3  68  77 90 94 95 97 98 99 
 
3.4.1 Development of Technologic Capacity in the Telecommunications 
Equipment Sector 
The foundation of the Turkish telecommunications equipment sector started 
with the PTT-ARLA (PTT Research Laboratories), which was founded under the 
directives given by the National Security Council in 1965 (Soyak, 1994:81).  The 
main goal of PTT-ARLA was to produce necessary telecommunications equipment 
for national use, which was largely imported from other countries.  During the 
balance of payments crisis years in the late 1960s, PTT-ARLA acted as an import 
substitution institution in the sector by conducting basic research and development 
and adapting imported equipment into local conditions.   
The first products of PTT-ARLA were electro-mechanic-based analog 
multiplex systems, power systems, and some measurement systems to meet the 
demands of PTT.  The first initiatives in the equipment production sector were 
designed to utilize the engineering knowledge that had already accumulated locally.  
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For example, due to the balance of payments crisis in the late 1960s, the SIEMENS 
EZ1 analog multiplex systems were adapted to local conditions through some 
engineering modifications.   
As a condition in a public procurement, NETAS was established in 1967 
with a partnership between PTT and Northern Networks LLC. of Canada, formerly 
Northern Electric Company LTD., to produce telecommunications equipment in 
Turkey.  NETAS remained a national company until 1993 when majority shares of 
the firm were sold to the foreign parent company.  As a requirement of the import 
substitution phase of macroeconomic conditions, the firm mainly manufactured 
Cross Bar phone switches and phone devices for end-customer use.  In addition to 
PTT-ARLA, NETAS became the first private telecommunications company in 
starting research and development in Turkey by establishing an R&D department in 
1973.    
SIMKO, a joint company of SIEMENS Telecommunications AG., of 
Germany and KOC Holding of Turkey, was the first company to produce Cross Bar 
switches under a foreign license in 1964.  Following SIMKO, with their own 
designs and manufacturing, NETAS, TELESIS, and KAREL became other 
suppliers of Cross Bar switches after this date.   
In the transmission equipment field, the first multiplex systems (PCM) 
which convert analog data into digital format for transmission were obtained 
through imports, and the first digital transmissions in Turkey started in 1974.  In the 
following years, PTT-ARLA and TUBITAK (Turkish Higher Council for Scientific 
and Technological Research), developed the first PCMs with local resources.  
As was mentioned in the previous parts of the chapter, in digitalization of the total 
telecommunications network in Turkey, the early 1980s were the years in which the 
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most rapid developments were observed.  In 1984, with a license agreement 
between NETAS and NORTHERN TELECOM, imported digital switches DMS 
100 and DMS-200 were put in service. 
In the same year, PTT-ARLA became a joint stock company, TELETAS, 
and introduced second generation digital switches which were manufactured under 
a license from ITT/BELL in 1985.  Manufacturing with totally local resources, 
NETAS provided the first small city analog switches and the first rural area digital 
switches to the PTT network in 1985 and 1989, respectively.      
 
3.4.2 The Performance of the Turkish Telecommunications Equipment Sector 
by Years 
A close look at the performance of the Turkish Telecommunications 
Equipment Sector in Turkey reveals the macroeconomic characteristics of the 
whole economy in Turkey.  During the import substitution years between 1960 and 
1980, domestic demand for the sector was mainly provided by local production and 
import of telecommunications equipment.  As the export figures show, until the 
mid-1980s, there was almost no export capacity (Table 3.9).  This was also related 
to the low levels of the share of investments in the telecommunications 
infrastructure in the gross domestic product, which between the mid-1970s and 
mid-1980s was only 0.3% of the GDP, on average.  After the mid-1980s, however, 
the same percentage ranged between 0.8 and 1.0 of the GDP in respective years 
(Soyak, 1994:85).  Another reason for the low levels of investment in the sector in 
the pre-1980s was the monopoly position of the Turkish PTT as a sole actor in the 
telecommunications sector in infrastructure investments and equipment purchases. 
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Table 3.9 Production, Export and Import Figures in Turkish Telecommunications 
Equipment Sector, in Million USD. 
Source: State Planning Organization, Yearly Programs, 1970-1993; TESID, 
Turkish Electronic Industrialists Association, Yearly Almanacs 1995-2004. 
YEARS PRODUCTION EXPORT IMPORT 
1970  4,35 - 10,3 
1975  22,24 0,16  34,2 
1980  57,99 -  18,2 
1985  131,31 21,9  52,5 
1989  249,3 27,4  215,1 
1990  461,8 57,6  175,2 
1991  669,4 59,8  189,7 
1992  769 70,5  159,7 
1993  716,1 79,7  266,3 
1994  400,8 92,8  366,0 
1995  365,5 107,7  418,9 
1996  550,8 140,5  510,9 
1997  665,5 137,8  835,3 
1998  624,3 151,8  1.200,1 
1999  841,0 149,8  2.001,7 
2000  924,0 400,0  2.463,3 
2001  935,0 534,9  972,1 
2002  952,2 547,9  901,1 
2003  912,0 537,4  1.096,8 
2004  975,0 603,4  1.911,0 
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With the transition to an export-based economic growth model and the 
implementation of free market rules as the main direction of the economy, 
provision of a basic telecommunications infrastructure came as an inevitable point.  
As was previously stated, after the mid-1980s, the share of the investment in the 
sector in the total GDP increased gradually and in the telecommunications 
equipment sector, additional firms appeared as new entrants and increased the 
competition in the market.  As the subjects of this thesis, two international 
companies with relatively high shares in the market as new technology generators 
between 1980 and early 2000s have been chosen and their changing positions as 
some of the most important contributors to the innovation capacity in the Turkish 
telecommunications sector are discussed in the next chapter. 
 
3.4.3 The Changing Role of the State in the Innovation System of Turkish 
Telecommunications Sector  
The innovation capacity of the Turkish telecommunications equipment 
sector is closely related to the organizational structure of the sector.  As the first 
part of the chapter revealed, the innovation structure of the global 
telecommunications sector in different periods can be generalized into three 
different modes.  In the first period, the state monopoly service provider in 
telecommunications was usually closely interconnected with its in-house R&D 
department, which was responsible for new product development.  Direct state 
funding, public procurement regulations, university-industry  partnerships, and 
strategic project initiatives had main instruments of innovations in this period and 
the role of state in the new technology development was direct and active.   
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In Turkey, the telecommunications sector, like many other sectors, was also 
under direct state support until the mid-1990s.  As this thesis has revealed, until the 
1950s, for mostly defense-related reasons, a nationwide network expansion and 
service provision policy was in effect.  During the Second World War, Turkey kept 
its neutrality but a military mobilization on a national scale required a well-working 
network and thus, PTT’s most important investments in those years were related to 
military communication within major cities and various fronts.  Similarly, in the 
beginning of the cold war period, the NATO-financed telecommunications projects 
with some civilian use were the main initiatives in the sector until the late 1960s.  
As PTT assumed the role of monopoly service provider, it configured the new 
technology development and use by establishing its own R&D lab and setting local 
content requirements for other private companies.  In addition to civil use, public 
and private telecom companies involved in some defense-related projects beginning 
as early as 1970.  Even though some generic foreign technologies were used in their 
implementation, for the most part local workforces and technology were employed 
in the realization of these projects, for security reasons.  As the next chapter 
reveals, this direct involvement of the state in the local technology creation through 
defense-related projects had a positive effect on the technology capacity of the 
case-study firms.  However, as the case studies reveal, these defense-related 
projects have not created wide-ranging technological capacity that would increase 
the civil use of related technologies.   
After the liberalization of telecommunications services and the privatization 
of equipment companies, the direct involvement of the Turkish state in technology 
became limited.  After the privatization of Turk Telekom in 2005, the major 
telecom equipment companies which used to provide components for network 
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installation and development to Turk Telekom found themselves vulnerable in the 
highly competitive market, due to changing procurement policies of the new 
company.  With the decrease in direct orders from Turk Telekom, these companies 
had to suspend their local R&D activities on fixed-line equipment and technologies.   
On the other hand, because of the ongoing projects and progress toward the 
development of more sophisticated technologies, a core R&D department in Firm A 
has been kept active for the defense-related projects.  With the decrease in R&D 
activities on civilian technologies after the beginning of 2000, defense-related R&D 
activities became the only activities with direct state support in the sector.  As 
Chapter 6 shows, the state support for new technology development in the sector 
has been transformed into indirect support through various science and technology 
programs of universities, non-governmental organizations and other institutions, 
such as EU funds and grants from private firms. 
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CHAPTER 4.0 CASE STUDIES: THE EFFECTS OF PRIVATIZATION 
ON TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT CAPACITIES OF TURKISH 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT COMPANIES 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The development of the Turkish telecommunications sector in general was 
summarized in the previous chapter.  The following chapter deals with two case 
studies of firms selected on the basis of their changing trajectory in local 
technology development capacity over the period of their privatization in the early 
1990s.  The selected firms as case studies represent some important 
characteristics: First of all, they are the first two firms established to manufacture 
most of the telecommunications equipment that PTT demanded between the late 
1960s and the early 1990s.  Another important characteristic of these two firms is 
their initial aim to increase local technology capacity by mobilizing domestic 
resources under the import substitution economic model.  For Firm A, this goal 
was supported with an initial technology transfer agreement with the parent 
company at the start up phase and research and development efforts primarily 
targeted the localization of this imported technology.  
In contrast, Firm B was established as a research and development 
laboratory for the Turkish PTT.  In its initial period, Firm B worked 
independently to manufacture telecommunications equipment both to increase the 
technological capacity in the sector and to reduce foreign currency payments for 
imported equipment.  The establishment of Firm B as a research laboratory also 
coincided with the similar establishments in PTTs in some European countries, 
some of which consequently became global telecom giants such as ALCATEL in 
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France, SIEMENS in Germany, and TELEFONICA in Spain.  As the following 
chapter reveals, from its initial establishment until its privatization, Firm B was 
respected as a reliable alternative to dependency on global telecom giants in 
technology creation.  
 
Table 4.1 The Share of Firm A and B in Total Telecommunications Sector 
Production and Export 
YEARS  PRODUCTION, in Million USD  EXPORT, in Million USD 
 
FIRMS 
A+B 
% of Total Telecom 
Sector 
FIRMS 
A+B 
% of Total Telecom 
Sector 
1980 34,7  60  na  na 
1985 98,8  75    (21.9) 
1990 290,5  63    (57.6) 
1995 281,0  77    (107.7) 
2000 343,0  37    (400) 
2005       (765  ) 
 
In addition to being the oldest two establishments in the sector, Firm A 
and Firm B together also counted for more than half of the total production and 
exports between years 1980 and 2000 (Table 4.1).  Since no reliable 
documentation is available, it is not possible to comment on related data for the 
pre-1980 period.  However, it would not be wrong to say that, with domestic 
market oriented development logic and under the limited foreign trade conditions, 
these two firms realized most of the manufacturing in the sector during the 1970s.  
The sharp decline in the total share of the two companies in the sectoral 
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production in the late 1990s is mainly related to the inclusion of a third 
telecommunications company and the introduction of mobile GSM services and 
the establishment of related firms in the mid-1990s.  Another reason for the 
relative decrease in Firm A’s and Firm B’s total share in total telecommunications 
equipment production was the rapid growth in imported equipment in the late 
1990s (See Table 3.9). 
Even though the selected telecommunications equipment companies for 
the case study were established under different circumstances, with the 
involvement of their respective parent companies as the main technology 
provider, both companies experienced roughly the same technological trajectory 
throughout their existence.  In its initial period, the research and development 
policy of Firm A was mainly concentrated on the adaptation of imported 
equipment into local conditions in which the parent company acted as the main 
resource for the appropriate technology.  On the other hand, unlike Firm A, Firm 
B was a research and development laboratory of PTT.  Thus, in its initial period, 
Firm B independently worked to gain technologic capability to manufacture the 
imported equipment in local conditions.  In its later stages, however, Firm B also 
became dependent on its parent company.   
The case study companies acted as the sole providers of 
telecommunications equipment of the Turkish PTT under the protected domestic 
market conditions.  This mutual dependency provided an assured market for both 
companies in the earlier stages that created sound financial support for their R&D 
operations.  However, starting in the late 1980s, payment problems of PTT and 
the growth policy of the parent companies in the surrounding region caused the 
firms to engage in new business partnerships in the neighboring countries. 
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As the telecommunications equipment technology evolved from electro-
mechanic to digital, both companies experienced the same technological 
trajectories in their R&D departments.  While hardware development was the 
main component in the R&D facilities during the previous period, more than 75% 
of R&D engineers were occupied with hardware development.  However, after 
the transition to digital technologies this ratio changed to around 25%.  In addition 
to changes in the employment structure, R&D departments in both companies 
after their privatization became one of the software development centers of their 
parent companies.  Except for some project-based solutions for the parent 
companies, this specialization in software development resulted in a transfer of 
global ownership rights and development responsibility of some software to be 
used with the equipment produced by the respective parent companies.  This 
transition after privatization caused a gradual increase in outsourcing of all 
production facilities and left the companies consisting almost only of management 
and R&D departments. 
 
4.2 Firm A 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Firm A was established in 1967 as a joint venture between the Turkish 
Post Telephone and Telegraph Authority (PTT), now Turk Telekom and Northern 
Telecom Limited, now Nortel Networks Corporation of Canada.  The majority 
shareholder of the firm was PTT and the parent company held 31% of shares until 
its privatization in 1993.  The main goal of this joint venture was supplying 
Turkey with locally manufactured telecommunications equipment.  Currently, 
31.87% of the Firm’s shares are traded on the Istanbul Stock Exchange, and the 
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major shareholders are Nortel Networks (53.13%) and Turkish Armed Forces 
Foundation (15%). 
In the earlier years of the firm, public switches, transmission systems, and 
office switches (PBX) were the main products.  In the late 1980s, fiber optic lines 
equipment and power equipment were added to the production line.  In the late 
1990s, however, the company moved to the production of network systems and 
some military telecommunications equipment.  As of 2005, 530 employees, 360 
of whom are R&D engineers, work in the company.     
 
4.2.2 Technology Acquirement and Use in Firm A:  
As one of the main suppliers for PTT at the time, Firm A obtained its first 
production technology from its parent company through a licensing agreement in 
1967. Although the parent company has remained the major source of technology, 
the firm set up its own R&D lab in 1973.  The main goal of the lab was to 
increase the local content of the products, which was a proper intent in an import 
substitution model of macro economic settings.   
The R&D lab in the firm was operated partly independently from the 
parent company, Northern Telecom, owing to the almost no limitations on the 
subject of license agreement.  The lab’s first achievement, and the first technology 
transfer from the parent company, was the transformation of Cross-Bar switches, 
from a electro-mechanic to an electronic base.  In 1982, the first switches that 
enabled direct calls at the intercity and international levels, Spacenet EX100 and 
EX200, were put in service.  In the following years, the first rural switch, ELIF-1, 
which was made completely in Turkey, was produced (Soyak, 1994:93). 
 
  99 
Table 4.2 Some basic information about Firm A, (*) Million USD 
Source: Firm A Annual Reports  
YEARS EMPLOYEES SALES*  NET  PROFIT*  INVESTMENT*
1980  1823 34,7  7,7  0,7 
1985  2665 45,7  3,8  2,9 
1990  1735 140,4  6,5  3,9 
1991  1738 223,1  33,9  3,3 
1992  1955 273,7  34,5  11,3 
1993  1954 330,9  57,4  14,7 
1994  1486 213,6  114,7  11,4 
1995  1522 234,1  105,2  10,3 
1996  1601 348,3  74,2  6,2 
1997  1656 263,0  42,6  5,7 
1998  1239 209,0  9,4  4,4 
1999  1247 217,3  20,5  3,3 
2000  1076 241,7  28,0  4,8 
2001  619 132,7 11,9  2,1 
2002  537 98,0  9,6  0,9 
2003  529 131,9  4,4  1,2 
2004  521 152,4  7,4  1,7 
2005  530 101,4  12  1,0 
 
 
 
  100 
Transition to digital technology in telecommunications was partly enabled 
by obtaining technological capability through the transformation of electro-
mechanic systems to electronic systems.  However, instead of allowing Firm A to 
develop digital switching technology in-house, the parent company insisted on 
selling the related technology in an additional licensing agreement.  Thus, 
beginning in 1984, production of the first digital switches, DMS-100 and DMS-
200, was started in the firm through the licensing agreement.  In the following 
years, digitization in the production process was also realized through the 
contributions from the parent company.  As a result of this process, the first 
digital office switch, (PBX), DIGINET DX 4, was locally designed and produced 
in 1989.   
In 1989, an expert group was set up to improve the software technology 
of the digital switches. This was the first move from an independent R&D facility 
which aimed to realize original product development through utilization of the 
local resources.  This was related to the parent company’s global policy of 
establishing expert R&D groups that specialized in the development of some 
specific parts of a worldwide-selling product.  In the case of Firm A, this new 
division of labor was dictated by the parent company as part of the development 
of the software side of the digital switches.   
In the late 1970s, some social democratic governments favored a 
nationally owned company in such a strategic field as telecommunications and 
obtained ownership of majority shares of the firm through capital increases.   
However, since it was the main source of technology, being in the position of 
being a small partner in the firm was not a sustainable business practice for the 
parent company in competitive global conditions.  Thus, this condition was held 
  101 
only until the early 1990s and as a result of an international tender, 20% of the 
Firm A shares that were held by the Public Participation Administration (PPA) 
were sold and transferred to Northern Telecom Limited in March 1993, and the 
parent company’s share increased to 51% in Firm A.   During my interviews with 
the firm, this was elaborated as a necessary condition for a technology flow 
procedure.     
As can be seen from Table 4.2, in 1993 the firm experienced the strongest 
sales since its establishment.  This was due to high demand from PTT for DMS 
urban exchanges, power systems and data transmission products and increasing 
export capacity owing to a high level of devaluation of the Turkish currency.  In 
the same year, Firm A signed an agreement to establish a joint venture company 
with Kazakhstan to commence production of telephone sets and rural exchanges 
under the firm’s own license.  The new company was called Vesnet, and 51% of 
its shares were owned by Firm A. This was a similar business move by the parent 
company Nortel Networks, through which the Firm entered the Turkish market 
with major telecommunications equipment licensing. 
In line with the purpose of its establishment, Firm A constantly increased 
the local content of the products that were produced under the license of the 
parent company. In the R&D unit, existing analog technologies were successfully 
transformed to digital technologies.  The firm kept the R&D expenses to a total 
sales ratio between 6% and 9% to maintain its market share in domestic and 
global markets.  Even though the R&D expenses stayed at a relatively similar 
level from the early 1970s, the distribution of engineers between the hardware and 
software sections of the R&D unit changed substantially.  As another study about 
Firm A showed, until the mid-1980s, almost 75% of the R&D engineers in the 
  102 
firm were responsible for hardware development.  However, this ratio changed 
dramatically after the early 1990s and only 15 to 20% of the total R&D engineers 
remained as hardware developers (Ansal and Soyak, 1999:44).  Even though this 
trend can be attributed to rapid developments in digital technology, it is clearly 
seen in Figure 4.1 that, after the mid-1990s, the hardware development side of the 
firm significantly diminished.  As interviews with the firm representatives 
revealed, this was in accordance with one of the parent company’s global firm 
strategies.  According to this strategy, Firm A developed DMS exchange 
technology after its transfer in the early 1980s and exported the same technology 
by adapting the original content to the local conditions in export markets.   
According to one company official, this was also a result of the technological 
conditions in Turkey.  For example, to build an ATM exchange, it was necessary 
to employ around 4000 engineers.  However, in those days, there were about 1000 
engineers in Turkey in this specific field.  Since current global conditions in the 
sector make it almost impossible for less developed countries like Turkey to have 
ownership of a product as a whole, the firm today specializes in some specific 
parts of the parent company’s particular global products and makes efforts to get 
some ownership rights on them. 
As the same person whom I interviewed explains, within the biggest three 
sector companies in Turkey, Firm A is the only one which returned the inward 
technology transfer into an outward technology export gateway to surrounding 
countries in the region (Akurgal, 2000). 
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Table 4.3 Research and Development Expenses and R&D Personnel in Firm A 
Source: Firm A Annual Reports 
YEARS 
R&D 
EXPENSES 
(Million USD) 
R&D/TOTAL 
SALES, % 
R&D 
PERSONNEL 
R&D/TOTAL 
PERSONNEL % 
1980  NA -  NA  - 
1985  2,2 4,8  NA  - 
1990  8,4 6,0  NA  - 
1991  13,1 5,9  200  11,5 
1992  16,1 5,9  267  13,7 
1993  16,7 5,0  262  13,4 
1994  15,3 7,2  290  19,5 
1995  18,5 7,9  315  20,7 
1996  20,1 5,8  328  20,5 
1997  23,9 9,1  379  22,9 
1998  18,7 8,9  362  29,2 
1999  16,3 7,5  320  25,7 
2000  21,5 8,9  330  30,7 
2001  10,0  7,5             285  46 
2002  7,2  7,4             260  48,4 
2003  8,5 6,4  240  45,4 
2004  6,6 4,4  272  52,2 
2005  7,3          6.1  360  65 
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In comparison with the parent company’s level of R&D technology at 
home, and the firm’s R&D technology, similarities can be found on some project-
specific cases.  If the parent company wants to produce a specific component in 
Turkey, the firm obtains the necessary machinery and equipment equivalent to the 
parent company’s at home.  Similar conditions are also valid for other subsidies of 
the parent company in different countries.  The parent company avoids creating 
competition between different subsidies over a specific component and rather, 
encourages subsidies to increase their knowledge over different technologies 
(Akurgal, 2000).  
 
1973-1993 Period  
1973-1974 Local design change on electromechanical Bar Switches 
1977 Starting first software development activities 
1978 First steps in software development  
         Microcomputer Controlled Automatic Route Testing 
         System ARTER and Video Switchboard System: VISA 1978 
1979  Development of Automatic Rural switch: N5-3B 
1982  First electronic PABX, locally designed SpaceNet family: EX-100 and 
EX200 
1983 The printed circuit board manufacturing workshop 
         Introduction of digital technology: DMS-100 switching 
1984  Push-button telephone sets introduced 
         First digital switch DMS-100 put into service 
Figure 4.1 Major R&D and Related Activities in Firm A (1973-2004) 
Source: Company Annual Reports, Ansal, H. and Soyak, A., 1999. 
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Figure 4.1 (Continued) 
1985 First tandem switch DMS-200 put into service 
         First locally designed electronic rural exchange ELIF-1 put into service 
         Establishment of software development group for DMS systems 
1986 Computer-Backed Design System (CBDS) put into service in R&D unit  
         High capacity SpaceNet family members: EX-2000 introduced  
         New rural exchange ELIF-II   introduced  
         Joint R&D activity on DMS exchange systems started 
1988 First locally designed fully digital rural switch: DICLE introduced  
        Support activities for Gateway DMS-300  
        Power unit for small offices, SOP 
1989 Fully digital Diginet DX4 switches  
         Deployment of first Turkey-specific DMS load  with locally developed 
features  
         Participation in the Common Channel Signaling No:7 development on DMS  
switches  
        Telecommunications network design for Russian Federation 
1990 Development of hardware and software for the Announcement in Ringback 
tone feature on DMS  
         Participation in the DMS-300 development Commonwealth of Independent 
States telecommunications network signaling development 
1991 Diginet DX2 switches developed  
         Design of DMS systems for China and Morocco  
         Design of the direct fiber-optic transmission from the exchange 
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Figure 4.1 (Continued) 
1992  Interactive Compound Auxillary Platform for Services (ICAPS) for new 
generation Diginet family 
         A  new  hardware-independent,  time-sharing,  multitasking  software  design 
for rural switches  
         First application of DRX-4 (DICLE) in Macedonia 
         An original application on DRX-4: Built in Fiber Interface 
         Design of power unit for urban switches and radio-link systems: PS-2000 
         Remote Management System (RMS) for power systems 
1993 First Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) 
         New member of Diginet family DX3 
         Special telephone set design for DX2 and DX3 
         Object-oriented software design and flexible application capabilities in rural 
products family  
         Universal Tone Receiver card hardware and software design for DMS, 
         Design of first standard power unit in cabinets: KEBAN 
         Flexible Multiplexer for transmission: FLUX 
1993-2004 Period (After Privatization) 
1994 Ownership of international software development on the DMS 100i 
switching system. 
         Proprietary, integrated conference circuit NETCONF was introduced which 
made the firm one of the only three conference circuit producers in the world. 
         A new joint venture RONTEL with Russian Federation was established in 
which Firm A owned 45% of shares to manufacture rural switching and terminal 
equipment under license from the firm. 
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Figure 4.1 (Continued) 
1995 First major defense contract, Identification of Friend or Foe System (IFF) 
was awarded to the firm. 
         Software  supplied  to  the  parent  company  amounted  to  11  Million  US 
Dollars. 
1996 Preparation of software loads to DMS 100i exchange to China, Central and 
Latin America, CIS and Turkey. 
         Software  supplied  to  the  parent  company  amounted  to  10  Million  US 
Dollars. 
1997 Global responsibility for the preparation of software loads to DMS 100i 
exchange to China, Central and Latin America, CIS and Turkey 
         Software  supplied  to  the  parent  company  amounted  to  10  Million  US 
Dollars. 
1999 Decision made for the investment of 15 Million US Dollars in two years to 
expand capabilities in optical networks and technologies of the R&D unit 
2000 For the expansion of the national switching network Firm A was awarded a 
contract for the delivery of SDH transmission systems.  The contract represented 
a 40 % market share and constituted an important milestone for the company 
which involved local production and development. 
         Field trials of the locally designed tactical ATM and ISDN switches and 
terminals for the armed forces were successfully completed. 
2002 Nortel Networks moves its overall international switching R&D program 
primeship to Firm A. 
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Figure 4.1 (Continued) 
2003 TASMUS (Tactical Area Combat Telecommunication System) developed 
for Turkish Armed Forces utilizing ATM, ISDN and X25 switching infrastructure 
were equipped with high speed IP based communication capabilities providing 
video and data transmission over ADSL. 
         The  155Mbit/s  (STM-1)  product,  TN-1XE,  compatible  with  Turkish 
standards, was locally developed for Turk Telekom, other operators and Internet 
service providers. 
         Software  development  for  foreign  markets  amounted  to  6.9  Million  US 
Dollars. 
2004 The feature set of TN-1XE transmission product which was fully developed 
in Firm A’s R&D unit was enriched with the design of the Electrical Line Card 
and Very Long Haul Optical Line Card (1550nm/80km). 
 
 
4.2.3 Effects of Privatization on the Firm A 
As can be seen from Table 4.2, total employment in Firm A has been 
reduced since its privatization in 1993.  According to an upper-mid level manager 
who was responsible for relations with universities and research groups, this was 
a result of the parent company’s global restructuring plan that followed a cost 
reduction plan through downsizing and outsourcing.  As the annual amount of 
investment of the firm decreased after the mid-1990s, Firm A started to outsource 
many divisions that once realized all the stages of production.  The paint shop was 
the first section to be outsourced.  Then the electrical bobbin-making, sheet metal 
molding, and cable manufacture sections followed.  In 2000, the printed-circuit 
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(PC) board assembly line was outsourced to Solectron Electronic Ltd (Akurgal, 
2000).  According to the same person, even one part of the R&D unit was 
outsourced.  The PC board layout group, which converts the draft layouts into 
ready-to-produce board prints, also left Firm A.   
The sudden decrease in employment in the last decade has been mainly 
related to this massive outsourcing of the firm’s basic functions.  Usually, after 
leaving Firm A, former employees set up new spin-off companies in a similar 
field to provide the firm related components and services.  In order to support 
these new companies, through a gentlemen’s agreement, Firm A guaranteed to 
buy from these new companies without accepting any competition from other 
companies for up to two years.  Besides these new set-ups, the firm systematically 
uses other small firms for outsourcing and supports them with some technical 
expertise if it is necessary.  For outsourcing of a component or service, the firm 
usually requests competitive prices from more than one qualified supplier, and 
buys the cheapest one.  
The institutional collaborations for the support of R&D activities of the 
firm include the Technology Development Foundation of Turkey (TTGV), whose 
main goal is to support the R&D activities financially in critical fields, and the 
Scientific and Technical Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK).  According to 
the records of TTGV, Firm A received financial support for new product 
development activities for at least three projects since the establishment of TTGV. 
The R&D unit of the firm is also connected with the R&D units in the parent 
company and other subsidies through TURPAK (Pocket Switching Data Network 
of Turkey).  Through this network, R&D units in both companies synchronize and 
share the information and developments on specific projects.    
  110 
Firm A is also one of the biggest companies in Turkey to provide military 
telecommunications systems to the armed forces.  As Figure 4.1 shows, in the last 
decade the firm provided some major telecommunications systems to the Turkish 
Armed Forces.  Since the Turkish Army Forces Foundation has a major share in 
the firm, for most defense projects it was the main provider, together with 
ASELSAN, a defense technologies company owned directly by the Foundation.  
However, because of the firm’s dependency on the technologies of the parent 
company, the number of defense projects was kept limited for security matters. 
 
4.2.4 The Evaluation of Innovation Capability in Firm A 
4.2.4.1 Pre-Privatization Period (1973-1994) 
Firm A was established as a joint venture between NORTEL and PTT in 
1967.  During the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) policies, the Firm 
produced necessary telecommunications equipment in accordance with the local 
content requirements of PTT.  The related technologies were acquired through 
technology transfer agreements, which was a common policy in developing 
countries that could not produce necessary technologies domestically.   
In functional terms, the research and development activities in Firm A can 
be divided into two main tasks.  The first task the local R&D (the local R&D 
unit), and the second one has been the company-related R&D (the company R&D 
unit), which is responsible for the localization and development of equipment that 
was originally produced by the parent company, NORTEL.  However, until the 
introduction of DMS systems in the mid-1980s, the R&D department kept 
working on both tasks under one roof.   
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In those years, the major tasks of the R&D unit were to make localizations 
on the cross bar switches, and digital DMS switches and on their respective 
software. The introduction of locally designed original rural switch N5-3B in 
1979 and the electronic PBX office exchanges with embedded software EX-
100/EX-200 in 1982 were the first achievements of local technology development 
efforts. In line with the investment policy of PTT, local development of a rural 
exchange system that would work flexibly in various conditions was also realized 
with the introduction of ELIF-1 rural exchanges in 1985. Until the acceptance of 
major defense contracts in the late 1990s, the major achievements of the local 
R&D unit remained limited to the feature development of rural exchanges.  This 
is very similar to conditions in India and Brazil, in which RAX and TROPICO 
rural exchange systems were developed successfully in local conditions, 
respectively. However, as Mani and Schima stated, even though these countries 
achieved the development of rural exchanges that counted for more than half of 
the total capacity, they were not able to step up to a higher level of technological 
achievements. According to Mani, India’s failure was due to a lack of strategic 
direction of the public research laboratory, C-DOT (2005). In Brasil, however, 
after its privatization, CqPD, the public research laboratory, was more oriented 
towards specific support for the parent company’s global clients (Schima, 2004). 
The successful application of ELIF-1 and ELIF-2 rural exchanges by Firm 
A in the domestic market brought trade opportunities with Turkey’s surrounding 
countries and some other countries in the Middle East and Commonwealth of 
Independent Countries (the former Soviet republics) in the late 1980s.  This was a 
good business application in which a domestically developed product had 
technology and price advantages over other products from European and North 
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American countries.  In a region with middle and lower-middle income countries 
with vast rural areas like the former Soviet countries, Turkey had the opportunity 
to implement this related technology by financing the R&D through a strong 
export movement. 
With the introduction of DMS-100 digital switching systems in urban 
areas, Firm A increased its R&D personnel in the mid-1980s.  As Table 4.2 
reveals, since 1985, total R&D expenses and R&D personnel have increased 
steadily.  According to one company official, this is mainly due to increasing 
workforce demand for software developments of DMS systems which are directly 
imported from the parent company (Aydin, 2006).  After the first DMS-100 was 
put in service in 1984, a software development group was set up in 1985 and joint 
R&D with the parent company was started in 1986.  This focus on DMS systems 
resulted in an official break-up of the R&D unit, and the company R&D unit was 
established.  Even though the total number of employees in Firm A decreased 
between 1985 and 1995, the number of R&D personnel increased until the 2001 
economic crisis in Turkey and this was mainly due to increases in the 
employment in the company R&D unit (See Table 4.1, and 4.2).  
As Fransman correctly put it, in those years, the telecommunications 
sector was organized around the principles of the “old telecom industries” 
(Fransman, 2001), that is, the state monopoly service provider acted as the steady 
buyer of the domestic equipment suppliers.  Thus, under the closed 
macroeconomic conditions, companies were organized vertically, that is, nearly 
all parts of the equipment were produced under in-house conditions without 
considering the relative cost of this equipment in the world markets.  The mutual 
dependency was so high between the state monopoly and the equipment 
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companies that PTT even demanded the production of telephone sets that were to 
be distributed to end-users.   
The major source of technology in this period was the parent company 
NORTEL’s own R&D departments, which were located in Canada.  As NORTEL 
assumed the provision of related equipment to Bell Canada, major breakthrough 
developments were achieved with the technological innovations of Western 
Electric, which held minority stakes in NORTEL.  In 1971, Bell Canada and 
NORTEL established a joint R&D subsidiary called BNR and developed one of 
the first small digital exchanges in the late 1970s that were sold worldwide 
(Fransman, 2001). 
 
4.2.4.2 Post-Privatization Period 
After the introduction of rural exchanges ELIF-1 and ELIF-II, the first 
digital rural switch DICLE was also developed in 1988.  However, until the mid-
1990s, the local R&D unit was mostly occupied with the improvement of features 
of the rural and PBX office exchanges that were locally designed by Firm A.  
After the privatization of Firm A in 1994, the first defense contract was signed 
with the Turkish Army Forces in 1995, and the development of the Identification 
of Friend or Foe System (IFF) was completed in the same year.  Even though the 
related technology was transferred from the parent company, the requirement of 
confidentiality in the specific equipment design, production and the related test 
operations necessitated the production under local conditions.  According to the 
director of the local R&D, for the purpose of this project, Firm A invested more 
than 4 million dollars to realize production and testing processes, and this 
generated an important capability for the related projects (Akurgal, 2000).   
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Following the IFF, another major defense contract, TASMUS (Tactical Area 
Combat Telecommunications System), was signed in 1996 and this project has 
become the major work for the local R&D unit since then.  For example, for the 
first time in Turkey, dedicated ATM and ISDN exchanges were developed locally 
for this project.  Additionally, in 2003, the infrastructure of TASMUS was 
equipped with high speed IP-based communication capabilities providing video 
and data transmission over ADSL.  Since Firm A became a foreign-owned 
company after privatization, in those defense projects the firm started to act as an 
outsourcing company of ASELSAN, the major public defense electronics 
company that gets direct procurement orders from the Armed Forces.  Even 
though there are local subsidiaries of the other multinational companies in the 
sector, the selection of the firm in those defense contracts can be explained with a 
15% share of the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation in Firm A.  According to the 
director of the local R&D unit, this relationship will last for many years, as long 
as the firm keeps its leadership in related technology and guarantees support for 
its products.  
On the other hand, the company R&D unit, which in earlier times was 
directly occupied with the localization of imported equipment from NORTEL, 
started to focus on the feature development of DMS exchanges that were put in 
service in the mid-1980s in Turkey and surrounding countries.  For example, after 
the establishment of a dedicated software development unit for DMS, the firm 
locally developed the first country-specific DMS system load in 1989.  The 
continuing focus on DMS systems have resulted in the development of both 
software and some application-specific card designs.  Even though the main 
hardware development was completed in NORTEL’s home country, many new 
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features for DMS systems such as development of the ring-back tone, adaptation 
of the No. 7 signaling system, card and software design for Universal Tone 
Design, and a built-in fiber interface were implemented in local conditions.  This 
specific focus on the DMS systems resulted in a transfer of international 
ownership rights to software development on DMS-100i switches just after the 
privatization of Firm A in 1994.   
As Figure 4.1 reveals, the software development activity in the company 
R&D unit counted as a major export-earning subject after those years.  The 
transfer of software development-related work was one of the earlier expansions 
of the parent company in search of outlets for cheap labor.  However, the major 
task change in the company R&D unit came with the global telecom bust in 2000.  
As a result of new restructuring in NORTEL’s global business program, many 
research activities in the US, Canada, and Britain were transferred to some 
developing countries, to India and China primarily.  In this reorganization, 
NORTEL moved its overall primeship of its international R&D program on the 
DMS switching equipment to Firm A.  According to the director of the company 
R&D unit, even though India and China offered more competitive costs for this 
task, the quality of the workforce had a qualifying effect on the preference of the 
parent company (Çınar, 2006).  With this organization, the company R&D unit 
assumed the provision of global software solutions for specific products of the 
parent company.   
The convergence of computer and telecommunications technology in the 
last decade made the software part of the network equipment became more labor 
intensive.  This was mainly due to technological breakthroughs in software 
developments which enabled old-fashioned fixed networks equipped with the 
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ability to carry data, voice and video signals.  This transition has also changed the 
main subject of innovation in those countries with lower technological 
capabilities.  As Fransman stated, in the old telecom industries, due to high 
barriers to entry in the sector, innovation was limited to some public laboratories 
in developed countries and the main focus was on the development of hardware 
parts.  However, as the new telecom industries emerged, liberalization and 
technological advancements in the sector lowered the barriers to entry and the 
software part of the technology gained more importance, which enabled the 
inclusion of other countries with lower technological levels.  Thus, change in the 
focus of the sector has also affected the meaning of innovation in the sector today 
and software developments and improvements have been considered as 
innovative activities.  As the case of Firm A showed, the company R&D unit 
today functions as a software solution provider for NORTEL’s original equipment 
deployed in various countries.  During interviews with the company officials, 
some stated that every new development in this software is a contribution to the 
existing capabilities of the related network systems and thus, these new 
developments can be considered as incremental innovations, even though they are 
not patented to Firm A.  
As can be seen from Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, the Marmara earthquake in 
1999, a global telecom crisis in 2000, and a macroeconomic crisis in Turkey in 
2001 had decisive effects on the firm’s structure.  Since the overall economic cost 
of the earthquake amounted to 20 billion USD, as in some other sectors, public 
investments in the telecommunications sector were halted for a couple of years.  
Following this, with the effects of the telecom burst, a major reorganization in the 
firm was realized and many parts of the production facility were outsourced.   
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Lastly, a hard-hit economic crisis in 2001 caused the total GDP to tumble around 
12% in Turkey.  As a result of these developments, between 1999 and 2001, total 
employment, net sales and net profit in the firm decreased about 50%.  Similarly, 
expenses on R&D and employment in R&D fell dramatically.  Even though the 
latter has been increasing for the last four years, R&D expenses have continued to 
fall since 2000.   
Another major development in the sector that changed the focus of Firm A 
was the introduction of wireless GSM communications in Turkey in the mid-
1990s.  First of all, it caused gradually diminishing annual orders from the Turk 
Telekom for fixed network equipment after the late-1990s.  With the decreasing 
demand for its fixed network equipment, Firm A focused more on GSM systems 
and gave important technology support to the private GSM companies.  This rapid 
transition from a domestic market for fixed equipment with a monopoly buyer to 
a competitive wireless equipment market resulted in more focus on the support 
and feature development for imported equipment.  The main results of this 
development were twofold:  First, without considering new innovative operations 
in competitive wireless technologies, the local R&D unit has limited itself to 
defense projects.  Second, the increasing workload from the support and 
development for existing NORTEL equipment worldwide  has resulted in gradual 
increases in employment demands in the company R&D unit that counted more 
than 90% of total R&D employment for Firm A in 2005. 
 
4.2.4.3 Technology Spillovers From Firm A 
It is generally accepted that attracting and embedding inward foreign 
direct investment (FDI) has important effects on development because FDI may 
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represent an important source of technological spillovers.  Although not the only 
means available, spillovers from FDI are regarded as one of the most practical and 
efficient means by which industrial development and upgrading can be promoted 
(Dunning and Narula, 2004).  The spillover effect can be in two different but 
related forms:  Direct spillovers, which affect growth of employment, exports and 
innovation; and indirect spillovers to domestic firms by supply chain agreements 
or workforce transfers, and establishment of new start-up companies by former 
employees (Narula and Marin, 2005).  In the case of Firm A, it was stated that 
Firm A worked as a school for the sector in Turkey.  According to company 
officials, it is estimated that more than 1000 personnel at different organization 
levels have left the firm to either set up their own companies or work in new 
companies.  During the early 1990s, many former employees left to set up new 
companies to produce PBX systems or handset units that the firm introduced after 
1985.  In the late 1990s, the new GSM operators and related companies attracted 
employees from the firm.  Lately however, the main characteristics of these spin-
off companies have appeared as new software companies (Aydin, 2006; Akurgal, 
2006 and 2000).  
 
4.3 Firm B 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Firm B was established in 1967 as the PTT Electronic Communications 
Equipment Factory and Laboratory, or PTT/ARLA, as a division of the 
Directorate of Turkish Post, Telephone and Telegraph (PTT).  The main goal of 
the firm was to produce the prototypes of basic telecommunications equipment 
locally and supply them to other local firms for mass production.  In the following 
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years, due to shortages in the supply equipment of PTT’s rapidly growing 
investments, PTT/ARLA was also given authorization to produce 
telecommunications equipments.   
In 1980, under a license agreement with the ITT Telecommunications 
Company, the firm started to produce analog R/L (Radio Link) systems.  After the 
license agreements, PTT/ARLA customized the imported R/L technology by 
concentrating efforts on R&D and created its own R/L technology.  Additionally, 
in collaboration with the Marmara Research Institute of TUBITAK (The 
Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey), PCM systems and 
data modems, which were obtained through imports previously, started to be 
produced locally.  
As the market economy conditions started to intensify in the early 1980s, 
PTT/ARLA was partly privatized and became a joint stock company.  After 
privatization it was given its current name and PTT became the major stakeholder 
in Firm B.  In 1984, the firm signed another license agreement with ITT in order 
to produce SYSTEM 12 digital exchanges.  The necessary amount of investment 
in new production lines was calculated and in accordance with the firm’s capital 
ratio, 19% of shares were offered to the ITT Company by the firm management.  
However, with the Turkish government’s pressure on the subject, the total shares 
to be transferred to ITT were increased to 39% in 1985 (Godekli, 1989:75).  In 
1987 all ITT companies in Europe were sold to ALCATEL of France.  In the 
following years, with the increasing emphasis on more privatization efforts, the 
remaining shares of PTT and other small holders were sold in a block and Alcatel 
Bell became the major shareholder with 65% of shares in 1993.   
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As of 2005 Firm B focuses on three main production groups:  
•  Fixed Network Operations Group:  
The main activities of the group are access, data/IP, voice and optical 
activities and related network/service management and solutions.  With the 
increasing use of DSL and broadband technology, Firm B gained 55% of the 
market share in related technology in Turkey.  Additionally, the group 
accommodates the Headquarters of the New Generation Network (NGN) 
Engineering and Support Team, which launched the only NGN project applied at 
Turk Telecom, and which serves all Alcatel customers in the world in network 
solutions.    
•  The Mobile Network Operators Group: 
This group serves existing mobile operators in Turkish and Iranian 
markets.  In transition to the next generation mobile networks, the group aims to 
increase the activities on Third Generation Networks (3G) in Turkey. 
•  Special Networks Group: 
This group targets the operators outside the communications industry who 
use their own special communications network.  The main activities of the groups 
are the turnkey design, installation and operation of communications 
infrastructure for railroads, underground systems, highway and airports, 
signalization applications and broadband data transmission and control systems. 
 
4.3.2 Technology Acquirement and Use in Firm B 
In terms of attainment of production technology, Firm B shows different 
characteristics in different periods. In the PTT-ARLA period, all production 
technology obtained through imports and necessary customizations were made to 
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be used locally.  Technology choice and decisions were made according to 
sectoral development schemes which were based on national economic 
development plans. 
In the first years of PTT/ARLA, “reverse engineering” was a common 
way to gain the capability to produce a product with the latest technology.  While 
the production of necessary equipment was realized, intensive research and 
development efforts were made to produce locally to decrease the dependency on 
imported technology. This was an “adaptive” industrial policy that followed the 
existing technology rather than inventing a unique telecommunication component.  
Besides its production function, the laboratory worked as a “vocational school” 
for all PTT technicians and engineers in order to exploit the new ideas of young 
people and make them aware of new developments (Ceyhun, 2006:71).    
Another instance that showed the importance of PTT/ARLA as the 
technology expertise in these years was its first-hand responsibility in preparing 
the First Electronic Industry Development Plan of Turkey in 1967.  According to 
this plan, in the development of the electronic industry, state support was 
considered a necessary condition.  In the production of telecommunications 
equipment and professional components, the state must be in an essential position, 
while in the development of consumer electronics, the field must be left to private 
enterprises.  Similar policy suggestions were made by the same group of 
PTT/ARLA in the Second Five-Year Development Plan for the years between 
1970 and 1974.  In particular, technological developments in some critical 
components such as semi-conductors and micro-electronics were respected as 
vital for an independent national electronics industry.  However, most of these 
suggestions were never realized. 
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Table 4.4 Some basic information about Firm B, (*) Million USD 
Source: Firm B Annual Reports  
YEARS EMPLOYEES SALES* NET  PROFIT* 
1985  1504 53,1 8,9 
1990  1718 150,1  11,2 
1991  1926 222,4  11,3 
1992  1692 221,1  9,1 
1993  1595 275,4  -0,5 
1994  806 69,4  -1,5 
1995  768 46,9  12,6 
1996  576 83,6  19,7 
1997  596 97,1  36,8 
1998  663 122,4  26,0 
1999  658 121,1  10,6 
2000  657 101,3  -9,6 
2001  561 150,6  -10,4 
2002  506 90,2  1,1 
2003  340 171,9  -1,0 
2004  287 167,0  -15,7 
 
After the firm became a joint stock company in 1983, the parent company 
appeared as the main resource for new technology.  However, as can be seen in 
Figure 4.2, some other international telecommunications companies were also 
chosen for new technology transfer resources.  In choosing the foreign partner 
BTM of Belgium, a subsidiary of ITT, in addition to its technological advantages 
  123 
in exchange systems, some political concerns were taken into account
4.  With the 
license agreement, Firm B was given the right to produce, sell, lease and export to 
some other countries in which the parent company had no trade relations.   
According to the royalty clause of the agreement, Firm B would pay 6% royalty 
for each product sold and half of this royalty would be used to finance joint R&D 
facilities (Sarper, 2000).   
In many cases, Firm B had a right to choose the best technology for 
transfer in joint stock company times.  For example, in a search for technology 
transfer on fiber optic line equipment, Ericsson equipment with 34Mbit/s and 
140Mbit/s were chosen for the deal.  However, Alcatel had already bought the 
European branches of ITT, including BTM, the foreign partner of Firm B.  Thus, 
Firm B was warned by the government to consider its parent company 
ALCATEL’s related technology for the transfer.  However, after a thorough 
evaluation, it was decided to insist on the previous choice and ERICSSON 
technology, with relatively more advanced features, was transferred.  This shows 
the relative independence of the firm in technology choice, a lack of which was 
felt in the later periods of the firm.  This independence was also necessary in 
gaining market advantages by obtaining the necessary capability in the first 
instance and developing related technology in-house conditions in the following 
years.       
 
 
                                                 
According to the personal biography of a former employee in Firm B, who held different positions 
in the firm as R&D manager and president, besides ITT,  Fujitsu (Japan), and  Siemens (Germany) 
were other candidates for technology transfer and partnership agreements on the production of 
exchanges.  In addition to its technological superiority, however, ITT was chosen to ease relations 
between the US and Turkey, which had difficult times after Turkey’s military intervention in 
Cyprus in 1974 (Yucel, 1997:125).  
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Table 4.5 Research and Development Expenses and Personnel in Firm B 
Source: Firm B annual company reports. 
YEARS 
R&D EXPENSES 
(Million USD) 
RD EXP/TOTAL 
SALES % 
R&D 
PERSONNEL
RD/ TOTAL 
PERSONNEL % 
1980  1,2 2,3 NA - 
1985  5,3 3,5  140  9,8 
1990  7,5 3,4  168  9,8 
1991  8,5 3,8  188  10,5 
1992  10,5 3,8  178  12,4 
1993  5,4 7,7  197  15,5 
1994  7,1 15,2  125  15,5 
1995  6,5 7,8  119  18,2 
1996  6,0 6,1  105  21,1 
1997  9,1 7,4  126  22,2 
1998  9,8 8,1  147  23,3 
1999  12,8 12,6  153  23,6 
2000  10,3 6,9  155  17,5 
2001  4,1 4,5  98  7,5 
2002  3,0 1,8  38  9,4 
2003  2,1 1,3  32  11,5 
2004  5,3 2,3  33  9,8 
 
In case of conflicts in obtaining the necessary technology, usually Firm B 
developed its own technology without the parent company’s knowledge.  For 
example, in order to enter the Turkish market in small scale exchanges, the parent 
firm wanted Firm B to produce ALCATEL’s own equipment in Turkey.   
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However, due to its cost disadvantages relative to other rivals in the market, Firm 
B refused to produce them locally and started to develop its own technology 
secretly.  Finally, in 1992, the firm developed the first small-scale digital 
exchange, and LEVENT was introduced. 
In the early 1990s, Firm B suffered severely from market saturation in 
Turkey.  For example, due to narrowing market conditions, supplier firms decided 
to get a consensus on lowest prices to be offered in PTT’s tenders and share the 
related product orders in accordance to relative market shares of the firms.   
Besides that, payment problems of PTT, the sole buyer of the firm’s products, and 
the entry of a third supplier firm, made Firm B officials increase their efforts to 
search for new opportunities in foreign markets.   
After the privatization of the firm in 1993, Firm B became totally 
dependent on its parent company, ALCATEL, in technology transfer and in 
research and development efforts.  The only exception to this was the cardphone 
systems group, which continued to develop its own products and sold them to 
various countries.  In this period Firm B became a branch of the parent company, 
and was assigned different projects according to ALCATEL’s global business 
policies.  Different R&D groups in divisions of Firm B were given some 
technological assignments as a part of the parent company’s global projects.   
In different interviews with the Firm B managers and engineers, it was 
stressed that, under present global conditions it is impossible to be an independent 
firm in terms of innovative capacity in a large-scale industry like 
telecommunications.  According to these sources, this requires strong support 
from the state in both financial and political terms.  For example, in the mid-
1990s, the South Korean conglomeration, Daewoo, was very active in the Middle 
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East in the telecommunications sector with its strong financial backing from the 
South Korean state.  However, with the severe financial crises in 1998, Daewoo 
lost its financial incentives in the region and had to retreat.  If this financial 
support of the states in many countries had not existed, only a couple of powerful 
global companies with connections in many countries would have succeeded.  For 
example, today in Turkey there are not enough engineers in the 
telecommunications field to build a product like a city exchange with a medium 
level of technology.  Instead, the best way to attain the latest technology with 
limited sources is to be a part of a global conglomeration and having as much 
collaboration in different technologic fields as possible.   
Another common statement made by the interviewees was the inefficiency 
or non-existence of related state policies in keeping firms like Firm B as strategic 
national assets for innovative efforts.  In Turkey it can be asserted that, after 1980, 
with the conditions of a rapid transition to a market economy, privatization and 
liberalization of state assets without following a strategic policy had reverse 
effects in some technology-intensive sectors like telecommunications.  Like Firm 
A, Firm B was also privatized without a political consensus at different levels of 
management in the firms.  Only ASELSAN, a military electronics and 
communications company, which is owned by Turkish Armed Forces Foundation, 
has remained as a state company with its own technology development divisions.   
Below is Figure 4.2 on the main products that have been developed since 
the establishment of Firm B as a research laboratory in 1967.  As can be seen 
from the table, in its first years of operation the firm developed necessary 
equipment for basic PTT investments.  Localization of the existing equipment and 
reverse engineering were main ways to increase technological capacity.  With the 
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inclusion of the parent company as a holder in the firm after 1983, transition to 
digital equipment production and advanced production technologies such as 
Printed Circuit Board production (PCB) were realized.  In the following of its 
privatization the company increased its regional reach and acted as a branch 
company of its global parent company. 
 
 
1967-1983 PTT/ARLA Period 
          Analog Multiplex Systems………………………..….Locally Developed 
          Digital Multiplex Systems…………………………....Locally Developed 
          Radio/Link Systems………………….……………Bell Telecom License 
1983  Post-Joint Stock Company Period 
1985  Digital Access Rural Radio/Link Systems…..…..…SR Telecom License 
          Second Generation Multiplex Systems………………Locally Developed 
          Data Modems ………………………………………...Locally Developed 
          Printed Circuit Board Production…………………….Locally Developed 
          Coin Operated Public Phones……………………..….Locally Developed 
1986  PBX Systems………………………………………….…..Under License 
          140Mbit/s Optical Fiber Line Equipment………………Ericsson License 
          Digital Multiplex Systems up to 1920 Channels…......Locally Developed 
1987  565Mbit/s Optical Fiber Line Equipment………………Ericsson License 
          Production of integrated circuits through Gate Array technique   
          Technology Transfer of PCM Systems to Iran 
Figure 4.2 Major R&D and Related Activities in Firm B (1967-2004) 
Source: Company Annual Reports 
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Figure 4.2 (Continued) 
1989  Production of 2
nd and 3
rd order PCM Systems……….Locally Developed 
         Field Tests of 2 and 8Mbit/s Fiber Optic Line Equipment…Locally Dev. 
         Field Tests of 2 and 8Mbit/s Digital Radio Link Systems….Locally Dev. 
         Export to USSR, Iran and Sudan in total amount of  1.4 Million USD 
         Turnkey system installation to Northern Cyprus including software 
         License  agreement  with  SEL  Alcatel  of  Germany  for  the  local  
production of power supplies  
         New 35,000 sq. meters plant was commissioned 
1991  New generation 8 and 34 Mbit/s PCM equipment are developed locally 
         34 Mbit/s fiber optic line equipment………………...Locally Developed   
         Total equipment export amounted to  8.6 Million USD 
         Total 1292 persons were trained in different technical subjects 
1992   First Digital City Exchange, LEVENT………….....Locally Developed 
          Sub-multiplexer system development for ALCATEL’s GSM Division 
         ASIC (Application Specific Integrated Circuit) used for new generation 
PDH systems 
         The new generations of the optical fiber line equipment at all hierarchical 
levels from 2 to 140 Mbit/s were developed according to SMD technology  
         Agreements  signed  to  found  joint  companies  under  the  names  of 
KOMTEL in Kazakhstan, ALTEL in Uzbekistan, AZTEL in Azerbaijan. 
1993 Development of the EC7 software package for the System 12 Exchange  
         LEVENT exchanges were put in service in Turkmenistan and Iran          
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Figure 4.2 (Continued) 
1993-2004 Period (After Privatization) 
1994 Synchronous Digital Hierarchy (SDH) based transmission systems have 
been initiated ……………………………………….……..ALCATEL License  
         First  attempts  to  development in Broadband applications ..ALCATEL 
License 
         R/L systems and installation services provided to GSM firms Telsim and 
Turkcell   
1995 Firm B is still the sole supplier of Turk Telekom for R/L equipment and 
Payphones 
         Business  plans  shifted  from national customers’ needs into global   
competitive market 
         EC7, which provides a platform for new networks like No:7, ISDN, an 
IN, has been implemented to nearly 380,000 lines. 
         Field  trials  of  622  Mbit/s SDH systems have been carried out and 
integrated to the existing network. 
         EC7 software package was adapted to System 12 exchanges according to 
the conditions in Turkey and in Commonwealth of Independent States 
         Firm  B  contributed  to  the  R&D  projects  of  ALCATEL’s  Broadband 
ISDN and TMN technologies.      
1996  Fiber Optic route between Izmir-Usak-Afyon was equipped with the 
SDH STM4 systems. 
         Mainly  to  Caucasia  and  Central  Asia  Countries,  export  earnings 
amounted to 21 million USD   
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Figure 4.2 (Continued) 
1996 (Continued) The overall ALCATEL design coordination responsibility of 
the software installed in the Commonwealth of Independent Nations (CIS) was 
assigned to Firm B. 
         R&D  unit  of  the  Firm  completed  the  G2  BSC  and  G2  Transcoder 
products for mobile applications in collaboration with ALCATEL’s Central 
R&D group. 
         Development of the second generation Microwave Digital Radio Link 
System for 2 and 8 Mbit/s was completed. 
1997 Firm B became the lead company by winning 50% of the tender for 
wireless local loops to be introduced in Turkey for the first time 
          For the implementations of the ALCATEL Group’s related projects, new 
design centers such as transmission and access systems were established. 
         Firm B was one of the two companies to be awarded Turk Telekom’s 
SDH contract which would be the backbone of Turkey’s SDH network. 
         Firm B was designated as the single unit which was responsible for the 
worldwide R&D, manufacturing, sales and installation of payphones within the 
ALCATEL Group. 
         The R&D unit in Firm B modified the software and hardware parts of 
LEVENT and System 12 exchanges of Turk Telekom. 
         In addition to the design coordination responsibility for ALCATEL joint 
ventures in CIS countries, Firm B was assigned to the management of 
ALCATEL’s signaling department. 
         An ASIC Design Center was established within the R&D unit to provide 
all design services to ALCATEL    
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Figure 4.2 (Continued) 
1998  The SDH system was put into service by Firm B, which was the 
backbone of the telecommunications in Turkey. 
         Firm  B  was  awarded  with  Turkey’s internet infrastructure “TTnet” 
contract, which was based on ADSL and ATM technologies. 
         The R&D group on transmissions systems started to focus on “ATM on 
SDH” project. 
1999 Field tests of the new software version (V8.3) of LEVENT exchange 
were completed successfully. 
        Switching  and  Routing  Division participated in the know-how project 
“Call Server” to set up the voice over IP and voice over ATM (VoIP and 
VtoA) technologies. 
         CAMEL-ph2 protocol was developed for mobile applications. 
         The development of the 3.5 Ghz WLL (Wireless Local Loop) project, in 
cooperation with ALCATEL Spain, were finalized. 
         The chip card system that operated on payphones in various countries 
were updated to enable them to use new generation chip cards and smart cards. 
2000 A contract for SDH systems amounting to 122 million US Dollars were 
signed with Turk Telekom. Firm B provided and install new generation SDH 
(Synchronous Digital Hierarchy) systems and network management systems to 
optimize the increased data & voice traffic. 
         A contract was signed with Telsim-Motorola, the second biggest GSM 
company in Turkey, for low and medium capacity microwave equipment in 
2000. 
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Figure 4.2 (Continued) 
2000 (Continued) As the sole worldwide research and development center for 
cardphones and electronic payment systems, Firm B developed outdoor phones 
of D5, operable with credit card and smart cards and its related management 
systems. 
2001 Firm B was awarded for nationwide network expansion of Aycell A.S., 
the GSM operator of Turk Telekom. 
         The backbone network elements of TTnet, Turkish National Internet 
Infrastructure network, were completely replaced and upgraded with 
ALCATEL’s products, putting the link capacities at a speed of STM-4 
(622Mbit/s). 
         Within the SDH systems frame-contract signed with Turk Telekom in 
2000, Firm B delivered the new generation SDH equipment and the related 
network management systems. 
         Software developments for SYSTEM 12 digital exchanges were carried 
out in different countries and Turk74, the first SYSTEM 12 exchange with 
world release was put into service in Istanbul.      
                Firm B’s R&D unit on network systems set up Nextra VoIP network 
between Prag, Bratislava and Frankfurt. 
2002 A technology transfer agreement on smart cardphones was signed with 
Iran. 
         A preliminary agreement was signed with a local company in India to 
provide new generation smart phones. 
         A contract was signed with Turk Telekom for the supply of 121,788 ports 
for Internet dial-up services.   
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Figure 4.2 (Continued) 
2003 An agreement signed with Turk Telekom to build the infrastructure for the 
ADSL Broadband services to accommodate 200,000 ports. 
          Firm B signed a contract with Sabanci Telekom, a private company, to 
set up Next Generation Networks infrastructure.  The company will enter the 
fixed telecom market after long-awaited end of monopoly of Turk Telecom 
over voice. 
                    R&D Unit of Fixed Solutions Division (FSD) in Firm B, signed a 
contract for dial-up and LAN in Czech Republic. The same unit developed a 
solution for H3G of Austria on VoIP technology for 3G and Internet users.  
2004  The Firm completed updating Turk Telekom’s current SYSTEM 12   
exchanges and renovation of X-bar exchanges.  
         Signed  another  contract  with Turk Telekom to set up next generation 
ADSL system that will accommodate 600,000 ports. 
         A5020 Softswitch, the only NGN project applied at Turk Telekom, which 
enables the operator to build an infrastructure for IP-based networks, was 
introduced in Turkey.   
         The Java-based JAAWS software project that allows the DSLAN in the 
Turk Telekom network to be monitored and permits intervention at every user’s 
port was developed. 
         A  new  application,  based  on  the  DSLMAN  management  software  and 
designed to offer high-speed Internet access and VoDsl (Video over DSL) 
services, the JAMAN project was developed for Neuf Telecom of France. 
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4.3.3 The Evaluation of Innovation Capability in Firm B 
4.3.3.1 Pre-Privatization Period (1967-1993) 
What makes Firm B different from the previous firm is its initial purpose 
of establishment.  The establishment of Firm B coincides with the local 
technological development efforts in Turkey that were intensified during the 
Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) era.  Similarly to the periodization of 
Fransman, Firm B was first established as a public research laboratory of the 
incumbent PTT to provide locally developed prototypes of telecommunications 
equipment to be produced by local firms.  As it was stated above, due to the 
weakness of the existing industries in the sector, the firm assumed the start of 
production shortly after its establishment. 
The first production of radio/link systems was realized under the Bell 
Telecom license.  Following this, some major technological developments such as 
digital multiplex systems, public phones, and digital city exchange LEVENT were 
realized under local conditions to serve the needs of PTT and customers in 
neighboring countries.  During these years, new product development efforts 
resulted in employment of more than 150 researchers in the R&D unit, which 
counted for around 10% of the total employment.  Additionally, as a public 
research laboratory, during its PTT/ARLA period, Firm B collaborated with the 
Scientific and Technical Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK), the major 
scientific research institute of the Turkish government, universities and the 
Ministry of Transportation in order to built a capacity to innovate.     
In this old telecom industry model, PTT was the main actor directing the 
macro policies on infrastructure expansion that determined the product 
development plans of the equipment industries.  Since PTT focused on the service 
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expansion into rural areas between 1970 and 1980, radio/link systems to enable 
communication in different terrains on Turkey were developed.  Similarly to other 
countries like Brazil, Korea and India, in those years, the innovation system in the 
sector was supported by three main pillars:  
1. The public technology procurement of the main service provider, 
PTT, which gave preferential treatment to locally developed 
equipment, thereby assuring a ready market,  
2. Government-provided subsidies for the performance of R&D, 
3. Sufficient supply of well trained scientist and engineers.   
Even though the first two conditions were generally met, the necessary 
supply of a workforce for the sector could not be realized sufficiently, and to 
overcome this problem, existing PTT engineers and technicians were employed 
temporarily.  This resulted in the development of a vocational school system that 
increased the skill development of the existing workforce and additionally, the 
establishment of new start-up companies through turnovers.  
Until its privatization in 1993, Firm B acquired technology capacity 
through technology transfers; that is, the government initially resorted to the 
import of disembodied technology through the licensing mechanism, obtained the 
technology and then encouraged the firms to indigenize and develop local 
capability.  The first major initiative in this was the development of System 12 
exchanges that were produced under ALCATEL licensing starting in 1985.  The 
local content in this product was gradually increased and the first digital city 
exchange, LEVENT, was put in service.  Besides this main product there were 
also others such as multiplexing systems and fiber-optic line equipment that were 
both developed locally or under license.  However, during this period, even 
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though ALCATEL appeared as the main supplier of technology with its 40% of 
shares, the firm had discretion in choosing the most suitable technology without 
ALCATEL’s willingness.  For instance, in order to introduce fiber-optic 
transmission technology, Firm B made a technology transfer agreement with 
Ericsson to produce 34 and 140 Mbit/s capacity equipment in 1986 and following 
this, 8 Mbit/s in 1989 and 34 Mbit/s capacity equipment was developed locally.  
According to a former director of Firm B, ALCATEL’s related system had 
disadvantages in terms of technology and price and thus, even though ALCATEL 
was unpleasant about it, the firm had the opportunity to choose from different 
vendors (Ceyhun, 1997). 
However, in some cases, the parent company created obstacles to prevent 
the firm from obtaining more advanced technologies by using conditionality 
clauses.  For instance, Firm B had a printed circuit board production section as 
early as 1985 and the management wanted to strengthen the capabilities of this 
section through a transition to the production of very large-scale printed circuit 
boards (VLSIs).  System 12 exchanges were equipped with a couple of VLSIs and 
they counted for the major cost within the imported parts of the system.  Firm B 
first applied to the state sources to establish a joint company to produce related 
equipment in Turkey.  After an unproductive debate period with state bodies, the 
firm returned to the licenser company to obtain that equipment from different 
sources with relatively lower prices.  However, the parent company, as license 
issuer, declined the request on the grounds that the related part was an embedded 
part in the system. 
The organization of production was also compatible with the sector 
policies during these years.  With a vertical organization scheme, the firm 
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produced almost all parts of the equipment internally, ranging from micro-circuit 
production to metal plating and mechanical parts production (Gulsun, 2000).  This 
is also apparent in the levels of total employment which counted between 1500 
and 1900 employees until 1994 (See Table 4.4).    
In addition to new product development, Firm B also joined efforts to 
develop the features of ALCATEL’s existing equipment such as new software 
packages for System 12 exchanges deployed in Turkey and other countries in the 
region.   
 
4.3.3.2 Post-Privatization Period (1993-2005) 
In the early-1990s, a narrowing internal market for exchanges, payment 
problems of PTT for equipment procurement, and a strong bias of the government 
for the privatization of state assets resulted in the sale of public shares to 
ALCATEL in August 1993.  The privatization period also coincided with the 
years that, for the first time in Firm B’s history, saw the posting of a negative 
balance sheet in profits for two consecutive years in 1993 and 1994
5.   
Following this period of hardship, the firm announced a tough 
restructuring plan that included a massive lay-off of almost 50% of total 
employees, which reduced the headcount from 1595 to 800 in 1994.  The 
organization of the firm was also changed and in line with ALCATEL’s global 
business model, a consumer support department was set up in addition to existing 
departments to provide specific solutions. As a reflection of this organizational 
                                                 
5 The general economic crisis started in January 1994, just when the Firm’s debts to the banks 
reached a peak.  This accumulation resulted from the requirement of working capital created by 
very high overdue receivables.  The interest rates increased to peak levels and elevated financial 
burdens of the firm, in March 1994.  Finally, a concordat was issued for the firm in March 1994 
and only after a period of negotiations, the concordat was withdrawn in August, 1994 (Firm B 
Company Report, 1994).  
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change, more than half of the total 115 engineers were employed for services 
global customers as of January 2006. This was the first part of the transition to a 
more consumer-oriented focus of the firm that gradually intensified in the 
following decade.  
Even though the decline in the total number of R&D personnel was 
relatively low immediately after the privatization, the change of the focus in the 
R&D firm become apparent with the increasing software development efforts in 
collaboration with ALCATEL and the gradual decrease in efforts towards the 
development of original equipment.  For example, the design of the GSM-
Multiplexer, a part of the ALCATEL-GSM mobile telephone system were 
finished locally in 1994 and this success resulted in the teaming up of Firm B’s 
GSM R&D group with the other related ALCATEL teams in Italy, France and 
Belgium to develop the next generation GSM system.  Similar to this project, the 
first upgrade of the EC3-EC7 software package for System 12 digital exchanges 
for world release was realized by Firm B’s R&D unit in the same year.   
It should be added that, even though the firm’s R&D policy had changed 
substantially, further R&D on the feature-development of locally developed 
equipment (cardphone systems, LEVENT exchanges, various capacity fiber-optic 
transmission systems, and multiplexers) continued and some parts of the 
production were exported.  Additionally, an ASIC (Application Specific 
Integrated Circuit) Design Center was established by the parent firm in 1998 to 
serve the design needs of all Global Business Divisions of the ALCATEL Group.  
However, as Figure 5.2 reveals, after privatization there was no new equipment 
developed within the resources of Firm B.      
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The changing focus from the vertical organization of equipment 
manufacturing to the provision of application-specific solutions resulted in 
continuous downsizing in the firm after the privatization.  In line with this policy, 
the printed circuit board (PCB), micro-circuit production, cabling and assembly 
production, and metal parts production departments were closed by 1999 and 
related equipment was procured through outsourcing agreements.  
Changes in the R&D policy of ALCATEL between the mid-1990s and the 
early-2000s are closely related to Fransman’s periodization of telecom industries.  
According to him, after liberalization of their home market for 
telecommunications equipment, big multinational companies like ALCATEL 
increased their global reach for outsourcing their production and research 
activities in order to stay competitive (Fransman, 2002).  In the process of global 
reorganization in R&D, ALCATEL employed a strategy to benefit from its 
foreign subsidiaries by assigning specific tasks to them on the basis of their 
accumulated technological capabilities.  For instance, Firm B was assigned to 
develop the 3.5 GHz WLL (Wireless Local Loop) project in cooperation with 
ALCATEL Spain, in which the radio transmission unit used its technological 
expertise accumulated from the development of radio-link systems for over thirty 
years.  A similar policy was developed for the cardphone systems.  In addition to 
its local advancements in these systems, Firm B further developed them by 
conducting ALCATEL-backed research and sold them to the countries like 
Turkey, China, Columbia and Palestine. 
After the crisis in 2000, the firm became more oriented toward IP-based 
communication solutions and GSM network development.  Rapid increase in 
internet services resulted in investment demands of Turk Telekom in dial-up and 
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ADSL broadband and wireless network systems for end-users.  In these projects 
the firm adapted ALCATEL’s advanced broadband solutions by making 
necessary configurations for the client’s demands.  However, as the firm become 
more oriented towards IP-based solutions, software development increased its 
share in local R&D activities.  This orientation become more dominant after the 
global telecom bust, which made the parent company more cost-sensitive in its 
operations and resulted in further downsizing and outsourcing in both the 
headquarters and subsidiaries.  The detrimental effects of this crisis for Firm B 
were further deepened when the Turkish economy experienced the most severe 
downturn of the Republic period in 2001.  The result was further decreases in 
both total and R&D employment and expenses in the firm.  Additionally, the 
ASIC center, the last piece of the R&D unit that was focused solely on hardware 
development was closed in 2003.  Furthermore, the firm outsourced its major 
production units--exchanges and cardphones--in the same year by leasing its own 
production facility to a private firm
6.   
According to one of the firm managers, under the present conditions, the 
firm today functions as one of the global business units of ALCATEL with a 
specific task assignment (Sen, 2006).  For Firm B, the tasks are marketing and 
support for clients in domestic and regional markets, and in order to perform these 
tasks, three major business units in the firm have been formed:  
 
1. Fixed Networks Operators Group: Activities of this group are comprised of 
mainly Access, Data/IP, Voice and Optical activities and related network/service 
management and solutions.  In addition to its role as a solution-provider, the 
                                                 
6 Similarly to Firm A, Firm B also leased a big part of its physical plant area which used to 
function as the main production area.   
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group functions as a consultant for fixed telecommunications operators and the 
newly-licensed operators who entered the market in 2004.  The group also offers 
solutions on DSL technology and Triple Play applications, which is grouping 
together Internet access, TV and telephone service into one subscription on a 
broadband connection.   
2. The Mobile Network Operators Group:  This group creates customized projects 
for existing mobile operators in the Turkish and Iranian markets and for the 
wireless communication system needs of Fixed Network Operators.   
3. Special Network Operators Group: This group offers solutions for operators 
outside the communications industry who use their own special communication 
networks.  Application areas for these solutions include railways, airports, 
underground systems, pipelines and power lines and so on.  
In order to serve the solution needs for these three departments, two major 
system design groups were established to perform necessary R&D activities for 
specific solutions:    
1. Fixed Solutions Department (FSD): This group works on software development 
and system integration tests for new networks, known as Next Generation 
Networks, together with ALCATEL Bell, Belgium.  The R&D work focuses on 
Internet-based voice transmission applications known as VoIP and product 
customization of ALCATEL Softswitch
7 system for specific needs of operators.  
In addition to solutions for the domestic market, the group works with various 
business units of ALCATEL in developing specific applications for international 
clients like British Telecom (UK), Deutche Telecom (Germany), Qnet (Kuwait), 
                                                 
7 A softswitch is a central device in a telephone network which connects calls from one phone line 
to another, entirely by means of software running on a computer system. This work was formerly 
carried out by hardware, with physical switchboards to route the calls. 
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China Unicom (China) and Reliance Triple Play (India).    
2. Access Network Department (AND): Development of network management 
software for DSL and dial-up networks are the main tasks of AND.  In addition to 
software packages developed for Turk Telekom’s DSL networks, most recently 
the group implemented an application based on DSLMAN management software 
for Neuf Telecom, France.  As the client’s new demands arrive, necessary 
functions are continually added. 
As the above text reveals, today Firm B functions as a support and 
development unit for specific applications of the parent company.  According to 
Firm B officials, as the telecommunications network becomes more IP-based 
technology, development of software applications for generic hardware is 
respected as a more appropriate technologic activity for countries who are not 
able to produce cutting-edge hardware (Ege, 2000).  Additionally, as the new 
entrants from East Asia have made generic hardware development more oriented 
towards cheap labor, the software part of the sector has gained more importance 
due to the need for flexible solutions in various applications. 
According to the R&D manager in Firm B, the R&D department does not 
create a stand-alone device or system, but instead it uses other sources of 
hardware and software to create a combined system to meet the specific demands 
of the clients.  Even though these solutions can not be recorded as new 
innovations, they are some kind of new products with different inputs configured 
for specific applications.  For these specific solutions, in case the parent 
company’s technology is insufficient, Firm B uses different inputs from the other 
IT companies like Sun, IBM, Cisco and even from their competitor firms like 
Siemens, Ericsson and Nortel.  In this process the local R&D unit produces 
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necessary intermediary software to make those different technologies integrate 
and work accordingly.  For example, DSLMAN management software was 
developed for Turk Telekom to increase the interoperability of different hardware 
and software programs.  With the advanced intervention technology of this 
management software, as of January 2006, Turk Telekom become able to manage 
the DSL network to the extent that new ADSL subscriptions can be processed in 
seconds, while for many EU countries it takes a week or more (Sen, 2006).  If 
these new applications are also applicable in other countries and hold a relatively 
long life cycle for consequent uses, they become a part of the standard product 
and service lists of the parent company after thorough technologic assessments.   
Since the telecom crisis in 2000, the hardware development process has 
been centralized and the parent company headquarters in Belgium has become the 
exclusive decision unit for related R&D.  In order to decrease the attached cost in 
these operations, most R&D processes of ALCATEL are realized in India through 
outsourcing agreements.  According to Sen, this was one of the results of the 
transition from circuit-switch-based PSTN systems to packet-switch-based IP 
network systems in telecommunications.  For instance, in the former, only a 
handful of big multinational companies were able to built a digital exchange for 
national telecom operators and this advantage resulted in monopoly profits for 
companies like ALCATEL, NORTEL, LUCENT, ERICSSON and SIEMENS .  
However, as the IP-based networks prevailed, smaller firms gained more 
competitive advantage by focusing on a specific part of the hardware and 
software.  This, of course, drained the profits of big companies and forced them to 
collaborate with the smaller firms to exploit their scale advantages.  
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CHAPTER 5.0 THE TURKISH NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEM 
AND ITS CONNECTION TO TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The development of telecommunication industry and its technological 
capabilities in Turkey is much related to the general development of science and 
technology polices that have been followed since the application of first 
organized industrial development plans in early 1960s.  As the case studies 
showed in the previous chapter, in telecommunications industry today Turkey 
mostly depended on the acquisition of foreign technologies.  Even though the 
development of a local technological base was initiated in the mid 1960s, with 
the privatization of existing telecommunications equipment industries through 
1990s, capacity on the research and development for recent technologies on this 
sector was shifted to multinational telecommunication companies.  Thus, it is 
important to analyze the general conditions in science and technology policies in 
order to reveal the reasons behind the underdevelopment of the sector.   
In the first part of this chapter a brief evaluation will be made to assess 
the progress from basic science and technology issues to the implementation of 
National Innovation System in Turkey.  In addition to the changes in general 
issues, related developments in telecommunications sector will be evaluated in 
light of the major changes in the innovation capacity and development in the 
service side of the telecommunications sector as well. The chapter starts with a 
short historical background information of developments in the science and 
technology policies in Turkey and an assessment highlights the major barriers in 
of the current policy framework. 
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5.2 From Science Policy to National Innovation System: Development of 
Science and Technology Policy in Turkey 
5.2.1 1960-1980 
Since the beginning of the First Five-Year Development Plan in 1963 
Turkey has prepared several science and technology policy programs to support 
the newly developing industrial structure.  As a contribution of the first 
development plan, the establishment of The Scientific and Technological 
Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK) was suggested to design a relevant 
basic and applied research program on natural sciences (Göker, 2002).  In 
addition to the establishment of TÜBİTAK, the plan also proposed to take 
measures on supporting private R&D facilities, increasing R&D efficiency, 
boosting public R&D by employing more scientists in public sector and sending 
3000 PhD students to the European countries and the US within the plan period 
to acquire latest scientific advancements to catch up with the industrialized 
countries (Şahin, 1997).      
Even though creating a technological capability was not the first priority 
of the plan, during the plan period of 1963-1967 there was another important 
event that Turkey was involved.  “The Pilot Teams Project on Science and 
Economic Development” was originally initiated by OECD in 1962 and aimed 
to determine the appropriate ways to use scientific research and technology in 
solving problems of developing countries in production and social welfare 
(OECD, 1966).  The projects involved seven countries namely, Greece, Italy, 
Turkey, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Yugoslavia, and the report on Turkey was 
published in 1967.  The report outlined the appropriate science and technology 
policies in light of the general conditions of existing industrial sectors and the 
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targeted levels of economic and social welfare (Göker, 2002:3).  It also 
delineated the necessary industrial research and development subjects that 
Turkey should respect as major pillars for technological advancements in 
agriculture, energy and some certain industries such as textile, metallurgy, 
chemicals, machine manufacturing, electrical machine, and electronics.  In short, 
the report suggested not only advancements in research on basic sciences but 
supporting critical industrial sectors with technological knowledge obtained 
through these research activities.  Even though the report was prepared by the 
same expertise group that realized the First Five-Year Development Plan, the 
necessary steps to be taken for an organized science and technology policy did 
not take place in the plan (Aral, 2003:38).   
According to one of the team members who prepared the “The Pilot 
Teams Project” of OECD, the unenthusiastic approach of industrial 
entrepreneurs during those years was the major reason for unsuccessful attempts 
in preparing a technology development policy (Türkcan, 1998).  “…In the first 
years of import substitution period entrepreneurs were busy with learning the 
production process and imported new technology.  However, nobody was 
thinking about creating these technologies domestically” (Türkcan, 1998:45). 
In the Second (1968-1972) Five-Year Development Plan, technologic 
development and technology transfer were mentioned briefly.  This plan 
included similar suggestions to the First Plan and advised sending another 3000 
PhD students abroad, without suggesting any solid plans for developing a 
domestic science and technology policy.   
The main difference of The Third (1973-1977) Five-Year Development 
Plan from the previous plans was its focus on applied sciences and technology 
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besides basic sciences.  Increasing the total quantity of technical personnel and 
promoting high technology use in sectors which open to international 
competition were main targets.  However, within the previous two plan periods, 
only 1200 PhD students were sent as oppose to be sent 6000 PhDs in total.  
Thus, the plan again suggested sending another 3000 PhDs during the next five 
years (Şahin, 1997).   
In conclusion, until 1980s, the main aim of the science and technology 
policy was supporting basic and applied research without considering direct 
effects of the technological advancements on the economic and social welfare.  
 
5.2.2 1980-1990 
As a major difference from the previous three plans, the Fourth Five-
Year Development Plan (1979-1983) included a separate section that concerns 
technology policies.  During the last year of this plan period, the first 
comprehensive science and technology program for Turkey was prepared.  With 
a close collaboration between State Planning Organization (DPT) and The 
Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK) and 
contribution of more than 300 scientists and experts, Turkish Science 
Policy:1983-2003 was submitted. With the plan, for the first time in Turkey; 
1. Total qualitative and quantitative capacities in research and 
development was calculated according to the related international 
norms and rules, 
2. Long term policies and targets on scientific and technological 
development were outlined, 
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3. Priorities in science and R&D programs were designated in 
accordance with the priorities in economic and social development.   
Additionally, under the framework of this program, The Supreme 
Council of Science and Technology (BTYK) was established as a highest level 
authority for governance of innovation policy and formed by the related 
ministers, representatives of public bodies, academia and non-governmental 
organizations and is chaired by the Prime Minister. 
According to Turkish Science Policy: 1983-2003 (TSP) program, the 
first priority areas for research and development support were determined as 
electronics engineering, computer science, and telecommunications.  In addition 
to this priority areas, development of devices with integrated circuits; software 
development for micro level hardware; development of semi-conductor 
technology; digital communications systems, remote and satellite 
communication systems, ISDN based infrastructure, fiber-optic communications 
systems and technology and optimization of the existing telephone lines were 
determined as technological subjects with high priority support (Göker, 2002:6).   
The intended results of this program could not be realized due to lack of 
necessary support from governmental institutions at policy formulation stages.  
According to Prof. Dr. Özdaş, who was responsible for the coordination of the 
program during preparation period, in the early 1980s, South Korea had 
prepared a similar science and technology policy program and for many aspects 
Turkey was ahead of South Korea at that time.  However, Turkey did not follow 
the program requirements while South Korea strictly kept its orientation toward 
more advancement on science and technology (Özdaş, 2000).  
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5.2.3 1990-2000 
In the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan, DPT advised to create a 
Major Application Plan in order to use as a guideline for Turkish Science Policy 
1983-2003 documents.  According to Özdaş, this was an additional burden by 
policy makers who create complicated bureaucratic processes, while wasting 
critical time and money for delivering similar policies again and again (Özdaş, 
2000).   
One of the most useful implementation of the Fourth Plan (1979-1983) 
was foundation of the Supreme Council on Science and Technology (BTYK), 
which was required to meet twice in a year to design related policy programs 
associated with economic and social development plans.  However, founded in 
1983, BTYK could only manage to perform its first meeting in 1989.  In the 
second meeting in 1993, BTYK formulated Turkish Science and Technology 
Program: 1993-2003, aimed to reach certain thresholds on science and 
technology parameters to gain a leading edge in the world.  For this; 
1. Increasing the number of full-time equivalent R&D personnel per 
10.000 economically active population from 7 to 15 by 2003. 
2. Increasing the share of Gross Expenses on R&D in total GDP from 
.33% to 1%. 
3. Increasing the share of private sector R&D from %18 to 30%. 
In order to achieve the above targets a policy framework were designed 
by BTYK, and The Progress in Science and Technology Project was published 
to be followed during the Seventh Plan (1996-2000) period.  The project aimed 
to determine the major layers of science and technology strength of Turkey and 
achieving the capacity to translate benefits of science and technology to 
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economic and social welfare, namely increasing innovation capacity.  With the 
project, seven priority areas were specified as critical building blocks for 
technological improvement: 
1.  Developing a National Information Network to carry out 
Telematic Services within all parts of the society in order to be ready 
to the coming age of informatics society.  
2. Adapting flexible production and flexible automation in critical 
industries to retain and further increase the capacity of international 
competition. 
3. Renewal of railway transportation system by focusing on High-
Speed train technologies.   
4. Determining a product and area centered investment and growth 
strategy for space, aviation and defense technologies. 
5. Focusing research and development in biotechnology and genetic 
engineering.  
6. Focusing on environment friendly and energy saving technologies 
and utilization of them for nationwide use. 
7. Focusing on research and development on advanced material 
technologies.   
In order to achieve above targets, the project also suggested some related 
institutional and legal arrangements such as; 
1. Policies on public procurement policy towards improvement of the 
scientific, technological and industrial capabilities in the country 
2. Regulatory policies on wide range diffusion of international norms and 
standards 
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3. Policies on the management of human and financial resources relevant 
to the program targets 
4. Policies on supporting research and development activities 
5. Policies on supporting creativity and entrepreneurialism. 
6. Policies on supporting university-industry partnerships. 
Post-1993 policies in the field aimed not only to excel in science and 
technology but, enhancement of technological innovation structure through 
forming of a systematic policy framework that would act as a guide within 
policies like education, learning, research and development, taxation, finance 
and infrastructure.  According to Taymaz, for a long term economic growth in 
countries like Turkey, innovation plays an essential role for leap-forwarding the 
competition capacity of industrial base in international fields and without the 
close collaboration within the above policy fields an effective innovation policy 
can not be realized (Taymaz, 2001).  
 
5.2.4 2000-2005 
Turkish economy experienced its most severe economic crisis in 2001.  
Total GDP decline in 2001 was about 7.5%, the biggest downfall in a single year 
recorded since 1923.  A heavy balance of payments problem coupled with the 
increasing unemployment rate in the urban areas.  Under the IMF’s austerity 
program since 2002, however, recovery in economic conditions has taken place 
that mostly attributable to the considerable rise in industrial production.   
In technology and science development issues, the early 2000s resulted 
in mostly introduction of policy on enhancement of innovative capacity for 
Turkey.  In line with the policy, for the first time in its history, Eighth Five-Year 
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Development Plan (2001-2005) set the following innovation-related objectives: 
1. Fully establishing and efficiently operating the National Innovation 
System (NIS). 
2. Completing legal and institutional arrangements for the smooth 
functioning of the NIS. 
3. Supporting scientific and technological developments with the target 
of transition to a knowledge economy.  To this end, enhancing 
physical, human and legislative infrastructure, increasing state 
support for R&D, encouraging the establishment of techno-parks and 
extending venture capital implementations. 
4. Encouraging the improvement of university-industry collaboration, 
establishment of technological support and development centers, 
techno-parks and technology institutes to enhance the technological 
potential of industry.  
5. Increasing innovative capacities of enterprises through training and 
international co-operation. 
6. Orienting public procurement policy towards improvement of the 
scientific, technological and industrial capabilities in the country 
(European Trend Chart on Innovation, 2004).  
It can be said, the Government documents related to innovation mainly 
draw on the Science and Technology Policy Documents issued in the late 1990s.  
To generate objectives similar to the above, reports of the “Ad-Hoc Committee 
on Science and Technology” were used.  The committees in these fields were 
formed by the representatives of the related public bodies, umbrella 
organizations, academia and business enterprises to examine and compared with 
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other countries using benchmarks.  Although this ensured the involvement of all 
stakeholders in the area, in some cases, as the innovation policy-making body, 
the Scientific and Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK), was not included in 
the preparation of the Industrial Policy for Turkey (2003), which can be 
explained as an example of ineffectiveness in the innovation governance system.       
As an important step in the preparation of the science, technology and 
innovation policies for the year 2023, the technology foresight study was 
completed by the end of June 2004 under the Vision 2023 Project, which is 
coordinated by TÜBİTAK.  Furthermore, in line with its policy objective of 
creating the information society, the Government implemented and brought the 
“e-Transformation Turkey Project” into force in 2003.      
In preparation of science, technology and innovation policy of Turkey 
for the next twenty years has been made under the Vision 2023: Science and 
Technology Project.  It is coordinated by TÜBİTAK with the participation of a 
wide range of stakeholders and involves four sub-projects: (a) Technology 
foresight, (b) Technology capacity, (c) R&D manpower and (d) R&D 
infrastructure.  The first two sub-projects have been finalized as of August 2004.  
The “R&D manpower” and “R&D infrastructure” are ongoing projects in which 
an online database is used by researchers for entering information on their 
capabilities and experiences.  The science and technology strategy document 
was ratified and adopted by the Government in September 2004.   
The major objective of the Vision 2023 Project has been to eliminate the 
major problems of science, technology and innovation policy making and 
implementation in Turkey, which are identified as lack of a shared vision and 
commitment of the NIS actors (namely the Government, the academia and the 
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public and private sector).  Therefore, high levels of participation and 
commitment have tried to be ensured in the project implementation.  For this 
purpose, a Steering Committee, consisting of 65 representatives from 27 
governmental bodies, 29 industrial organizations and NGOs, and 9 academic 
organizations, has been established.  One of the other significant objectives of 
the project was examining the some other country cases to design a relevant 
technology foresight study with the help of international experts.   
According to strategy document of the Vision2023 Project, development 
of generic technologies in strategic fields is a crucial decision on a country’s 
sustainable social and economic development.  Thus, in order to maintain its 
competitive advantage on particular technologies, each country has to emphasize 
creating appropriate policy frameworks that comprise finance, education, R&D, 
infrastructure and business policies on related fields.  The document forecasts 
the general conditions for the year 2023 in Turkey, determines social and 
economic targets that support this vision and delineate the strategic technology 
fields with priority in order to reach the targets. 
In light with the vision, main targets were determined as; 
1. Attainment of competitive advantage on industrial production; 
2. Improvement of  the quality of life conditions;  
3. Achievement of the sustainable development targets;  
4. Strengthening the technological infrastructure in transition to 
information society.   
For the last target, the vision2023 project defined some concrete goals 
that are related to the thesis.  In order to reach the defined target, it is resolved 
that, (a) development of user-friendly computers; (b) provision of high quality 
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standards and safety in information management and transmission; (c) 
development of fourth generation communications mobile systems; (d) design 
and implementation of broad-band network system; and (e) perfection in 
satellite communication systems; (f) development of bio-electrical human-
computer peripherals, should be considered as major applications  (TÜBİTAK, 
2004). 
In the third part of the project eight different technologies were identified 
as strategic technologies that Turkey should involve to gain global 
competitiveness.  These technologies are Information and Communications 
Technologies, Bio-technology and Genetic Engineering, Nanotechnology, 
Mechatronics, Production Process and Technologies, Advanced Material 
Technologies, Energy and Environmental Technologies and Design 
Technologies.   
In the technology foresight study, Information and Communications 
Technologies (ICT) are defined as a common technology that the other seven 
strategic technologies use globally.  Thus, with the report of an expert group on 
ICT, it was determined that; 
1. Integrated circuit design and production, 
2. Display unit technologies, 
3. Sensor technologies, and 
4. Broadband technologies are seen as the technologies that Turkey 
would be competitive in the world ICT market in the next two 
decades.   
In broadband ICT technologies, it was stated that Hybrid Fiber Coax 
(HFC) could not reach the intended density and as of 2005, only little above 1 
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million subscribers connected for services in Turkey.  It is anticipated that 
wireless technologies will be more demanded than other modes of connections 
by the users.  Thus, with the support of xDSL technologies, wireless broadband 
access would be common connection type for customers.  It is recommended 
that WPAN (Wireless Personal Broadband Access Network; IEEE 802.15) and 
WMAN (Wireless Metropolitan Broadband Access Network; IEEE.802.16) 
technologies should be adopted.  These technologies could be applied to the 
existing twisted copper lines and with a relevant multiplexing technology, which 
make it possible to reach up to 20Mb/s speed in xDSL lines (ICT Strategy, 
2004).              
 
5.3 Development of National Innovation System Approach 
Establishing a National Innovation System (NIS) was adopted by 
TÜBİTAK in its policy agenda in 1993.  Through its policy development unit, 
BTYK, some important policy proposals were developed and put into effect.  
The most important initiative for developing a NIS program for Turkey was 
commenced after the December 1999 meeting of BTYK, which proposed an 
Emergency Action Plan to accelerate activities toward NIS.  Some measures like 
expanding the scope of R&D supports, definition of critical technologies for 
Turkey, determination of National Policies on Molecular Biology, Genetic 
Engineering and Biotechnology, and studies on earthquake prevention and 
disaster management were offered as the first priority areas.    
In this period, one important project about national information 
technologies was the formulation of the Master Plan of Turkish National 
Information Infrastructure (TUENA) in 1999.  The initiative for TUENA started 
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in January 1996 with an order from the Prime Minister’s office.  Under the 
coordination of the Transportation Ministry and secretary of TÜBİTAK, the 
Master plan aimed “…to develop an information sector policy-including 
internet- for improving information technologies and for enabling Turkey’s 
transition to a knowledge society with keeping in mind the following points: 
public security, public interest, socio-economic aspects, legal and institutional 
aspects” (TUENA, 1999).  Other participants in the Master plan were, Turkish 
Technology Development Foundation (TTGV), Turkish Electronics 
Industrialists Association (TESİD), and Türk Telekom.   
With the participation of 182 experts and 200 institutions, a final report 
was published in May 1999.  Associated with long-term strategic approaches, 
four major work packages about current conditions in Turkey and selected 
countries from the world, infrastructure planning, national value-added 
instruments and institutional restructuring were delivered.  In the first package, 
the information society infrastructure of following selected countries were 
examined:  Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, European Union, 
Finland, France, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, United 
Kingdom, and the USA.  Studies on action plans indicated that the greatest 
importance in terms of targets of plans and other relevant policy documents was 
attached to the production of Information and Communication Technologies 
(ICT) hardware (TUENA, 1999).  According to the classification of the study, 
the Asia-Pacific countries came first those who attached the greatest importance 
to hardware.  The group generally classified under the heading of “industrialized 
countries” followed them.  It was observed that the sector of broadband 
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communication services and content/multimedia was the area to which the 
greatest importance was attached after hardware in the action plans of those 
countries.  For the developing countries, however, the formation of the basic 
telephone infrastructure was the most important target followed by the 
production of hardware.  As a conclusion of the first part, the following were 
stated as necessary conditions for a “global information society”; 
1. The infrastructure should maximize general socio-economic benefits 
for a sustainable human development 
2. The national/local value added of the Turkey’s ICT industries should 
make a leapfrog jump. 
3. Turkey should make leadership in her region in order to get a share 
from global ICT market. 
4. Turkey should be able to develop policies and organizational 
structures to reach above-mentioned vision (TUENA, 1999:15). 
In the second part of the Master plan, vision for the future and targets 
toward an information society were delineated.  In TUENA, time series and 
causality methods were used to predict future demand to the new network.  Due 
to close relationship of a society’s demographic structures and usage of 
communication technology ownership, a preliminary household survey was 
conducted to form a base for future predictions.  
Based on future demographic trends, predictions indicated that, access to 
internet expected to reach up to 1.5 million households out of nearly 17 Million 
total households in 2010.  However, since this represented less than 10 percent 
of total household, setting up more vigorous policies and targets were suggested.  
These policies included, shifting more commercial activities so far conducted by 
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traditional means to e-commerce transactions, increasing service based activities 
on national information network progressively by expanding it in accordance 
with the latest liberalization movement and distribute an efficient, cheaper and 
citizen-friendly   national information network to foster a more transparent state-
citizen relationship.  Thus, by 2010, the Masterplan anticipated that; 
1. All households would be connected to the National Information 
Infrastructure, of which, broadband or lowband, 75% of the 
households in urban areas and 25% in rural areas. 
2. It is expected that, 2.5 million business and institutional subscribers to 
the network of whose 20% of them will reach the capacity of 
155Mbps (broadband); and the remaining 80% will use 2Mbps 
capacity.  
3. Terminal prices will drop by 50% in average during the ten-year 
period. 
4. Transmission and switching costs will fall by 66% during the ten-year 
period.   
In light of the above postulates, TUENA plan presumed that capacity of 
the network will jump to 100 Terabit/second, from its current rate of 1 
Terabit/second.  For individual use, 90% of 2 Mbps subscribers will be using 
intelligent terminals at the start of the decade but their ratio will go down to 80% 
in the end.  On the other hand, 10% of 2Mbps subscribers who will be using 
LAN technologies at the starting point will rise to 20% percent by the end of 
2010.   
Even though its ambitious targets, TUENA could not be realized widely.  
As of 2004, only 7.2% of all households had internet connection and the most 
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common connection type was dial-up (DIE, 2004).  Furthermore, only 20% of 
all people had an access to Internet within the last year.  The major reason for 
this poor development can be attributed to the generally reluctant attitude of 
policy makers at governmental levels towards national information network.   
Additionally, severe economic crisis in 1999 and 2001 had adverse effects on 
necessary public and private investments on information and telecommunication 
technologies.      
 
5.4 The Assessment of Innovation System in the Turkish 
Telecommunications Equipment Industry In Light of the Case Studies 
For the developing countries, traditional support mechanisms for the 
R&D activities in the local telecommunication equipment industry had two 
integral components: (i) supporting the organization and conduct of these public 
R&D projects through the provision of targeted research grants and other fiscal 
incentives; and (ii) providing an assured market for the output of these R&D 
projects through subscription to public technology procurement.  As the case 
studies in the previous chapter revealed, a similar development pattern was 
initiated for the development of local telecommunication equipment industry in 
Turkey during the early 1960s and 1970s.  However, increasing deregulation 
and economic liberalization in the late 1980s have resulted in; (i) a weakening 
importance of those traditional support mechanisms and (ii) growing R&D 
concentration of multinational telecommunication companies in the sector that 
weakened the local R&D activities in Turkey.  The reasons for these negative 
outcomes can be attributed in one part to Turkey’s relatively weak organization 
of the sectoral innovation system in compare to other developing countries that 
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were examined in the previous chapters.  For example, contrary to the other 
countries that were examined, telecommunication sector in Turkey poses a 
fragmented organizational structure in determining future policies.  Even though 
the preparation of long-term development plans in the sector involves the 
participation of representatives of public and private companies, research 
institutions and universities, the state authorities still play the major role in 
designing future policies.  This is mostly because of the absence of a research 
and policy development organization at the national level to describe the most 
suitable telecommunications policies and to design financial, institutional and 
educational technology development policies in the sector.  Examples of this 
kind of organizations are to be found in South Korea (ETRI), and Brazil 
(CPqD).  In South Korea ETRI (Electronics and Telecommunications Research 
Institute) is charged with the responsibility of developing the necessary 
technologies and functioned as the center of the sectoral innovation system in 
telecommunications sector (Mani, 2005).  A close interaction between ETRI, the 
private equipment manufacturers and the service providers enabled a dynamic 
innovation system unique to South Korea.  Both the conditions for source of 
funding and human capital are significantly more prosperous in compare to the 
similar conditions in other major developing countries (Mani, 2005, 21).  This 
strong structure showed limited contraction even though the government’s 
involvement in multilateral agreements that narrowed the channels of financial 
support to the research institutions and the effects of major financial crisis in the 
late 1990s.   
In her comparative study Szapiro reveals the differences between Brazil 
and Spain in the liberalization and deregulation process on their 
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telecommunications sector.  According to her, CPqD, the public research 
laboratory in telecommunications, successfully played a pivotal role in creating 
a national innovation system in the Brazil.  “…CpqD’s close relationship with 
industry has enabled technology transfer and joint development with local firms 
in exchange, transmission and peripheral telecom technology and there can be 
little doubt that in the areas of industrial and technological progress in digital 
telecom Brazil was in the 1980s leading the Third World mostly as a result of 
the policies adopted after 1974” (Hobday, 1990, 19; quoted in Szapiro, 2004, 7).       
By the end of 1980s, locally added value increased and assemblage 
activities with imported goods gave way to local production and CPqD acted as 
telecommunications policy and research institution at the national level by 
enabling collaboration for technological development between universities, 
research institutions and other firms.  
However, according to Szapiro’s findings, privatization and 
liberalization process in the sector had controversial effects on the Brazil’s 
innovation capacity in telecommunications.  With the absence of sectoral 
policies, rapid increase in telecom equipment exports until 2001 caused a serious 
trade of deficit and between 1988 and  2000, market share of nationally owned 
firms in the sector decreased from 77% to 8,7%.  Besides their increasing 
market share, the attitude of multinational subsidiaries towards collaboration in 
local technology development and innovation changed and they concentrated 
their efforts rather on product adaptations (Szapiro, 2004, 9).   
In contrast to the developments in Brazil, Spain followed a different path 
in deregulation and liberalization in its telecommunications sector.  According 
to the author, even though the incumbent state operator Telefonica was 
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gradually privatized between 1995 and 1997, the government still holds the 
golden share until 2007 that gives the government to exclusive voting rights in 
the company management.  What distinguishes the Spanish experience from 
other similar countries is the Telefonica’s rapid diffusion in Latin American 
telecommunication markets through mergers and buy-outs.  In this 
internationalization movement Telefonica also stimulated the small and medium 
size equipment suppliers to provide equipment and technology in the new 
foreign markets through increases in exports and foreign direct investments.    
In the sectoral innovation system in telecommunications, Telefonica also 
played an important role by conducting R&D through its research subsidiary 
Telefonica I+D in (Investigacion y Desarrollo) in Spain.  This subsidiary acted 
as technology provider for Telefonica especially after the new market expansion 
and development in the foreign countries (Szapiro, 2004, 13).  
As those country examples showed an innovation system in 
telecommunications sector require both a strong government policy for the 
development of local technological base and an expansion strategy in the foreign 
markets to supply new market opportunities for those local telecom firms.  What 
the major difference between the above countries and Turkey is the lack of 
policy commitment of the government in Turkey.  As the first part of the chapter 
revealed, there have been always some attempts to construct related science and 
technology policies since the start of the modern republic era in the early 1920s.  
However, a strong government willingness to follow these policy and programs 
were not fully materialized due to some factors regarding to common 
characteristics of developing countries such as macroeconomic and political 
instability, the specifities of historical-institutional environment, lack of 
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institutional interaction between actors of economic, industrial and social 
policies.    
Turkey’s experience in the development of telecommunication sector 
and related equipment sector in the last two decades shows similarities with 
some other developing countries.  The examples that were examined previously 
like Korea, Brazil and Spain developed their telecommunications sector through 
the close guidance of incumbent state telecom operators and a local innovation 
system that put network expansion at the national level and development of 
related domestic telecom technologies that support this expansion high priority 
targets.  During the expansion period in Turkey, PTT and Türk Telekom later, 
acted as technology diffusion centers by describing the required technological 
specifications of the telecom equipment to the suppliers.  In the first years of the 
establishment of national telecom industry, PTT contributed to the technology 
development efforts by establishing TELETAŞ, its research and development 
laboratory for new equipment development and localization of some imported 
technologies.  However, as the liberalization and deregulation in the telecom 
sector proceed, the existing local innovation system started to dissolve.  First, 
the main telecom equipment suppliers to the domestic market, including 
TELETAŞ, which was the research and development unit of PTT, were to be 
privatized.  As the policy changes toward R&D and in-house innovation of the 
three multinational telecom companies showed in the case studies, what have 
been observed so far after the liberalization and deregulation in the sector are 
resemble with the developments in Brazilian telecom sector.  After the 
liberalization of the sector and long delayed privatization of Türk Telekom in 
2005, the already weak collaboration between institutions, such as public 
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research institutions, incumbent state operator, universities and equipment 
companies decreased gradually.  A similar weakness appeared in the policy 
making process which a free market bias dominated the overall understanding of 
the development in the telecom sector.  Similar to Brazil, after the privatization 
of Türk Telekom and rapid increase in the use of mobile telecommunication 
systems, telecom equipment industry in Turkey, particularly the subsidiaries of 
multinational telecommunication companies, changed their innovation policy 
and became a part of the main company’s global innovation policy.   
As the privatization of Türk Telekom in 2005 gave the new company the 
right to choose equipment suppliers freely from domestic and foreign 
companies, it is expected by the sector authorities that the existing weak 
backward linkages in the sector will be diminished gradually.  Unlike 
Telefonica’s ambitious strategy to search for new markets in foreign countries, 
the new management in Türk Telekom has showed no intention of growth in 
other countries since its privatization.  This is a disadvantage for small and 
medium sized local telecommunication equipment suppliers who partially 
depend on new contracts from domestic service providers.     
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CHAPTER 6  DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation contributes to the literature on innovation systems 
theory by investigating the trajectory of a national innovation system in the 
telecommunications sector in Turkey in an environment characterized by local 
and global changes in political economy. It also concerns the adaptability of a 
national innovation system approach, which originated principally in reference 
to industrially developed North American and European countries, to developing 
countries like Turkey. While most studies concerned with innovation systems 
theory and economic development have focused on high-tech industries in 
advanced capitalist countries, this study aims to draw attention to the global and 
local dynamics that constitute time-specific, country-specific and sector-specific 
limitations and opportunities characteristic of technologically backward 
countries. By documenting the changing historical trajectory of technological 
capacity development efforts in the telecommunications sector, this research 
illustrates how country- and sector-specific conditions, which originate in neo-
liberal approaches to industrial development that include phenomena such as the 
privatization of public assets in critical industries and reductions in direct state 
funding for research and development, have affected the innovation performance 
of the two major telecommunications equipment companies in Turkey. 
 
6.1 Major Findings 
In recent years in the field of development economics and geography, the 
term “innovation” has come into wide theoretical use to emphasize the 
importance of knowledge, learning and organizational capacity in a 
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contemporary global business environment that is filled with instability and 
uncertainty (Freeman, 1988; Simmie and Kirbie, 1988; de la Mothe and Paquet, 
1998). Through the influence of evolutionary economics theories and a 
Schumpeterian view of the firm, major approaches in this line generally consider 
large companies to be the main sources of new technology through innovation. 
As Edquist clearly puts it, however, innovation processes cannot be 
sustained without the endowment of critical institutions like legal structures, 
social rules, cultural norms, and policies that characterize learning and 
production in a given country (Edquist, 1997). It is therefore necessary to 
acknowledge major differences in those endowments across different regions in 
the global competition for innovation. As Lundvall assessed the subject, putting 
the innovation concept in a “national” context is the most effective way to 
design a productive environment (Lundvall, 1992). However, as the sovereignty 
of the nation-state has become questionable under the current regime of 
regionalized production, any kind of “national” regulation may become 
ineffective over time. This contradiction is more pronounced in less-developed 
countries in which the autonomous policy-making power of the state in the 
macro-economic sphere has been constrained significantly by the liberalization 
of market conditions. 
Before evaluating the two case studies presented here, it is necessary to 
comment on changing conditions in the telecommunications sector and, second, 
on the general macroeconomic conditions that govern industrial development in 
Turkey. With reference to the telecommunications sector in Turkey, it can be 
concluded that, in the very beginning of the sector’s history, dependency on 
foreign technology was widespread and it was only following the late 1950s that 
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the requirement for domestic telecommunications technology was widely 
acknowledged. Thus, Fransman’s “Old Telecom” period, which began as early 
as the 1930s in some developed countries, came to Turkey only in the early 
1960s. In this period PTT acted as a monopoly service provider and its research 
lab, ARLA, produced and provided necessary equipment for network expansion. 
Even though the most characteristic activity of the research lab was localization 
of some imported equipment, a trajectory of technological capacity-building 
through imitation and reverse-engineering was started. 
Related regulations pertaining to public procurement assured that 
domestic accumulation of technological capacity would be created in this model. 
Eventually, other private companies with mostly domestic ownership structures 
joined the sector to increase capacity through a mechanism of controlled 
competition. In the process, equipment suppliers increased their own R&D 
capabilities, which accelerated the transition of the industry into the new era. In 
the Turkish case, under the protective shelter of PTT’s procurement system, the 
case study companies that produced equipment for the domestic market were 
eventually forced to enter and compete in foreign markets. As the case studies 
revealed, both Firm A and Firm B entered markets in former Soviet republics 
and Middle Eastern countries to compete with other foreign companies as early 
as 1990. 
The major breakthrough that completed the transition to the New 
Telecommunications Industry Era was the deregulation of the service segment. 
Beginning in the early 1980s, in many markets in developed countries, state 
monopolies in telecom services were disbanded. Partial privatization of 
incumbent service providers and the inclusion of new entrants caused significant 
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changes in the sector. With the entrance of new operators in the services 
segment, equipment supply firms sought new opportunities in growing market 
conditions. 
In Turkey, the transition to the “New Telecommunications” period 
exhibited major differences from similar transitions that have been observed in 
developed countries. First, the privatization of Turk Telekom (TT) was realized 
only as recently late as 2005. Even though the privatization of TT was on the 
agenda of all successive governments following the 1980 military coup, due to 
its strategic position and strong public opposition to privatizing, no government 
could take the risk. Privatization took place just a short period of time before the 
end of the date given by a related European Union agreement. 
In the meantime, liberalization of the services market also remained 
limited, with partial liberalization occurring in the long distance and 
international calling services segments beginning in 2003. While the monopoly 
service provider remained a public company until 2005, in the equipment 
segment sector, however, developments were faster and more significant. Both 
of our case study companies were privatized in the early 1990s and the foreign 
shareholder companies that provided major technological input during the 
establishment phase for both firms became owners of the new companies. This 
was consistent with Fransman’s periodization according to which equipment 
companies went through major reorganization processes due to heightened 
global competition. Even though Turk Telekom’s monopoly position in 
providing traditional telecom services lasted until recently, the introduction of 
mobile phone service by private companies in 1994 was a major stimulus in 
moving equipment companies toward mobile systems installation and research. 
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Unfortunately, this transition to new technology did not create a serious 
opportunity in production and technology capacity-building in mobile 
technologies because of global restructuring in the major telecom companies 
that affected the two case study firms’ research activities. According to the new 
strategy, country branches of multinational telecom equipment companies 
concentrated their production and research efforts in particular products and 
processes that were arranged in accordance with the global business operations 
of their parent companies. 
The most important change in the case study companies in this period 
was the disintegration of the vertical organization of production. Following the 
privatization process, the case study firms either outsourced activities to foreign 
production facilities or ceased production altogether. In this period their R&D 
facilities also underwent significant change. The major task of the R&D 
departments was now identified as face-to-face and on-line “solution provision” 
for the existing global customers who demand particular changes and additions 
on the equipment or software products according to their business needs.  
In the labor side, the vertical disintegration that characterized the 
transition of the case study firms produced a sharp decline in total employment, 
but not in their R&D departments. Instead, in both firms, the R&D departments 
either increased total employment or showed only small changes as they 
retooled to provide solutions deemed necessary by both domestic and regional 
customers that reflected the increasingly global reach of their respective parent 
companies. 
Through the transition to the Infocommunications period, the case study 
companies increased their focus on the convergence of voice, data, and video 
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transmission over a single network. Since software-supported equipment 
became more important as a result of this process, it became easier for small-
scale firms that specialize in particular technologies or software packages to 
enter the market. In order to tap into this new advantage, most multinational 
companies during this period began to procure part of their equipment or 
software and other technological inputs from such small firms. 
In the Turkish case, with the transition to the Infocommunications Era, 
the entrance of those small firms had major implications on the employment in 
the R&D departments. With the increase in software-supported equipment, the 
foreign shareholder companies in the case study firms have outsourced most of 
their R&D activities on equipment and software to other countries like China 
and India in order to leverage cheap labor conditions. The most important 
consequence of this development was the growing number of software engineers 
in the R&D departments of the case firms. As one of the company official 
revealed, wage/quality ratio of the software engineers in those companies stand 
in the middle between of those engineers in the Central Europe and the East 
Asia, and therefore, the foreign shareholder mainly prefer to use the case firms 
for some high-order software development assignments (Cınar, 2005).       
The above findings are consistent with Munari’s exploratory study on the 
effects of privatization on the R&D structure of various companies in Italy and 
France (Munari, 2002). Similar to his assessments of the changing structure of 
R&D activities in the case of telecom companies, this thesis has found that, with 
privatization, Turkish attitudes towards R&D activities has shifted in orientation 
from fulfilling the national goal of generating and diffusing research-related 
public goods to addressing exclusively business-specific objectives. As the case 
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study firms confirm, provision of “business solutions” and consumer-oriented 
activities became major tasks of their R&D departments. Thus, as Munari’s 
findings show, besides engineers, graduates from fields such as business, 
anthropology and psychology were employed in R&D departments to better 
understand business and consumer needs. The ratio of R&D personnel to total 
employment changed almost instantly as a result of this reorientation following 
privatization. The search for new market niches and the spread of a new 
corporate culture geared toward creating markets for new technologies replaced 
the R&D departments’ previous task of developing telecommunication 
technologies for the general public good. 
Current conditions in the telecommunications industry are also related to 
the general development of industry in Turkey after the establishment of the 
republic in 1923. In the first years of the new republic, there was almost no 
industrial establishment. A war-torn economy was almost completely dependent 
on foreign technology for new industrial products. Under these dismal 
conditions the state served as the sole provider of industrial structure for such 
industries as textiles, petroleum, coal, and sugar. Accordingly, basic 
infrastructure elements at the national level, such as electricity, railways, and 
telecommunications, were all supplied by the state. In the first decades of the 
new republic, steady growth rates were achieved in the economic and social 
development fields by the application of Industrial Development plans that were 
implemented with the influence of the Soviet industrial model. The Second 
World War put a halt to this rapid industrialization process, although Turkey 
was not actively involved the war. 
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During this period the national telecommunications network expanded 
rapidly with the direct involvement of PTT. The necessary equipment for this 
expansion was however heavily dependent on imported material and the only 
existing telecommunication equipment plant in those years had no significant 
technological capacity to produce the critical equipment that would meet the 
growing needs of the new republic. 
In post-war conditions, Turkey changed its strategic alliance with the 
Soviet Union and joined the new Western capitalist treaty that was formed under 
the Breton Woods agreements. This new era brought more open trade relations, 
a supply of foreign funds for large public investments, and the establishment of 
democratic, European-like institutions in both the economic and social spheres. 
Through expanding trade relations with other parts of the world, domestic 
investments accelerated at an unprecedented rate, and a series of balance-of-
payment crises took place, initiating long-lasting relations with global financial 
institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. The balance-of-payment crises, 
which were accompanied by political turmoil, negatively affected industrial 
development. To some authors, like Boratav and Yeldan, this political shift in 
the strategic global alliance began a process of dependency on foreign resources 
in both the economic and social spheres. Thus, an independent industrial 
development policy was never realized due to insufficient accumulation of 
domestic capital. 
The import substitution industrialization model was set up to improve 
conditions in the national industrial base in the early 1960s. Because 
dependency on foreign industrial products caused the above-mentioned balance-
of-payment crises, a protective domestic market for the national industrial base 
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was deemed the only option. Even though a wave of rapid industrialization was 
created, growth in the intermediate and capital goods industries required more 
foreign financing and, under the restricted foreign trade conditions, only a very 
small amount of export earnings fueled this unfavorable circumstance. 
The telecommunications equipment sector in this period underwent 
significant changes with the increasing application of the technology transfer 
model in creating a solid domestic industry. Similar to the cases of some other 
developed countries, the monopoly service provider PTT was also actively 
involved in the technology creation process. A research lab built to design and 
manufacture equipment prototypes was established to transmit successful 
products to private companies for mass production. This model did not, 
however, reach its primary goal, because there was no private telecom industry 
with the technological capacity to transform new ideas into marketable products. 
The absence of such a capacity resulted from the late industrialization 
phenomenon, in which domestic industrial capacity could not keep up 
technologically with most of the demands on a national scale. As chapter 3 
shows, in the early 1960s industrial capacity in Turkey was in its formative 
years but it was able to produce basic consumer goods with low technological 
complexity such as some home appliances and automotive equipment for the 
protected domestic market. In addition to poor technological capacity, the lack 
of a skilled workforce for relatively higher technology industries was also a real 
drawback in this period. As the case studies show, in Firm B’s establishment 
years, the existing PTT workforce was employed temporarily across different 
parts of the country to overcome this problem. 
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Thus, in order to increase technological capacity, the establishment of a 
joint company with the involvement of a foreign firm as a technology provider 
became the most common model in those years. It was expected that the foreign 
partner company would provide necessary technological know-how and, after a 
undergoing a learning-by-doing process, and with the help of other national 
institutions like universities and research institutions, a spin-off effect would 
create a knowledge base in telecommunications technologies. The basic 
innovation system in this period was financially supported by the national 
procurement policies of PTT, which favored local firms and dictated minimum 
local input requirements for related equipment. Additionally, state funds for 
some defense-related projects in telecommunications technology were used 
heavily. NATO-funded projects for defense-related telecommunication systems 
played a noteworthy role in encouraging firms to develop their own 
technologies. However, the main goal for these projects was not to invent a new 
system, but rather to keep pace with other countries in the basic standards of the 
field. 
In addition to the arms race that characterized the Cold War period, the 
US embargo of Turkey aimed at arms trading and aid after the Cyprus crisis in 
1974 supported defense-related projects in those years. Even though defense-
related projects continued to provide an important stimulus in gaining strategic 
capabilities following privatization, the case study firms have had no 
opportunities to leverage defense-related technologies into marketable products 
for civilian use. This is an important drawback in supporting research and 
innovation in the sector. Since the telecom market was restricted to the services 
of PTT, in their growth years firms in the sector had to limit their development 
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and production lines to the demands of PTT. This condition generally held until 
the introduction of mobile phone systems in 1994, although for a brief time 
period the case study firms enjoyed market expansion in countries surrounding 
Turkey. Thus it can be concluded that, with the existence of PTT’s as the sole 
buyer, firms in the telecommunications equipment sector were unable to find 
markets for new products that PTT services did not support. 
The transition to neo-liberal economic policies in Turkey came with 
another military coup in 1980. More liberal economic policies, export-oriented 
industrial production, and flexible exchange rates were major characteristics of 
this period. With the rapid transition to free market conditions and the entry of 
foreign capital investment, investments in the services sector soared while the 
manufacturing sector staggered. Manufacturers utilizing productive capital gave 
way to rent-seeking operations, such as procurement of state bonds with high 
interest rates and land speculation. 
One of the most important developments in this period was the ruling 
government’s shift in priority to emphasize modernization of the existing low-
standards telecommunications infrastructure. As chapter 3 showed, in terms of 
both service quality and availability, the telecommunications equipment sector 
in Turkey closed the gap with other OECD countries and even exceeded the 
OECD average in the digitalization rate for the first time in history. A transition 
to fiber-optic lines, satellite technology, and GSM networks was also an 
important development in this period. These drastic changes in the sector can be 
explained by reference to the government’s pro-business approach to economic 
change, which required effective communication services at the national and 
global levels. 
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These developments of course stimulated the telecom equipment sector 
and the most important technological advancements were realized during this 
period. As the chapter 4 shows, equipment companies experienced significant 
changes in production and employment capacity and began to export their 
products to other countries. In this period technology capacity in both case study 
companies showed upward trends and as defense-related projects were added to 
the agendas of both firms. 
Similar to this period’s dominant policymaking philosophy, privatization 
became the most widely prescribed solution to the problem of financing chronic 
balance-of-payment shortfalls, and publicly owned telecommunications firms 
have been subjected to this process as well. In this period, with the privatization 
of the case study companies, the major focus of local R&D departments became 
developing software to support related equipment imported from the parent 
companies. This tendency became more apparent with the global restructuring 
wave in the late 1990s, in which many equipment production companies 
transferred their production bases to low-income countries in order to stay 
competitive in the global telecommunications market. In addition to overcoming 
this crisis, the global telecom companies had to restructure their organizational 
bodies in order to adapt to the new info-communications technologies era. Thus, 
many global telecom companies from European and North American countries 
relocated some of their basic equipment R&D departments to India, China, and 
other Asian countries. 
In this period, with the increasing importance of the software component 
of telecommunications systems, deployment of more of the workforce on 
software development tasks in countries like Turkey with lesser technological 
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capacities became a common business practice. As the case study companies 
from the Turkish telecommunications equipment sector show, after the transition 
to the info-communications period, parent companies rearranged the structure of 
the R&D departments in their foreign firms. According to this new global 
division of R&D labor, Turkish companies became responsible for global 
support of the software components of the particular equipment in which parent 
firms specialized. This of course caused a radical change in the structures of the 
R&D departments and, except for some defense-related projects, technical 
personnel in these departments were focused only on software-related tasks. 
According to Munari, these radical changes in the R&D units consequently 
necessitated the creation of new high-profile missions to be promoted both 
internally and externally (Munari, 2002: 231). With a similar move, Firm A has 
recently announced the establishment of a Center for Excellence for Global 
Operations in Istanbul. According to this new strategy, the parent company will 
eliminate most of its nearly 100 service centers worldwide and the new center 
will be focused on providing services in product and technical support as well as 
integration and acceptance services globally (Nortel Press Release, 2006). With 
this move, the R&D unit’s task of service provision, which began following the 
privatization of the firm, has become the firm’s sole task globally. 
 
6.2 Discussion of Findings 
One of the main findings of the present research was that innovation 
capabilities in developing countries have actually deteriorated considerably over 
the past two decades due to the devaluation of the regulative powers of the 
nation-state. In the case of telecommunications, with the privatization of public 
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companies in the sector, multinational companies have gained superior power in 
designing their global policymaking strategies, and this too has diminished the 
capacity of nation-states’ policies to stimulate the development of local 
innovation capabilities. 
In the telecommunications sector, changes in technological structure, 
namely the transition from hardware-based to software-based communications, 
have contributed to the trajectory of the sector as well. As Fransman’s historical 
categorization suggests, the characteristics of innovation in the sector have 
evolved from major breakthroughs in hardware to incremental developments in 
software and microelectronics. Coupled with the vertical disintegration of sector 
firms, innovative production has become more readily available to small firms 
that supply new applications to global concerns. Thus, major global firms in the 
sector have obtained new technologies they need from both internal and external 
resources. Consequently, R&D units in global firms have become centers for 
solution provision for their clients. 
The creation of a suitable environment for an innovation system at the 
national level was another concern of the thesis. As chapter 5 revealed, several 
science and technology policy programs have been deployed since the 
establishment of the Turkish republic in 1923. However, political instability and 
chronic balance-of-payments problems have always been major obstacles to 
fully realizing those policies. In the first years of the republic, state-supported 
investments in basic industries and agricultural establishments accounted for the 
majority of new product developments. Until the end of the Second World War, 
rapid developments were achieved in the petrochemical, steel, mining, railway 
transportation, cement, and food industries. After leaving the Soviet bloc as a 
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strategic partner in the early 1950s, Turkey joined post-war capitalist 
institutions, critically affecting domestic economic development policies. For 
example, joining NATO to counter the Soviet threat has required allocating 
large portions of the annual budget to military expenses. Only recently have 
resources allocated from the state budget for education exceeded defense-related 
expenses. Similarly, other global institutions, such as the IMF and the OECD, 
have had major effects on macro-economic policies. For example, the transition 
to parliamentarian democracy brought more liberal-democratic policies in the 
early 1950s, but without a proper domestic base of industrial production, these 
changes caused the first major balance-of-payments crisis due to rapid growth in 
imported materials. In making such a rapid transition of the industrial base, very 
few resources were allocated to agriculture and therefore unbalanced regional 
development caused large amounts of in-migration flows into urban areas. 
Following the military coup in 1960, more domestic-market-oriented 
industrial development policies were followed. In line with the import 
substitution model of industrial development, the development of a national 
science and technology base became a priority in the attempt to establish a self-
sustaining economy. Through the protection of markets from foreign 
competition, important development goals were achieved in many industrial 
sectors such as the automotive, consumer goods, and construction industries. 
During this period, in addition to the establishment of new universities, with the 
application of long-term development plans and technology policies, important 
research institutions such as TUBITAK (The Scientific and Technological 
Research Council of Turkey) and ARLA (Telecommunications R&D Unit of 
PTT) were set up. As noted in chapter 5, starting in the late 1960s, successive 
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governments found themselves having to substantially alter or abandon plans 
and policies that had been created during the previous government’s regime. 
This behavior can be attributed to the political culture in Turkey, in which each 
government wants to leave a distinctive footprint on major economic and social 
policies. As the discussion shows, similar political behavior was followed with 
respect to science and technology policies, and the political will to apply these 
policies has remained weak until the present day.  
Formal innovation systems theory is still in an evolutionary stage. It is 
not possible to apply one-recipe-for-all approach to many countries, for various 
reasons. First of all, the current changes in the global business models of 
multinational companies leave very small room for the states to utilize the 
complete set of measures that NIS model requires. Secondly, in addition to the 
increasing influence of the multinational companies in the innovation-based 
sectors, formal agreements on global trade, labor, and services, such as GATT 
and EU, would limit the state’s options in the formation of an environment 
conducive to the development of a national innovation capacity in certain 
economic activities. Thirdly, the NIS model is still a normative model in its 
main characteristics and the construction of an “ideal institutional environment” 
for the development of innovative capacities in each country. As this research 
shows, due to the major differences in their current institutional setup, 
applications of the ideal type of the NIS model is hard to be realized even in the 
industrially advanced countries.        
For developing countries like Turkey, in order to apply NIS model it is 
necessary to identify strengths and weaknesses of the certain strategic sectors 
that would counterweight the detrimental effects of the current neo-liberal 
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policies. More emphasis on the support of small and flexible firms with high 
innovative capacity would be an alternative to growing influence of the large 
multinational companies. Even though this would work as a margin of the global 
innovation structure, it would make it possible for the developing countries to 
start a counter-movement against the dominant multinational firms without 
violating the international rules significantly. Measures like financial incentives, 
partnership requirements with universities and other research institutions for 
those small scale innovative firms and domestic input requirements can be given 
as major examples.  
Another contradiction of the NIS model is the applicability of the model 
in the developing country context in which the large numbers of population 
wanting to enter the employment market. With a limited amount of resources to 
invest in productive sectors with relatively lower levels of technological 
attainments might be more realistic in providing employment opportunities to 
masses with a decent wage level. However, an innovation-based industrial 
investment policy may increase the social dissonance by widening the income 
gap between social groups. This remains as an important problem for the formal 
NIS model to solve.    
Contrary to the claims of the mainstream economic thought, today we 
witness the growing intervention of the states in certain strategic ways to 
manipulate the economic activities. One of the most important of these 
intervention methods has been the provision of ubiquitous telecommunications 
infrastructure that makes possible for the masses to get connected to the global 
networks of knowledge flows with good quality services at affordable prices. In 
order to utilize these kinds of intervention methods, countries like Turkey should 
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construct a policy framework that assess the strategic sectors to be kept isolated 
from the short-term efficiency claims of the current neo-liberal policies. 
Moreover, these countries might benefit advantages of globalization by putting 
limitations on the privatization of strategic assets and designing alternative 
measures to counter-balance the adverse effects of the corporate-welfare politics 
against public-welfare politics. 
Another important implication of the increasing influence of the 
multinational companies in the global innovative sectors is the effects on the 
labor forces of the host country. As the case studies in Turkey have showed, 
after the privatization of two telecommunications companies, the basic R&D 
departments in the firms have been relocated to other countries and existing 
engineering workforce has become the service and maintenance providers for 
the existing systems that were developed elsewhere. This underutilization of the 
engineering workforce has negative consequences on the development of skilled 
workforce for the domestic innovation capacity in the long term.         
 
6.3 Further Study 
Further studies on the limitations of the formal NIS model and on its 
application to the developing countries should focus on the restructuring of the 
model by incorporating the successful examples from other developing countries 
which only to some extent followed the formal model.  With the inclusion of the 
existing systems of the other developing countries with different endowments 
and political systems—such as Cuba, China, post-socialist countries in Eastern 
Europe, particular countries from South America and even some countries from 
Africa—a more realistic model can be constructed with less flaws. 
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A more specific research for the further study might be directed to 
compare the changing trajectory of innovative capacities in different sectors in 
Turkey and in some of the post-socialist countries from Eastern Europe. Since, 
Turkey and most of those countries from Eastern Europe are the candidates for 
the European Union; a comparative study would reveal the effects of the 
increasing deregulation and openness of the domestic markets to foreign 
investments on the innovation capacities of the comparison countries that 
currently pursue the same goal, but come from historically different political 
systems. 
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APPENDIX 
 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
1. The major characteristics of R&D activities:  
•  Total share of R&D expenses in the annual turnover of the firm 
•  Process R&D vs. Product R&D 
•  R&D for local adaptation 
•  Comparison of R&D capacities with those in the foreign shareholder 
company 
•  Ratio of R&D personnel in total employment 
•  Limitations and opportunities of conducting R&D in Turkey 
•  Major use of R&D outcomes 
2. Major characteristics of technology transfers 
•  Production for consumer, intermediate or capital goods  
•  Major reasons for the transfer  
•  The way of transfer: Buy off, licensing, joint venture or through domestic 
subsidiaries  
•  Capacity development programs for workforce  
•  Supplier relations 
•  Production for domestic or foreign markets or both 
•  Level of complexity and the “age” of the transferred technology 
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